




ESSAYS ON REPORTING AND INFORMATION 











Dissertation Submitted to the  
Department of Accounting, Auditing and Law 
NHH Norwegian School of Economics 


























This dissertation would not be possible without the help and guidance of my supervisors. Lars Ivar 
Oppedal Berge, thank you for pushing me to be the best researcher I could be and for being heavily 
invested in me for these last four years—it has been a pleasure. I hope that the submission of this 
dissertation marks the start of a long academic partnership. Thank you to my co-supervisor, Bart 
Dierynck, for inviting me to Tilburg University. The months my family and I spent there were terrific 
both personally and professionally. I also want to thank you for all the time you have taken off your 
busy schedule to read and comment on my ongoing work throughout these years. To my second co-
supervisor, Ivar Kolstad, thank you for excellent advice on how to conduct my research and on how to 
manage a healthy work-life balance. 
Apart from my supervisors, I want to thank Anita Meidell for encouraging me to pursue a Ph.D. in 
the first place. Without you, I would probably be doing something entirely different today. I would also 
thank Tina Søreide for motivating and inspiring me to reach further with my academic efforts while 
living a busy family life. I am grateful to Trond Bjørnenak for letting me take ownership of topics and 
lectures in BUS401. Your mentorship throughout my Ph.D. has greatly developed me as a teacher and 
as a researcher. Kenneth Fjell, thank you for inviting me to supervise multiple theses with you, enabling 
me to learn from the best. My experience at the department would not have been the same without you. 
This acknowledgment would not be complete without also thanking Maren Dale-Raknes. I do not 
know of anyone who is as patient with me as you. You are always on top of things and are able to solve 
any problem that I might throw at you. I also like to thank the department heads: Finn Kinserdal and 
Katarina Kaarbøe. Your encouraging leadership style has inspired me to be ambitious in my academic 
pursuit. 
While there are numerous people I am grateful to, I only have space to mention a few. Thank you to 
the energetic Ph.D. group at the department. Especially, Kyrre Kjellevold, Dan-Richard G. Knudsen, 
Shrey Nishchal, Andreas Ulfsten, Kasper Vagle, Christian Andvik, Grete Helle, and Peter Edlund Frii. 




Arshad, Ceren F. Ay, and Katrine Nødtvedt for being great friends and co-writers. I have much enjoyed 
the time we have shared during the last few years. 
To my mother, father, sister, and brothers: thank you for supporting and believing in me. Because 
of you, I approach life with the attitude that “anything is possible”. I would also like to express my 
gratitude to my mother- and father-in-law for helping me focus on my academic efforts amid a global 
pandemic. Still, the main reason I have managed to remain a “happy Ph.D. researcher” is because of the 
most beautiful human being, Linn Mee W. Berge, whom I am lucky to call my wife. She has helped me 
keep calm and enjoy the Ph.D. experience. While in the Ph.D. program, our lives have changed quite 
significantly. We are now parents to two incredible children: Yuna Elén W. Berge and Elliot W. Berge. 
No words can express the joy and gratitude all of you have brought into my life during this Ph.D.  
Lastly, I want to thank God for the gift of life. He has directed my steps and has kept me throughout 
these years. Though life is a vapor, life in him is eternal. 
 
 
Joel W. Berge 










COMMENTS AND CONFERENCES 
All chapters in this Ph.D. dissertation benefitted from the feedback and comments from numerous 
people. The following is an overview of some of the individuals whose comments and feedback have 
improved the respective chapters.1 
Chapter I: I appreciate insightful comments from Lars Ivar Oppedal Berge (supervisor), Bart 
Dierynck (co-supervisor), Christoph Feichter (discussant at New Directions 2018, Brussels), Victor 
Maas (discussant at EAA 2019, Paphos), Eddy Cardinaels, Marcel van Rinsum, Stephan Kramer, 
William Messier, Aasmund Eilifsen, Robert Bloomfield, Mathias Ekström, Lars Jacob Tynes Pedersen, 
Thomas de Haan, Farah Arshad, Razvan Ghita, participants at the 2017 Limperg course in experiments, 
and other comments received during presentations at Tilburg University, Erasmus University, Vrij 
University, 11th Conference on New Directions in Management Accounting (EIASM), and 42nd EAA 
Annual Congress (Paphos, Cyprus). I would also like to thank members of the Economics Ethics and 
Law (EEL) and FAIR research group at NHH for guidance in developing this paper. 
Chapter II: We want to thank Erik Sørensen and Lars Ivar Oppedal Berge for their excellent input 
and supervision in all phases of this paper. We would also extend thanks to Thomas de Haan 
(discussant), Nina Serdarevic (discussant), Bertil Tungodden, Catalina Franco, Stefan Meissner, 
Hallgeir Sjåstad, Ola Sund, Helge Thorbjørnsen, and participants at the FIBE 2019 conference for 
comments and feedback on this paper. 
Chapter III: We appreciate helpful comments from Ivar Kolstad (co-supervisor), Eddy Cardinaels, 
Christoph Hörner, Wim van der Stede, Alexandra Van den Abbeele, Marcus Arnold, Lars Ivar Oppedal 
Berge, Bart Dierynck, and Lars Jacob Tynes Pedersen. We would also like to thank two anonymous 
reviews at the Hawaii Accounting Research Conference 2021, and participants at the Doctoral 
Colloquium at the 2019 EAA conference in Paphos, Cyprus, comments received during the FIBE 2020 
conference, and our Brown Bag seminar at Tilburg University and NHH. Thanks to George E. Newman 
                                                     





for providing experimental instructions used in “Tainted Altruism: When Doing Some Good Is 
Evaluated as Worse Than Doing No Good at All”. 
Chapter IV: I want to thank Dan Richard G. Knudsen and Andreas Ulfsten for their comments and 
excellent advice on conducting a structured literature review and for interesting discussions concerning 
digitalization in managerial decision-making settings. I would also like to thank Kenneth Fjell and Trond 
Bjørnenak for their input, and Lars Ivar Oppedal Berge for the idea to combine the extant literature with 





















General Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VI  
Chapter I Plausible Honesty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 01 
Chapter II Strategic Curiosity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 
Chapter III Doing Well While Doing Good  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 




1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
In this Ph.D. dissertation, I investigate issues concerning decision-facilitation from a behavioral 
perspective. Decision-facilitation is broadly defined as a process in which information is acquired, 
communicated, and used to improve decision-making (Demski & Feltham, 1976). In the following 
sections of this introduction, I describe the general research motivation for the dissertation, provide an 
overview of the chapters and how they are related, and end with a note on methodology. 
1.1.  General Motivation 
With the recent data explosion, firms are increasingly concerned with honing their capabilities to 
transform available data into actionable knowledge (Chen, Chiang, & Storey, 2012; Mikalef, Boura, 
Lekakos, & Krogstie, 2019). Academics and practitioners alike relate firms’ capabilities in extracting 
information from data to their competitive advantage and long-term profitability (KPMG, 2015; 
LaValle, Lesser, Shockley, Hopkins, & Kruschwitz, 2011). In response, firms increasingly delegate the 
responsibility for information acquisition and hire employees with expertise in transforming data into 
actionable information (e.g., data scientists) (Davenport & Patil, 2012). 
Although employees with expertise are more effective in acquiring valuable information, their 
interests often diverge from those who, in the end, use the information in decision-making (Ramanna, 
2015). Analysts, managers, and consultants often have interests in recommending a course of action that 
will benefit themselves and their business unit (Bentley, Bloomfield, Vidai, & Ferguson, 2019). For 
example, superiors might rely on project managers’ expert knowledge in selecting the best projects to 
invest in. However, project managers might have incentives to bias their reports in a self-serving manner. 
Another example is participative budgeting, where subordinates might choose to misreport actual cost 
predictions to receive slack benefits (Brüggen & Luft, 2011). 
Conflicts of interest are particularly problematic when the superiors’ cost of obtaining the 
information is prohibitively high (Demski & Sappington, 1987). In settings where the acquired 
information can be considered private, classical agency theory suggests that employees have “narrow 
self-interest” and will therefore not hesitate to act upon opportunities to serve their self-interest at the 





evidence from experimental research shows that people often have moral reservations for acting 
unethically (Blay, Douthit, & Fulmer, 2018; Evans, Hannan, Krishnan, & Moser, 2001; Gneezy, 
Kajackaite, & Sobel, 2018) and that contextual factors significantly affect decisions made under conflict 
of interest (Cardinaels, 2016; Shalvi, Gino, Barkan, & Ayal, 2015). 
In this dissertation, I present four chapters that offer new perspectives on the decision-facilitation 
process in firms, focusing on settings with conflict of interest. The first three chapters present three 
experimental studies. Chapters I and II explore how preparers strategically avoid and collect information 
to self-justify misreporting in settings with conflicting interests. Unlike the preceding chapters, Chapter 
III focuses on employees’ use of contextual information when deciding whether to behave 
opportunistically toward their employer. Chapter IV presents a comprehensive review of the extant 
experimental research literature concerned with decision-facilitation. This final chapter introduces a 
conceptual framework of the decision-facilitation process that encompasses three distinct phases: 
information acquisition, communication, and information usage. I use the framework to systematize the 
previous literature, identify gaps, and motivate suggestions for future research.  
The below figure provides an overview of the three phases of the decision-facilitating process and 
illustrates how the four chapters of this dissertation are related.  
 
FIGURE 1.—Thematic overview of the chapters in the dissertation 
1.2.  Overview of Chapters 
1.2.1 Chapter I 
In the first chapter, which is single-authored, I use a laboratory experiment to examine managers’ 





crucial aspect of managers’ reporting tasks, little experimental research exists on how reporting-
managers collect and process data when preparing reports (Haesebrouck, 2017; Luft, 2016). 
In the project-selection setting, superiors often rely on the recommendations of better-informed 
managers whose interests are misaligned with the superiors. Prior research finds that managers often 
feel morally compelled to report honestly and, therefore, tend to sacrifice private benefits to produce 
honest reports (Evans et al., 2001). However, project managers might self-justify recommending 
suboptimal projects by avoiding relevant information because the ignorance can be used to convince 
themselves that they would have reported otherwise if they fully knew the project was sub-optimal. 
In the experiment, participants are randomly assigned to the roles of project managers and superiors. 
The project managers’ task is to assess their project’s profitability and report to superiors whether 
implementing it is also in the firm’s best interest. I manipulate whether project managers have discretion 
in acquiring complete profitability information and whether obtaining this information requires both 
collecting and processing data. Among project managers who have to actively acquire information, I 
manipulate whether obtaining this information requires just clicking a button (high information 
accessibility) or analyzing a dataset (low information accessibility). 
Results from the experiment provide evidence that managers with discretion rarely avoid collecting 
data—even when obtaining the underlying information requires data processing. However, managers 
with discretion report significantly more opportunistically when obtaining information requires data 
processing. This increase is best explained by managers’ enhanced ability to engage in a process of 
cognitive maneuvering to avoid drawing unfavorable conclusions when processing data. Because 
accounting systems largely determine how readily available information is to its users, the main practical 
implication of this study is that improving internal accounting systems can serve as an indirect control 
against misreporting. 
1.2.2 Chapter II 
In the second chapter, co-authored with Ceren F. Ay and Katrine Nødtvedt, we investigate whether 
people use curiosity in a strategic manner to justify dishonest behavior. Specifically, we propose that 
individuals experiencing a want-should conflict will be motivated to acquire information that can serve 





ignorant (Dana, Weber, & Kuang, 2007; Golman, Hagmann, & Loewenstein, 2017), we propose that 
people also tend to acquire non-instrumental information for the sake of justifying their selfishness—
we call this behavior “strategic curiosity”.2 
To test our predictions, we conduct a dice-rolling game (Shalvi, Dana, Handgraaf, & De Dreu, 
2011). Participants roll a fair virtual dice and report the outcome of the first roll for monetary rewards -
with higher reported numbers resulting in higher payments. We vary whether people can collect non-
instrumental information and the content of the additional information. 
We pre-registered hypotheses stating that a demand for justifications arises when there is a conflict 
between reporting honestly and self-serving reporting. This demand for justifications will be greater the 
larger the perceived distance is between factual reality (e.g., rolling a ‘one’) and the reality one would 
prefer to report (‘six’). Therefore, people are more likely to acquire information that could reduce the 
perceived distance between the factual outcome and the wealth-maximizing outcome when this distance 
is large (e.g., rolling a one) compared to when there is less or no distance (e.g., rolling a five or six)—
and obtaining more information would increase dishonesty. 
Our main finding is that people tend to strategically collect non-instrumental information 
strategically but allowing people to be curious does not result in a higher level of dishonesty. We provide 
further evidence on our main results and show that people acquire additional information—not only to 
search for justifications—but also to distract themselves from moral conflict. Thus, our study provides 
insights that increase our understanding of the link between information and moral decisions in online 
settings. 
1.2.3 Chapter III 
The third chapter—co-authored with Farah M. Arshad—is concerned with how contextual information 
about the employer’s CSR initiatives is incorporated into employees’ decisions to act opportunistically 
toward their employer. A classical understanding of CSR is that firms have a social responsibility to 
sacrifice some of their profits in society’s interest (Benabou & Tirole, 2010; Sprinkle & Maines, 2010). 
                                                     
2 Because this phenomenon has not yet been documented, the writing of this paper is targeted toward general 
behavioral economics journals and the paper therefore has a different format and style than the other chapters that 





However, firms have recently started to rethink CSR from being about sacrificing profits to endeavors 
that could benefit both the society and the firm’s bottom-line (e.g., Porter & Kramer, 2011), i.e., win-
win CSR. Even though a large body of research has investigated the consequences of engaging in 
philanthropic CSR, comparable research on the win-win approach to CSR is non-existent. 
This chapter makes a unique contribution to the research by investigating whether the presence of a 
profit motive in CSR has adverse effects on employee opportunism. We pre-registered hypotheses that 
employees tend to use the presence of a profit motive in CSR to form self-serving beliefs about the 
employer (e.g., the employer only cares about the money) that help employees justify behaving 
opportunistically. 
We hired 1,500 high-quality US workers on Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) to work for a sole 
proprietorship. Depending on the treatment condition, workers received a message about one of three 
initiatives recently undertaken by the employer: marketing campaign, philanthropic CSR initiative, and 
win-win CSR initiative. While working, we measured employees’ propensity to act opportunistically. 
Although we observe substantial employee opportunism across all conditions, we find that 
engagements in either philanthropic or win-win CSR do not significantly affect employee opportunism. 
We do, however, find that engaging in CSR significantly influences employees’ perceptions of the 
employer and that engaging in win-win CSR adversely affects these perceptions compared to 
philanthropic CSR. Though employee-perceptions are correlated with employee opportunism, engaging 
in CSR seems to affect many perceptions that have offsetting effects on employee opportunism—likely 
resulting in insignificant treatment effects. Thus, this study shows that, although engaging in win-win 
CSR undermines the positive perceptions of engaging in CSR, its effect on employee opportunism 
depends on the relative strength of the perceptions affected by the initiative. 
1.2.1 Chapter IV 
The last chapter is single-authored and is a systematic and comprehensive literature review of the last 
20 years of experimental management accounting research on decision-facilitation. Despite being one 





that does not specify key tasks and responsibilities of the decision-facilitation process (e.g., Bromwich, 
2006; Demski & Feltham, 1976; Luft, 2016; Sprinkle, 2003).  
This chapter presents a conceptual framework based on the General Communication Model 
(Shannon, 1948) but modified to the decision-facilitating approach where relevance, measurement, and 
evaluation of information depend on the decision and the user of the information (Demski & Feltham, 
1976). The conceptual framework allows for a systematic review of the existing literature and the 
identification of important gaps in this literature. In addition, the chapter introduces new theoretical 
lenses that propose interesting and testable behavioral predictions that deviate from the baseline 
predictions of classical information economics. On this basis, Chapter IV provides suggestions for future 
experimental research—not by mere “gap-spotting”—but by drawing on trends in practice and recent 
insights from psychology and behavioral economics. 
1.3.  A Note on Methodology 
This dissertation uses the experimental method to investigate research questions. An experiment is a 
scientific investigation involving active and purposeful manipulation and measurement of independent 
variables and observing their effects on other dependent variables (Bloomfield, Nelson, & Soltes, 2016). 
In the following, I outline the rationale for focusing on and using the experimental method in this 
dissertation. 
1.3.1 The Rationale for Using Experiments 
The ultimate goal of positivistic research is to make causal claims that can inform theories that generalize 
beyond the specific context in which the data has been collected (Bloomfield et al., 2016; Floyd & List, 
2016). According to the philosophical approach of constructive empiricism, theories play an 
intermediate role in specifying the causal link between unobservable constructs that are semantically 
meaningful. Causal links are not directly observable, but effects leave empirical traces that enable 
researchers to infer the nature of the relationships between constructs through empirical investigation 
(Shadish & Sullivan, 2012). Different from scientific realism, constructive empiricism argues that theory 
can be accepted without believing that its constructs are real; it is enough to accept them as useful 





The primary strength of controlled experiments is the ability to support causal claims and inferences 
(Angrist & Pischke, 2009). Empirically, causal claims imply that there is a covariance between the cause 
and effect (if X then Y, if not X then not Y), the cause should appear before the effect (temporal 
precedence), and that there are no other alternative explanations for the observed effect (Cook & 
Campbell, 1979; Shadish & Sullivan, 2012). To this end, there are two features to experiments that are 
essential. First, experiments do not merely measure the covariance between variables of interest but 
purposefully introduce exogenous variation in the independent variable(s) before observing the effect(s) 
on the dependent variable (Bloomfield et al., 2016). This ensures temporal precedence. Second, 
experiments can support counterfactual arguments through randomization. By randomly assigning a 
sufficiently large number of subjects into either control or treatment groups, the groups are statistically 
identical in terms of observable and unobservable characteristics. Because there are no ex-ante 
differences between groups, differences observed after the treatment manipulation can be attributed to 
the manipulation. 
Another advantage of experiments is that they excel at studying micro-level phenomena such as 
human decision-making processes and behavior (van Pelt, 2019). Using archival or field data to assess 
the relationship between dependent and independent variables poses challenges as they may be 
contaminated by effects beyond the researcher’s control (Sprinkle, 2003). Controlled experiments help 
to overcome such limitations and allow researchers to examine questions that otherwise would go 
unexamined. 
1.3.2 Benefits of Experiments in the Dissertation 
The chapters in this dissertation benefit from controlled experiments as they allow for examining how 
individuals avoid, over-acquire, or use non-relevant information to excuse misreporting. Studying 
dishonesty in practice is particularly challenging as people rarely admit their dishonesty in an unbiased 
manner in surveys or interviews. Moreover, prior research suggests that individuals conduct a mental 
cost-benefit analysis between misreporting for higher monetary gains and maintaining a positive moral 
self-image (Cardinaels, 2016; Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008). Without using an experimental approach, 
it would be impossible to build theories that shed light on the micro-level processes that guide an 





making information more easily accessible might affect managers’ tendency to misreport to their 
superiors. In practice, observing managers’ decisions to avoid relevant information is extremely 
difficult. The researcher would have to know what information the manager should acquire and whether 
the manager did acquire it before reporting. The laboratory experiment makes it possible to control what 
information is relevant, randomly endow information to some while giving others the discretion to avoid 
the information, and to obtain precise measures on managers’ information acquisition.3 
1.3.3  A Note on Generalizability 
A common critique of experiments is that they often lack external validity, meaning that the 
experimental setting does not resemble the real world and, therefore, its findings cannot be generalized 
outside the experimental setting (mundane realism). However, the purpose of experiments is not to 
resemble real-world settings but to facilitate clean tests of theories to further develop the theories. Rather 
than basing the generalizability on how well the experimental setting resembles the real world, the 
theories are the basis of generalization across “actors and settings” (Swieringa & Weick, 1982, p. 57). 
To that end, the experimental events must be believed, attended to, and taken seriously by participants 
(experimental realism). 
In all the experiments in this dissertation, experimental realism is ensured by adequately 
incentivizing decisions relevant to the underlying theory. The experimental studies also abstain from 
using any form of explicit deception to ensure that instructions are believed and taken seriously by 







                                                     
3 Two of the three experiments in this dissertation were conducted online where complete control over the 
setting is not possible. We decided to not conduct the experiment in Chapter II in the laboratory because of the 
trade-off between internal and statistical validity favored a setting in which we could increase statistical power. 
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In this paper, I use an experiment to examine managers’ tendency to avoid information in a trust-based 
reporting-setting. Participants are randomly assigned to the roles of project managers and superiors 
(without rejection authority). The project managers’ task is to assess the profitability of their project and 
report to superiors whether implementing it is also in the firm’s best interest. I manipulate whether 
project managers have discretion in acquiring complete profitability information and whether obtaining 
this information requires both collecting and processing data. Results show that managers with 
discretion rarely avoid collecting data—even when obtaining the underlying information requires data 
processing. However, managers with discretion report significantly more opportunistically when 
obtaining information requires data processing. I find that spending insufficient time analyzing data, 
analytical abilities, or unawareness of misreporting cannot explain the increase in opportunistic 
reporting. Instead, the increase is best explained by managers’ enhanced ability to engage in a process 
of cognitive maneuvering to avoid drawing unfavorable conclusions when processing data. The main 
practical implication of this study is that improving internal accounting systems can serve as an indirect 
control against misreporting. 
Keywords: Information Avoidance; Accounting Systems; Opportunistic Reporting; Moral Identity                                                                                                                 




1. INTRODUCTION  
A key challenge for firms is to make sense of a broad range of data and apply that knowledge to business 
planning, forecasting, and decision support (PWC, 2016). In a digital world with abundant data access, 
firms increasingly rely on managers with expertise in transforming a broad set of data into decision-
relevant information (Mohr & Hürtgen, 2018). Despite being effective at acquiring information, 
reporting-managers often have diverging interests from their superiors. For instance, managers can 
create budgetary slack by biasing budget proposals (e.g., Antle & Eppen, 1985) or recommend 
suboptimal courses of action to benefit themselves (e.g., Aghion & Tirole, 1997).   
Prior research finds that managers with misaligned interests often feel morally compelled to report 
honestly and tend to sacrifice private benefits to produce honest reports (e.g. Evans, Hannan, Krishnan, 
& Moser, 2001). However, this line of research often assumes that managers possess complete 
information such that their only decision is whether to report truthfully (Luft, 2016). Recently, 
Haesebrouck (2017) examines whether the process of acquiring information can influence managers’ 
reporting choices and finds that managers who must make an effort to obtain information report more 
opportunistically when the reporting context does not trigger honesty concerns. Though obtaining 
information can be effortful, the recent data explosion in firms also require managers to discern what 
information is relevant for various decisions and decide what information to acquire (Deloitte, 2018b). 
In settings with misaligned interests, managers can exploit this newfound discretion to strategically 
avoid information that provides them with a moral wiggle room that can justify reporting in line with 
their self-interest (Dana, Weber, & Kuang, 2007; Grossman & van der Weele, 2017).  
In this paper, I use an experiment to investigate managers’ tendency to avoid relevant information 
that varies in accessibility in a managerial reporting setting.1 Distinguishing aspects of the managerial 
reporting settings are that they are often based on trust (Douthit & Majerczyk, 2019) and reports 
typically contain factual assertions (Rankin, Schwartz, & Young, 2008). These aspects are important as 
trust-based settings make people more hesitant to strategically avoid information (van der Weele, Kulisa, 
Kosfeld, & Friebel, 2014) and factual assertions trigger honesty concerns (Haesebrouck, 2017). Indeed, 
                                                     





Church, Hannan, and Kuang (2014) find that opportunistic reporting does not differ between participants 
who can choose whether to collect information and participants endowed with information in a 
managerial reporting setting. However, information avoidance is not limited to instances where 
managers decide to not even bother collecting information that is easily accessible but extends to 
situations where avoid information by choosing not to draw unfavorable conclusions from the data they 
collect (Golman, Hagmann, & Loewenstein, 2017).  
The distinction between ways to avoid information is important in the managerial reporting context 
for the following reasons: First, physically avoiding data is a salient act of opportunism in the managerial 
reporting context. Because managers are entrusted to report information in good faith (Douthit & 
Majerczyk, 2019), choosing to blatantly avoid collecting relevant information might defeat the purpose 
of self-justifying reporting opportunistically. The trust-setting can therefore reduce the viability of using 
blatant ignorance as a justification to behave selfishly (van der Weele, Kulisa, Kosfeld, & Friebel, 2014). 
In contrast, failing to draw unfavorable conclusions when processing collected data is a less salient act 
of opportunism particularly because drawing self-serving conclusions could be justified as an “honest 
mistake”, enabling managers to appear (plausibly) honest to themselves while reporting self-servingly 
(Shalvi, Gino, Barkan, & Ayal, 2015).  
Second, accounting systems excel at easing the processing of data (e.g., using API to integrate 
different types of data) but are often unable to ensure that managers collect all relevant data (Bloom, 
Garicano, Sadun, & Van Reenen, 2014),2 particularly if the manager has expertise in discerning what 
data is relevant for various decisions (Demski & Sappington, 1987). Monitoring whether expert 
managers have attended to all relevant information is challenging for non-expert superiors—unless data 
relevance has been pre-specified (Lewis & Sappington, 1993; Labro, Lang, & Omartian, 2019). Easing 
the processing of data limits managers’ ability to cognitively maneuver away from drawing unfavorable 
conclusions when processing data because the data’s informational content becomes easier to infer, 
thereby making it harder to reasonably defend self-serving conclusions (Kunda, 1990; Peysakhovich & 
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Karmarkar, 2016). Accounting systems can therefore influence opportunistic reporting by reducing 
managers’ ability to avoid drawing unfavorable conclusions from the data they collect.      
I conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate managers’ tendency to avoid private information to 
justify reporting self-servingly. The experimental task is a project-selection decision (Aghion & Tirole, 
1997) based on Dana et al. (2007). Participants are randomly assigned to the roles of project managers 
and superiors. The project managers’ task is to assess the profitability of a potential project and report 
to the superior whether implementing the project is the best option for their firm. However, superiors 
are passive receivers of the reports, and their payment is thus directly affected by the project managers’ 
reporting choices.3 Though all project managers have incentives to report to implement their projects, 
not all projects are optimal to implement for the firm.  
In this setting, I manipulate whether project managers are endowed with or have to actively acquire 
information about whether implementing the project is optimal for the firm. Among project managers 
who have to actively acquire information, I manipulate whether obtaining this information requires just 
clicking a button (high information accessibility) or analyzing a dataset (low information accessibility). 
However, project managers can ignore this information without the superiors knowing about it (Lewis 
& Sappington, 1993). If they choose to collect data, the project managers determine how much time to 
spend on analyzing the data. 
Consistent with my predictions, managers with discretion in acquiring information rarely physically 
avoid information—even when obtaining the information requires an effortful analysis of data. Hence, 
when information is easily accessible, managers with discretion report to implement the sub-optimal 
project on a similar level as those without discretion. However, when obtaining information requires 
effortful analysis, managers with discretion are about 30 percent more likely to report to implement sub-
optimal projects than those without discretion. 
Supplementary analyses provide evidence consistent with the notion that project managers treat 
honesty as a moral constraint on their reporting decisions. These results suggest that managers report 
more self-servingly when information is less accessible (requiring analysis of data) because they can 
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circumvent internalized moral constraints that compel them to report honestly. Additional analyses show 
that analytical abilities, level of comprehension, or effort exerted cannot explain the observed increase 
in opportunistic reporting. Instead, results show that, despite spending significant time analyzing data, 
project managers in the low-accessibility condition tend to avoid free project information ex-post. 
Furthermore, results show an asymmetric treatment effect depending on project managers’ 
internalization of moral values (Aquino & Reed, 2002). Together, supplementary analyses seem to 
suggest that project managers in the low-accessibility condition tend to engage in a process of cognitive 
maneuvering to avoid drawing conclusions that morally compel them to report against their self-interest. 
This study makes some key contributions to the research literature. First, the study fills an important 
gap in the experimental management accounting research (Luft, 2016) by investigating how diverging 
interests affect private data collection and data processing. While Church et al. (2014) study how conflict 
of interest can lead employees not to collect data, this is the first to study how misalignment of interests 
can affect data collection and processing. Studying data processing is essential because accounting 
systems can facilitate easier data processing (e.g., integrating data sources) but can often not ensure that 
all relevant data has been collected (especially when determining relevance is difficult to pre-define).  
Second, this study contributes to research concerned with understanding the determinants of honest 
reporting in accounting. While previous research in accounting attributes honest reporting behavior to 
preferences for honesty (Douthit & Majerczyk, 2019; Evans et al., 2001; Rankin et al., 2008), the 
findings in this study suggest that managers tend to treat morality as a constraint to be circumvented. 
Rabin (1995) shows that treating morality as a constraint rather than a preference has implications for 
how people acquire information. When reporting honesty is a preference, managers will gather relevant 
information to ensure that their reports are factually true. When honesty mainly serves as a constraint, 
managers will avoid information that they suspect would be unfavorable to circumvent honesty 
constraints, helping them report in line with their self-interest. Thus, this study sheds new light on the 
determinants of honest reporting. 
Third, this study, to the best of my knowledge, is the first to experimentally investigate how 
improvements in information technology affect reporting honesty in an agency setting. Although 





al., 2014; Garicano, 2000; Labro et al., 2019), no research has examined its effects on reporting behavior. 
Though advances in information technology are often framed in terms of efficiency gains (i.e., reduce 
information acquisition costs), I provide evidence that improved information accessibility induces 
reporting honesty in managers responsible for acquiring information. Hence, this study identifies a 
previously hidden cost related to under-investment in internal accounting systems.  
Overall, this paper investigates an important—but understudied—aspect of managers’ reporting 
tasks, namely the information acquisition phase (Berge, 2020). For many, acquiring information is a 
tedious process because data is siloed in legacy IT-systems, and the available tools are ineffective in 
handling different types of data (Deloitte, 2018a). New tools such as automation, application 
programming interfaces (APIs), and machine learning offer to improve the efficiency in which managers 
can acquire information (Deloitte, 2018b). As the sophistication of these technologies increases, 
managers can obtain information, which they previously could only obtain through manual analysis, by 
“the click of a button” (Deloitte, 2018a; Liu, 2018). Thus, the main implication of this study is that 
improving internal accounting systems may serve as a control to prevent misreporting and possibly other 
types of fraud. As such, this study suggests that auditors should consider the digital sophistication of the 
internal accounting system as a part of their risk-assessment of controls designed to prevent fraud (e.g., 
PCAOB, 2010).  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explains the setting and provides the 
theoretical background from which I develop the hypotheses. In Section 3, I explain the experimental 
design and procedures. Section 4 contains the results with supplementary analyses. Finally, I provide a 
discussion with suggestions for future research in Section 5.  
2. SETTING AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
2.1.  Agency Setting and Predictions 
Project management is an important managerial task because it often involves significant investments 
and difficult trade-offs. The management within an organization often sets a policy on how projects are 
selected and implemented, and the projects are managed based on their direct and indirect contributions 





problematic agency situation. While management seeks to invest in the project that generates the most 
profit for the firm, management is often reliant on the input of better-informed project managers to make 
an informed choice (Balakrishnan, 1991). In cases where such information is difficult to acquire, firms 
usually delegate responsibility to acquire information to individuals who have expertise in making sense 
of data (Demski & Sappington, 1987) and report their findings to inform management’s project-selection 
decisions.  
In delegating the acquisition of information, management is exposed to distinct agency problems. 
First, the principal often cannot tell whether the agent is sufficiently informed (Lewis & Sappington, 
1993). Thus, the principal must deal with problems associated with agents not expending effort on 
acquiring information (hidden action). Second, the agent might recommend a project alternative that is 
sub-optimal for the principal because that project generates higher private benefits for the agent (Aghion 
& Tirole, 1997). Because of information asymmetry, agents may misreport private information to benefit 
themselves at the firm’s expense. Collectively, the agent often has an incentive to save the cost of 
acquiring information (Lewis & Sappington, 1993). Even if the information is acquired, agents may 
have an incentive to manipulate the information to reap information rents (Aghion & Tirole, 1997). 
There are two types of information asymmetry in this setting (Williamson, 2002). On the one hand, 
information asymmetry can stem from differences in direct costs of acquiring information (e.g., a 
manager that is closer to operations such that the cost of acquiring specific information is lower than for 
the principal). For this type of asymmetry, the principal might pre-specify what information should be 
attended to, making it possible for the principal to ex-post monitor whether agents have reported 
truthfully by checking the data themselves (e.g., internal audit). On the other hand, information 
asymmetry can originate from a difference in expertise in acquiring information, i.e., differences in 
indirect costs of acquiring information (Demski & Sappington, 1987).4  For this type of asymmetry, the 
principal is less able to pre-specify what information should be attended to (determining relevance is a 
part of the expertise) and is therefore less able to monitor the agent ex-post. 
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The distinction is important because of the distinct effect of information and communication 
technologies on the delegation of acquiring information (Bloom et al., 2014). When information 
asymmetry stems from direct acquisition costs and the information is not costly to communicate, 
advances in information technologies will reduce the cost advantage of agents, which leads to less 
delegation and more centralized decision-making (Garicano, 2000). When the source of information 
asymmetry is differences in the indirect cost of obtaining expertise, improvements in technologies will 
primarily reduce the cost of acquisition for managers, leading to more delegation of authority (Bloom 
et al., 2014).5 
The project selection setting has clear baseline agency predictions. Assuming that agents optimize 
their narrow self-interest, agency theory predicts that managers would (i) only acquire private 
information when the expected instrumental value outweighs the acquisition cost and (ii) misreport 
private information when the private benefit is greater than the expected penalty. As such, a body of 
literature investigates how principals can induce agents to both acquire and report information in a 
truthful manner by the use of formal contracts, incentive schemes, monitoring, hurdles, or audits (e.g., 
Antle & Eppen, 1985; Balakrishnan, 1991; Lambert, 2007; Shin, 2008). The general finding from this 
literature is that writing contracts that effectively induce agents to both acquire and report truthfully is 
particularly difficult (Balakrishnan, 1991; Shin, 2008) and not especially widespread in project-selection 
settings (Brüggen & Luft, 2016; Haka, 2007).    
2.2.  Hypothesis Development 
While traditional agency theory assumes narrow self-interest, behavioral research suggests that 
managers are sensitive to moral issues in agency relationships (Evans et al., 2001; Hobson, Mellon, & 
Stevens, 2011). One common view is that moral sensitivity can be incorporated into the agency 
framework by including preferences for morality in managers’ utility function (e.g., Stevens & 
Thevaranjan, 2010). Another view suggests that people’s moral dispositions come from a set of 
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managers’ opportunistic reporting behavior. I argue that making it easier for project managers to acquire 
information induces more honest reporting for managers with expertise in acquiring information. For non-experts, 
improvements in information technology would likely result in a loss of private information because the superiors’ 





internalized constraints on their real goal of pursuing self-interest (Rabin, 1995). The distinction in views 
is important because people tend to seek preferences and circumvent constraints. Rabin (1995) suggests 
that, when morality is treated as a constraint rather than a preference, people will actively seek to 
circumvent internal moral constraints by selectively and self-servingly avoid information. Thus, if 
managers consider honesty as a moral constraint on their reporting decisions, they might selectively 
avoid information that might morally compel them to report against their self-interest.  
Research on information avoidance finds that individuals tend to use ignorance as an excuse to pursue 
their self-interest when these choices could potentially have negative consequences on others (e.g., 
Grossman, 2014). By remaining ignorant of the potential negative consequences of the self-interested 
choice, people can maintain the belief that they would have acted differently if they were certain about 
potential negative consequences. Therefore, people can use self-inflicted ignorance as an excuse because 
that allows for attributing selfish behavior to ignorance rather than a breach of moral integrity (Grossman 
& van der Weele, 2017).  
The experiment of Dana et al. (2007) demonstrates the effect of willful ignorance on decision-making 
in a social dilemma. Similar to a dictator game, subjects are randomly matched together, and Player A 
(dictator) can choose between two options that directly affect the payment of Player B. Although one 
option clearly maximizes Player A’s payment, the alternative option leads to a fairer outcome and 
maximizes their total welfare. In this setting, Player A is either endowed with the information about how 
the different options affect Player B, or Player A has to click a button to obtain this information. Results 
show that, even though the resulting outcomes—and Player A’s ability to implement those outcomes—
are identical, providing Player A with the opportunity to ignore this information significantly reduced 
the frequency in which they choose the option that maximized the total welfare.  
Information avoidance, however, is not limited to avoiding collecting a piece of costless information, 
i.e., physical avoidance (Golman et al., 2017). Another way people can avoid information is to avoid 
drawing conclusions they dislike when analyzing data. Thus, this type of information avoidance can 
occur even when people have collected and attended to the relevant data. Yet, to avoid information while 
processing data requires that people can reasonably support drawing alternative conclusions from the 





beliefs, alternative conclusions must be somewhat plausible. If the informational content is immediately 
obvious and clear when attending to data, people are somewhat unable to cognitively maneuver away 
from that information. In that case, people would have to physically avoid collecting the data to remain 
ignorant of its content.   
Whereas physical information avoidance is a salient act of opportunism in the managerial reporting 
setting (i.e., choosing not to collect relevant data), choosing to avoid drawing the most logical 
conclusions is a less salient act. On the one hand, drawing an alternative self-serving conclusion could 
be the result of an unconscious bias in the processing of data (Hales, 2007; Kunda, 1990), making the 
act an “honest mistake”.6 On the other hand, even if managers are more intentional in avoiding 
unfavorable conclusions, the fact that they collected and attended to the data enables them to better 
maintain an honest self-appearance (Bodner & Prelec, 2003; Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008). 
Furthermore, drawing alternative conclusions can also provide a justification for reporting selfishly even 
though managers might not fully convince themselves as long as they can argue that reaching a self-
serving conclusion “could have been an honest mistake” (Shalvi, Dana, Handgraaf, & De Dreu, 2011; 
Shalvi et al., 2015).7 
While physical information avoidance can serve as an excuse for selfish behavior in dictator games 
(Dana et al., 2007), the effectiveness of such ignorance is significantly reduced in settings rich with 
moral cues. Van der Weele et al. (2014) provide experimental evidence that avoiding information to 
excuse self-interested behavior is rare in a setting built on trust (only 2 out of 256 participants choose to 
remain ignorant) and therefore find no treatment effect on selfish behavior. Many accounting researchers 
argue that the managerial reporting context is built on trust (Church et al., 2014; Douthit & Majerczyk, 
2019; Evans et al., 2001). In particular, reporting managers are often entrusted with the reporting task 
where the firm trusts the manager to report in good faith instead of relying on formal controls to induce 
truthful reporting (e.g., Church et al., 2019). Unlike dictators’ decisions to allocate resources, managers’ 
reporting decisions often contain factual assertions that could be congruent or incongruent with private 
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information (Rankin et al., 2008). These factual assertions add another moral dimension to the decision, 
where managers must choose between reporting truthfully or not (Douthit & Stevens, 2015; Rankin et 
al., 2008).  
 Considering the managerial reporting context, I posit that physical avoidance of relevant project data 
is rare and does not morally exonerate managers to report self-servingly. This is because physical 
avoidance is a salient act of opportunism. However, I conjecture that managers are less hesitant to draw 
self-serving conclusions to provide themselves with plausible excuses for reporting self-servingly. 
Because of the reluctance to physically avoid information, I argue that internal accounting systems play 
an important role in mitigating self-serving reporting from managers responsible for acquiring 
information. That is, when accounting systems are well-structured and user-friendly, managers can more 
easily infer informational content from the data they collect, thereby reducing their ability to self-justify 
drawing alternative self-serving information from the data. By contrast, when accounting systems are 
disintegrated and difficult to use, managers have to process the data to infer its informational content, 
which provides wiggle room for drawing self-serving conclusions from the data—even though the data 
is obtained and attended to. This discussion leads to the following proposition and hypotheses:8  
Proposition: Managers with discretion in acquiring information rarely choose to physically avoid 
collecting relevant project data before reporting 
H1: Managers with discretion in acquiring information report as self-servingly as managers without 
discretion when acquiring information is easy (highly accessible information).  
H2: Managers with discretion in acquiring information report more self-servingly when acquiring 
information requires processing data to infer its informational content (low information accessibility) 
compared to when acquiring information is easy (high information accessibility). 
3. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
3.1.  Experimental Task  
The experimental task is a contextualized version of the “moral wiggle room” game used in previous 
research (Dana et al., 2007; van der Weele, 2013). The experiment is programmed using the oTree-
                                                     





software (Chen, Schonger, & Wickens, 2016). Participants are randomly allocated to the role of either 
a project manager or a superior. The project managers’ task is to assess a potential project’s profitability 
and report to the superior whether implementing the project is the best option for the firm. Project 
managers choose between two pre-filled reports: ‘Report A’ (implement) recommends implementing 
the proposed project and states that it is the best option for the firm. ‘Report B’ (reject) recommends 
rejecting the proposed project and states that it is not the best option for the firm. 
Superiors, however, are passive receivers of the reports, and their payment, therefore, is directly 
affected by the project managers’ reporting decisions. The superiors cannot know whether a project 
manager has acquired information, or whether the project manager has misreported. 9 Unbeknownst to 
the superior, implementing a project always yields the highest payment for project managers. Project 
managers know that their project can either be optimal or sub-optimal to implement for the firm.10  
Project managers learn whether their project is optimal or sub-optimal by looking at a number 
displayed on their screens. If the number = 1, implementing the project is optimal and in the interest of 
both the superior and the project manager. If the number = 0, implementing the project is sub-optimal 
for the firm but still in the project manager’s interest. When interests are misaligned, project managers 
have an incentive to falsely report that the project is optimal to implement, i.e., false-positive report. 
However, the project managers can also mistakenly recommend rejecting an optimal project, i.e., false-
negative report. Although both false-positive and false-negative reports misrepresent information, 
project managers only have an incentive to submit false-positive reports (i.e., implementing a sub-
optimal project). Figure 1 shows the incentive structure of the experimental task: 
 
—INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE— 
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choice of the superior is to “rubber-stamp” the projects proposed by better informed subordinates (p. 2). 
Furthermore, taking away the possibility to reject proposals allows for a clean investigation of honesty concerns 
without strategic considerations (e.g., Douthit & Stevens, 2015).  
10 Project managers only know that their project could be either optimal or sub-optimal. However, the actual 





3.2.  Experimental Manipulations 
I manipulate whether project managers have discretion in information acquisition. Nested in the 
discretion conditions, I manipulate whether obtaining the information is easy (highly accessible 
information) or requires project managers to process a dataset (low information accessibility).  
In the no-discretion condition, the number that reveals whether the project is optimal (“1”) or sub-
optimal (“0”) is openly displayed on the screens of project managers. Because the number is highly 
visible, project managers are unable to avoid this information before reporting.  
In the high-accessibility condition, the number is ‘hidden’ in a 1×1 matrix. If project managers want 
to obtain the information, they must click and hold a button to reveal the hidden number. By clicking 
the button, project managers immediately know whether implementing the project would be optimal or 
sub-optimal for the firm.  
In the low-accessibility condition, the number is ‘hidden’ in a 4×5 matrix. If project managers want 
to obtain the information, they must click and hold a button to reveal 20 integers that add up to either 
zero or one. The sum of the integers reveals whether the project is optimal or sub-optimal to implement. 
To minimize the risk of calculation errors, the matrix only contains integers ranging from -2 to +2.11 
Thus, all project managers—regardless of their calculations skills—would be able to arrive at the correct 
sum if they spend enough time checking their calculations (i.e., counting carefully).   
In both discretion conditions, project managers privately choose whether to look at their matrix or 
not. If they choose to look, they are free to determine how many seconds they want to keep the matrix 
open. There is no time limit, and managers can close and reopen the matrix as many times as they would 
like.12 Figure 2 is a visual representation of the experimental conditions.  
—INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE— 
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both click the “push to reveal number(s)” button and have the mouse hovering over the button to see the content 





3.3.  Design Choices 
There are three important aspects of the design to discuss. First, the payoff matrix is such that the 
instrumental value of additional information is zero for project managers with narrow self-interest. 
Regardless of the number being “1” or “0”, choosing ‘Report A’ always maximizes the project 
manager’s payment. Hence, project managers who choose to acquire this information privately cannot 
be motivated by financial self-interest. 
Second, the optimal behavior from the superiors’ point of view is their project managers both acquire 
and report information in a truthful manner. Specifically, the total welfare is maximized when reports 
are congruent with private information: If number = 0, ‘Report A’ yields a total of 150 (150 + 0), which 
is less than ‘Report B’ (180 = 90 + 90). If number = 1, ‘Report A’ yields a total of 240 (150 + 90) which 
is more than ‘Report B’ (100 = 90 + 10). This payoff structure makes it clear that project managers are 
expected to both acquire and report in good faith as this maximizes the firm’s profit.  
Third, project managers report to participant-superiors instead of hypothetical superiors. This design 
choice reflects the project-selection setting where both superiors and project managers are affected by 
implementing projects. The division of participants into managers and superiors entails an introduction 
of a hierarchy, which is an important contextual feature of the managerial reporting context (Douthit & 
Majerczyk, 2019). Although this design choice introduces concerns about equity and fairness in 
participants’ reporting decisions (Rankin et al., 2008), it enables a comparison between behavior in the 
managerial reporting context and other non-contextualized studies that examine the effect of information 
avoidance (e.g., Dana et al., 2007; van der Weele, 2013).  
3.4.  Participants and Procedure 
One hundred and seventy-five business students from a European business school were recruited to 
participate in the experiment.13 This allows for a comparable number of subjects in each condition (about 
35) as in other studies on information avoidance (e.g., Dana et al., 2007; Grossman, 2014).14  The 
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experiment was conducted in a laboratory where each participant was surrounded by solid partitions that 
prevented them from seeing each other’s screens.  
Each experimental session consists of three stages. In the first stage, all participants practiced solving 
matrices with hidden integers by clicking a button to ‘open’ them and report the correct sum.15 In the 
second stage, participants were randomly allocated to either the role of superior or project manager. 
Before the reporting task, project managers read instructions and finished a comprehension test before 
reporting.16 Meanwhile, superiors worked on an unrelated task (see Section 4.3.1). In the third stage, 
project managers filled out the Moral Identity Scale (MIS) developed in Aquino & Reed (2002). In this 
questionnaire, the participants were prompted to consider the attributes of being fair, generous, and kind 
and then asked to indicate agreement or disagreement with statements about the importance of those 
attributes to their sense of self on a six-point Likert scale.17 Before exiting the experiment, project 
managers had the option to learn whether their reporting choices during the experiment led to a sub-
optimal or optimal outcome for the firm by clicking a button. Superiors had no such option to ex-post 
infer the truthfulness of the project managers’ reports.18 Overall, the experiment lasted about 45 minutes, 
and the total average payout was 246 NOK (about $30) for superiors and 177 NOK (about $22) for 
project managers.19  
4. RESULTS  
4.1.  Descriptive Statistics  
The main dependent variable is false_positive, which is a dummy variable for whether a project manager 
reports to implement a sub-optimal project. The false_positive dummy takes the value of zero when a 
                                                     
15 All participants practiced with the same three matrices, i.e., 2×2, 5×5, and 1×1. All matrices contained 
integers ranging from -2 to +2. To optimize learning, participants receive immediate feedback after submitting 
their answers. The software recorded both milliseconds participants spent looking at the matrix and the number of 
mistakes they made while practicing. 
16 The comprehension test consisted of four questions with multiple answer-options. Participants received 
immediate feedback when they submitted their answers. A counter kept record of how many mistakes participants 
made on the comprehension test. This enabled me to test whether participants’ comprehension level explains 
behavior in the experiment (see Section 4.3.1). 
17 This study follows Aquino and Reed (2002) in excluding one problematic item from the scale: “I often buy 
products that communicate the fact that I have these characteristics”.  
18 Superiors only know the aggregate profit they earn from all projects and can therefore not infer whether a 
report is untruthful. 
19 Project managers only know how their reporting choices affect the payoff for themselves and the superior. 





project manager reports to reject a sub-optimal project or to implement an optimal project. In contrast, 
the dummy variable false_negative indicates whether the project manager mistakenly reports to reject 
an optimal project. Other important measures are: ex-ante ignore, which is a dummy variable that 
indicates whether a project manager opened a matrix with hidden integers before reporting, and ex-post 
ignore, which is a dummy variable that indicates whether a project manager opted to learn whether 
his/her report led to an optimal or sub-optimal outcome for their firm after the experiment was done.  
Table A provides the descriptive statistics for key variables across experimental conditions for all 
project managers. The table shows that experimental groups are well-balanced, and idiosyncratic 
differences are evenly distributed across conditions (for all measures, p > 0.4). Despite random 
allocation, there are relatively more males in the low-accessibility condition (one-sided t-test, p = 0.067). 
Prior studies suggest that females are less likely to behave dishonestly (e.g., Ezquerra, Kolev, & 
Rodriguez-Lara, 2018). I therefore control for gender effects in further analyses. There are no significant 
differences in MIS scores with respect to internalization and symbolization scores (Kruskal-Wallis test: 
p = 0.47 and p = 0.14, respectively).20 
—INSERT TABLE A ABOUT HERE— 
4.2.  Hypotheses Tests 
The proposition provided in Section 2.2 states that managers rarely choose to physically avoid collecting 
relevant data before reporting. The frequency in which project managers choose not to collect 
information before reporting supports this conjecture. Only 4.3% in the high accessibility condition and 
2% in the low accessibility condition choose to physically avoid information before reporting. Compared 
to non-contextualized studies with similar trade-offs, Dana et al. (2007) find that 50% of subjects avoid 
collecting costless information. Grossman & van der Weele (2013) report that 60% of subjects avoid 
information, and Grossman (2014) finds that 45% avoid information.21 The findings in this study are 
more comparable to the results reported in van der Weele et al. (2014), where 2% of subjects avoided 
                                                     
20 All firms consist of one superior and three project managers reporting on different projects, except one that 
only had two project managers. Though the firm size is larger than one project manager and superior, project 
managers are not aware of each other, do not interact, and cannot influence each other’s payment. The focus on 
project managers’ behavior necessitated that I prioritized observations of project managers. 





information. Unlike the other studies, the experiment in van der Weele et al. (2014) is set in a reciprocal 
context based on the trust game (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995). Thus, my findings support the 
proposition that physical information avoidance is rare in the managerial reporting context.   
To test my hypotheses, I conduct logistic regressions with false_negative as the dependent variable 
indicating whether project managers report to implement sub-optimal projects. None of the project 
managers reported to reject an optimal project (false-negative report). Table B shows the results of three 
regression analyses. Model 1 includes all managers, while Model 2 focuses on project managers with 
misaligned interests where their projects are sub-optimal to implement for the firm. Model 3 extends 
Model 2 by including additional control variables.  
—INSERT TABLE B ABOUT HERE— 
Consistent with H1, the analyses reveal no difference in opportunistic reporting (i.e., false_positive) 
between project managers with discretion and project managers without discretion when obtaining 
information is easy (high accessibility). Considering that few physically avoided information before 
reporting (ex-ante ignore), this supports my conjecture that physical avoidance does not morally 
exonerate managers to report self-servingly in the managerial reporting context. Thus, I find support for 
H1. 
Consistent with H2, project managers with discretion over less accessible information (i.e., 4×5 
matrix) are significantly more likely to report to implement sub-optimal projects (false positive) 
compared to managers without discretion and managers with discretion over highly accessible 
information  (i.e., 1×1 matrix).  Indeed, the most comprehensive model (Model 3) shows that project 
managers with discretion over less accessible information are about 30 percentage points more likely to 
implement sub-optimal projects than those with no discretion (dy/dx = 0.332, p = 0.01). Thus, I find 
support for H2.  
Although discretion to avoid information before reporting does not affect reporting opportunism, 
Model 3 shows that those who submit false-positive reports also tend to avoid information ex-post (see 






4.3.  Supplementary Analyses 
There are several possible channels through which lower information accessibility could increase 
opportunistic reporting (false positive report). For instance, the increase could result from project 
managers making more mistakes when summing up the 4×5 matrix, or, the project managers might have 
only briefly looked at the matrix and decided to report without bothering to analyze the data adequately. 
Moreover, project managers could be subject to an unconscious self-serving bias when analyzing the 
4×5 matrix. In the following, I separately examine these alternative explanations before investigating 
the role of project managers’ moral identity in explaining the results.  
4.3.1 Calculation Errors 
One potential confound is that project managers in the low-accessibility condition misreport more 
because of calculation errors. In the process of summing up the twenty integers in the 4×5 matrix, project 
managers can make calculation errors that lead to them reaching incorrect conclusions about their 
project.  
To investigate the role of calculation errors, I benchmark project managers in this condition to 
participants who performed the same task but were paid according to their report’s accuracy. To obtain 
a baseline of unbiased reports, I provided all superiors with the opportunity to earn an additional NOK 
50 (about $ 6) while waiting for their project managers’ reports. The superiors’ task was to correctly 
solve the identical matrix as the project managers in the low-accessibility condition. However, the 
superiors do not know that their project managers are working with an identical matrix. The behavior of 
these superiors, therefore, serves as a benchmark of unbiased information processing.22  
Results show that only one out of 44 benchmark-superiors submitted an incorrect answer in the task.  
By contrast, 28 out of 41 project managers reported to implement sub-optimal projects (false positive) 
in the low-accessibility condition. None reported to reject an optimal project (false negative). Coupled 
with the lack of calculation errors made by the benchmark-superiors, the strong self-serving bias in 
project managers’ reports suggests that mere calculation errors cannot account for the observed increase 
in opportunistic reporting. 
                                                     
22 At the time of solving the task, the supervisors have the same level of experience with the matrix tasks and 





Furthermore, the number of mistakes project managers made while working on the 5×5 practice-
matrix is uncorrelated with reporting decisions in the low-accessibility condition (i.e., 4×5 matrix), r(47) 
= -0.06, p = 0.66. These variables are also uncorrelated when only considering project managers 
misaligned interests (i.e., sub-optimal projects), r(39) = 0.21, p = 0.18. Overall, the total number of 
mistakes on the comprehension test is also uncorrelated with the decision to report to implement sub-
optimal projects (false_report), r(129)=0.13, p = 0.15.23 Thus, differences in analytical abilities and level 
of comprehension seem not to explain the observed result.24 
4.3.2 Lack of Effort (Time) 
Another possible explanation is that project managers spend insufficient effort on analyzing the 4×5 
matrices. To investigate this possibility, I use the benchmark-superiors’ time data as a baseline of how 
much time project managers should spend on analyzing the matrix. While working on the tasks, a 
software recorded the milliseconds in which the matrices have been actively opened. The timer was 
programmed so that subjects could only see the hidden content of the matrix while pressing down a 
button and having the cursor hover over the button. If the button was released, the content disappeared, 
and the counter stopped until the button was pressed again. This software feature allowed for a precise 
measure of the time project managers spent looking at the matrix.  
In contrast to classical information economics’ prediction, I find no difference in data processing 
between project managers and superiors. Results show that benchmark-superiors—who were 
incentivized to report correctly—opened the 4×5 matrices on average 27.7 seconds (19.07) before 
reporting. In comparison, project managers kept them open for 28.86 seconds (18.61). The difference is 
                                                     
23 The comprehension test consisted of four multiple choice questions. Participants who gave incorrect answers 
received immediate feedback and had to answer correctly before proceeding. Participants could make up to 9 
mistakes on the comprehension test. Questions 1, 2, and 3 of the comprehension test concerned their understanding 
of the payoff structure. Question 4 concerned the factual assertion in their reports.  
24 In the post-questionnaire, project managers were asked “how certain are you that your recommendation to 
your superior was accurate?” Only the managers with sub-optimal projects report that they are more uncertain in 
the low-accessibility condition, t(85)=1.98, p = 0.05. They were also asked, “how comfortable would feel reporting 
information that might be different from true/actual information, if you did not know the true information for 
certain”. Only managers with sub-optimal projects report that they would feel more uncomfortable reporting 
uncertain information (t(107)=1.75, p = 0.08). However, these measures are not predictive of misreporting within 
the low-accessibility conditions (N = 34 both p > 0.20). Unfortunately, due to a technical issue, these measures 





non-significant (p = 0.75).25 Though project managers knew from practice that the size of the matrices 
(i.e., 1×1 and 4 × 5) indicates how much effort is needed to obtain the answer, I find that project 
managers’ decision not to open the matrix is insensitive to the size of the matrix.  
Thus, I do not find support for project managers spending insufficient effort analyzing the dataset in 
the low-accessibility condition. Instead, the analysis suggests that they work for a significant amount of 
time analyzing the data—despite having no financial incentive (only a social incentive). Figure 3 shows 
the distribution in time data for both benchmark-superiors (pay for accuracy) and project managers (pay 
for report) for both the practice matrix and the incentivized matrix task.   
—INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE— 
4.3.3 Awareness of Misreporting 
One explanation for why project managers in the low-accessibility condition have a strong self-serving 
bias in their reports could be because they are unaware that they are making self-serving inferences (e.g., 
Kunda, 1990). Similar to Hales (2007), the finding in this paper could be explained by project managers’ 
unintentional bias in processing data. In that case, the increase in false-positive reports could be 
explained by a cognitive information-processing bias instead of an attempt to self-justify misreporting.  
To assess project managers’ awareness in the low-accessibility condition, I analyze systematic 
differences in the frequency in which they ignore information ex-post. Before exiting the experiment, 
all project managers could choose to learn whether their report led to an optimal or suboptimal outcome 
for the firm (ex-post ignore). Assuming that managers would want to avoid information that would 
confront their moral self-image (Bodner & Prelec, 2003; Grossman & van der Weele, 2017), ex-post 
information avoidance could indicate whether managers suspected that they misreported.26  
Consistent with this notion, I find that 58 percent of all project managers who report to implement 
sub-optimal projects (false positive) ignore information ex-post. In comparison, only 34 percent ignored 
                                                     
25 Standard deviations in parentheses. The result is robust to excluding project managers with optimal projects 
(p = 0.52). 
26 Alternatively, managers who ex post avoid information could also generally be more careless. However, I 
find no statistical association between the time managers spend solving the 4 × 5 matrix and their tendency to ex 






information ex-post among those who report truthfully (two-sided test, p = 0.01). For project managers 
in the low-accessibility condition, 61 percent of those who report to implement a sub-optimal project 
(i.e., false positive) also ignore information ex-post. In comparison, only 31 percent of those who 
reported truthfully ignored information ex-post (two-tailed test, p = 0.078).27 Coupled with the finding 
that project managers in the low-accessibility condition spend about 29 seconds on average looking at 
the matrix, one would expect that these project managers would be keener to learn this information ex-
post for free. However, I find that ex-post ignorance is, in absolute numbers, more frequent in the low-
accessibility condition (53% compared to 45% and 44%), although not significantly different (two-
tailed, p = 0.24). This link between ex-post ignorance and misreporting in the low-accessibility condition 
suggests that project managers were relatively aware—at least suspect—that they misreported.28 Figure 
4 provides a graphical illustration of these findings.    
—INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE— 
4.3.4 Moral Identity  
The theory underlying my predictions suggests that project managers abstain from misreporting partly 
because they feel constrained by a set of internalized moral constraints (Rabin, 1995). If honesty is 
treated as a constraint, this theory suggests that project managers will attempt to circumvent these 
constraints. To investigate the role of moral concerns in project managers’ decision-making, I use the 
Moral Identify Scale (MIS) (Aquino & Reed, 2002) to measure whether participants who score high on 
the internalization of moral values are more likely to report truthfully. This scale has been used to assess 
the importance of self-image in previous experiments on information avoidance (Grossman & van 
                                                     
27 N = 41, p < 0.05 with one-tailed test.  
28 Recent studies in accounting document an “effort effect”, which posits that being required to exert effort to 
obtain information leads to a feeling of deservedness, resulting in more misreporting (Brown, Chan, Choi, 
Evans, & Moser, 2015). Haesebrouck (2017) finds that exerting effort leads to more honesty when reports 
contain factual assertions. I investigate whether this ‘effort effect’ could explain this study’s result by proxying 
effort as number of seconds managers open the 4 × 5 matrices. I find no difference in time spent on opening the 
matrices between managers who misreport (false positive) and managers who report truthfully (p = 0.521).  
Among project managers with misaligned incentives, I find no association between time and misreporting even 
when using their practice time as controlling for innate abilities. I only find that project managers in the low-
accessibility condition who misreport have a higher variance in time data compared to those who report 





der Weele, 2017). The scale has repeatedly been able to predict moral conduct across many decision 
contexts (Hertz & Krettenauer, 2016). 
The MIS is a quantitative measure of how central (or peripheral) moral values are to an individual’s 
sense of self along two dimensions. Project managers were prompted to consider a person who has the 
following characteristics: caring, compassionate, fair, friendly, generous, hardworking, helpful, honest, 
and kind.  Project managers were then asked to indicate agreement or disagreement with twelve 
statements about the importance of those attributes to their sense of self-identity (see Aquino and Reed 
(2002) for the complete scale). There are two dimensions to this scale. First, the internalization 
dimension measures how central moral values are to one’s sense of self-identity. Second, the 
symbolization dimension measures how important it is to an individual’s sense of self to be perceived 
by others as moral. 
Because project managers filled out the MIS after making their reporting decisions, an important first 
step is to assess the possibility that project managers’ altered their responses to the MIS depending on 
their decision to submit a false positive report (misreport). Although unable to entirely rule out this 
possibility, I use the exogenous variation in false_postive (i.e., low-accessibility condition) to investigate 
whether participants in the conditions with more frequent misreporting provide significantly different 
answers. Using the mean MIS scores as the dependent variables in regression analyses reveals no 
difference in mean scores across treatment conditions (for internalization and symbolization, both p > 
0.2). Considering the significant difference in opportunistic reporting in the low-accessibility condition 
(i.e., about a 30% increase), this suggests that the decision to misreport does not contaminate the MIS 
scores in a statistically significant manner. 
For project managers with sub-optimal projects, internalization scores are negatively correlated with 
reporting false positives (r(107) = -0.19, p = 0.047), and symbolization scores are uncorrelated (r(107) 
= 0.04, p = 0.65).29 The negative association between internalization scores and opportunistic reporting 
suggests that participants consider the reporting decision a moral decision. According to moral constraint 
                                                     
29 The symbolization score is presumably uncorrelated with reporting false positives because superiors cannot 





theory, project managers with high internalization scores might feel more constrained in this situation 
and thus be keener to relax these constraints than those with low internalization scores. 
To test whether there are asymmetric treatment effects with respect to the internalization of moral 
values, I split project managers into two groups according to their mean internalization scores, i.e., the 
upper and lower half of the internalization-score distribution. Then, I test for heterogeneous treatment 
effects by running the treatment analysis of Table B on the two groups separately. Table C shows the 
results of the subgroup treatment-analysis. Table C shows that project managers in the upper half of the 
internalization-distribution are more sensitive to low-information-accessibility treatment. In contrast, 
project managers in the lower half of the internalization-distribution are less affected by the treatment.  
—INSERT TABLE C ABOUT HERE— 
Figure 5 provides a graphical illustration of the asymmetric treatment effect.30 Only 32 percent of 
project managers with high internalization of moral values submit false positive reports when 
information is easy to acquire (high information accessibility). In comparison, 57 percent of project 
managers with low internalization of moral values misreport when information is easy to acquire (high 
information accessibility) (diff = 0.25, p = 0.044).31 The difference in misreporting demonstrates that, 
when acquiring information is easy, internalization scores are predictive of misreporting.   
—INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE— 
When acquiring information requires project managers to sum up the integers in the 4×5 matrices 
(low information accessibility), I find that 65 percent of project managers with high internalization 
scores choose to misreport. That is a 103-percent increase in misreporting compared to project managers 
with high internalization in the high-accessibility conditions (diff = 0.33, two-tailed test: p = 0.02). The 
increase in misreporting among project managers with low internalization is non-significant between 
the accessibility conditions (diff = 0.14, two-tailed test: p = 0.28). Because of the asymmetric treatment 
                                                     
30 I only include observations from project managers whose projects were sub-optimal to implement to the 
firm. This is because managers whose projects were optimal did not experience a moral conflict between reporting 
honestly and self-servingly. However, project managers in the low-accessibility condition only knew this after 
analyzing data. To compare behavior between treatment conditions, I focus on project managers with conflict of 
interest.  
31 Because only two project managers decided to not open the matrix in the high-accessibility condition and 






effect, project managers with high internalization misreport to the same extent as project managers with 
low when acquiring information requires processing data (low information accessibility) (diff = 0.06, 
two-tailed test: p =  0.67).  
5. CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
In this study, I report the results from an experiment designed to investigate managers’ tendency to avoid 
relevant information in a project selection-setting. By avoiding information, managers can justify 
recommending to implement a sub-optimal project by convincing themselves that they would have 
reported otherwise if fully informed. Previous research suggests that information avoidance can occur 
in two ways. Managers might either physically avoid acquiring relevant data or avoid drawing 
conclusions they dislike even though they attended to the data (Golman et al., 2017). I hypothesize that 
managers have moral reservations about avoiding information physically because that type of avoidance 
is a salient act of opportunism in the reporting setting. However, managers are less hesitant to avoid 
drawing conclusions they dislike. Because accounting systems largely determine how readily available 
information is to its users, I hypothesize that accounting systems play an important role in reducing 
misreporting from managers with discretion over information acquisition.  
I find that managers with discretion over acquiring information rarely physically avoid collecting 
relevant data—even when obtaining the information requires an effortful analysis of data. Therefore, 
when information is easily accessible, managers with discretion over collecting information misreport 
similarly to those without this discretion. However, when obtaining information requires effortful 
analysis, project managers with discretion are significantly more likely to report to implement sub-
optimal projects (false positive) compared to managers without discretion and managers with discretion 
over highly accessible information.   
Supplementary analyses provide evidence consistent with the notion that project managers treat 
honesty as a moral constraint on their reporting decisions (Rabin, 1995). Project managers tend to refrain 
from misreporting when they cannot obtain a plausible excuse for doing so (i.e., relax the moral 
constraint). Being able to physically avoid collecting information is not a plausible excuse in the 





obtaining information requires them to process data, as this provides them with an opportunity to 
construct a plausible excuse for reporting self-servingly (e.g., “it could be an honest mistake”). The 
supplementary analysis shows evidence consistent with this notion. It reveals that analytical abilities, 
level of comprehension, effort exerted, and unconscious processing bias cannot account for the observed 
increase in opportunistic reporting. Instead, project managers’ internalization of moral values seems to 
sufficiently explain the dramatic increase in opportunistic reporting in the low-accessibility condition. 
5.1.  Academic Contribution 
This study makes four contributions to accounting research. First, the study fills an important gap in the 
experimental management accounting research (Luft, 2016) by investigating how diverging interests 
affect private data collection and data processing. While prior research has only studied how conflict of 
interest can lead employees to not collect data for their reports (Church et al., 2014), this current study 
is the first to study how misalignment of interests can affect both the collection and processing of data. 
Studying managers’ data processing is important because accounting systems can affect how easy it is 
to derive information from available data (e.g., integrating data sources) but cannot force managers to 
collect all relevant data, especially when information asymmetry stems from differences in expertise in 
acquiring information and not just proximity to operations (Bloom et al., 2014). Thus, this study answers 
Luft’s (2016) call for more experimental research on how the private acquisition of information affects 
important management accounting constructs.  
Second, this study contributes to the research concerned with understanding the determinants of 
honest reporting in accounting. While previous research in accounting attributes honest reporting 
behavior to preferences for honesty (Douthit & Majerczyk, 2019; Evans et al., 2001; Rankin et al., 2008), 
my results are consistent with the notion that people tend to treat morality as constraints to be 
circumvented (Rabin, 1995). This suggests that reporting managers might use their discretion in 
acquiring data to actively gather, avoid, and interpret data to exonerate self-serving behavior. Thus, the 
design of the accounting system that managers use to acquire information for their reports can affect 





Third, this study, to the best of my knowledge, is the first to experimentally investigate how 
information accessibility affects reporting honesty in an agency setting. Recently, Deimen and Szalay 
(2019) developed a model to investigate whether and under what conditions transferring formal 
authority to managers with expertise in obtaining information (e.g., to implement a project) is better 
than relying on them to acquire and communicate information (e.g., recommend projects). This current 
study provides experimental evidence that the agency cost associated with communication with agents 
with moral concerns can depend on the sophistication of a firm’s accounting system. While traditional 
agency theory assumes narrow self-interest, this study demonstrates the importance of managers’ 
extended motivation in reporting situations.32 Hence, this study identifies a previously hidden cost 
related to under-investment in internal accounting systems.  
Lastly, the findings of this study relate to the research on dual roles and using employee-selection as 
a control against opportunistic behavior (Campbell, 2012; Maas & Van Rinsum, 2013; Pierce & O’Dea, 
2003; Sathe, 1983). Dual roles have been advocated as a means to achieve the best of high involvement 
and high independence. While dual roles have many benefits, research points out that dual roles can also 
create role conflict. Some have argued that selecting employees with key personal characteristics can 
eliminate the tensions arising from conflicting interests between roles, particularly in more complex 
situations (Pierce & O’Dea, 2003, p. 260). However, I present experimental evidence that personal 
characteristics (i.e., moral type) matter less when complexity increases because people can better justify 
their behavior to themselves. Because people may place more value on appearing moral rather than 
behaving morally, my findings raise a note of caution about relying too heavily on personal 
characteristics when complexity increases (e.g., Campbell, 2012). Put differently, the frailty of moral 
behavior in situations involving conflict of interest suggests that firms should focus on reducing role 
conflicts rather than relying on personal characteristics to overcome temptations to act opportunistically.   
 
                                                     
32 There are currently working papers investigating how expending effort to acquire private information affects 
reporting honesty (Brown et al., 2015; Haesebrouck, 2017). Although expanding effort relates to information 
accessibility, these studies do not provide subjects with discretion over the decision to acquire information or 






5.2.  Practical Implications 
The main implication of this study is that improving internal accounting systems may serve as a control 
by increasing the moral saliency of misreporting. Despite that information accessibility varies in 
practice, this study suggests that investments in accounting systems that improve information 
accessibility can—to some extent—increase the level of honesty in firms. While improving and tailoring 
such systems has previously been costly, this cost is falling with the influx of systems that take advantage 
of scalable software technology (e.g., Bygstad, 2015; Liu, 2018).  
Moreover, this study relates to the practice of risk-based auditing in which auditors assess the risks 
of misstatements. An important determinant in risk assessments is whether potential misstatements 
constitute fraud risk (intentional misstatement) or are merely unintentional errors (PCAOB, 2010). 
Although fraud risk is a significant risk by its very nature, assessing the intentionality of misstatements 
is difficult. This study suggests that auditors should consider the sophistication and user-friendliness of 
firms’ accounting systems as a part of their risk-assessment of controls designed to prevent fraud.    
5.3.  Limitations and Future Research 
My experimental findings are subject to limitations, which provide a basis for future research. The 
experiment is a one-shot reporting game where subjects can choose to remain ignorant while reporting 
with (relatively) high financial consequences. As a first step, this is an important design choice because 
it allows for comparisons to related studies investigating the effect of willful ignorance on ethical 
decision-making. In practice, however, managers report frequently and may occasionally face 
opportunities where they prefer ignorance over information. Whereas I find minimal information 
avoidance in this one-shot study, a natural next step would be to examine whether managers would 
change their behavior over time and repetition.  
Furthermore, there is no detection risk, audit probability, or any other risk of being caught 
misreporting in the experiment. Although this provides a clean investigation of the effect of discretion 
on honest reporting, a promising avenue for further research is to examine the effect of having audit risk 
in this setting. On the one hand, the risk of being caught could exacerbate the tendencies to engage in 





that an internal auditor might overview the work could produce a desire to be perceived as competent 
reporting managers. Therefore, it would be interesting to investigate how internal audits affect 
managers’ acquisition and reporting behavior in settings similar to the one used in this present study.   
This study provides evidence that relying on managers’ inner moral compass in situations with 
diverging interests may be ineffective in settings marked by complexity and ambiguity. Thus, in 
situations where accounting systems cannot sufficiently reduce the inherent complexity in the available 
data, further research could investigate what can reduce managers’ tendency to seek justifications for 
misreporting. For example, firms can provide clear instructions for what constitutes acceptable behavior 
in specific situations by clearly communicating norms against rationalizing opportunistic reporting (e.g., 
Church, Hannan, & Kuang, 2012; Murphy, 2012). 
This study investigates how internal accounting systems may induce reporting honesty in managers 
with discretion in information acquisition. While information accessibility is an essential aspect of 
accounting or information systems, it is not the only one. Innovation in information technology is rapid 
and changes many of the traditional aspects of accounting systems, e.g., direct mobile access, robotic 
process automation with system-generated reports, chat-bots, and new visualization tools (Deloitte, 
2018b; Fractal, 2018; MicroStrategy, 2019). As such, a promising avenue for further research is to 
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FIGURE 2.—Treatment manipulations in the experiment. To the left: the number (either “1” or “0” is 
clearly visible in an ‘open’ 1 × 1 matrix. In the center: the number is ‘hidden’ in a 1 × 1 matrix. To the 










FIGURE 3.—Distribution of seconds spent looking at matrices. Both benchmark-superiors and project 
managers solved identical practice (5 × 5) and actual matrices (4 × 5). The gray bars in the figure show 
the distribution of time participants actively opened the practice matrices, while the outlined bars show 
the same distribution of time but for the actual task. While superiors are incentivized to report correctly, 
project managers have an incentive to misreport. There is no difference in practice time between 
















FIGURE 4.—Ratio of ex-post ignorance by treatment conditions. The figure depicts the ratio of project 
managers with misaligned interest who opted to remain ignorant after they had made their reporting 
decisions (The no-discretion and high accessibility conditions are collapsed). Stars indicate p-levels for 
one-sided t-tests (p = 0.05 and p = 0.038, respectively). Combined, the difference in ex-post ignorance 
































FIGURE 5.—Misreporting false positives by information accessibility and internalization of moral 
values. The bars in the high-accessibility category also include the project managers in the control (no 
discretion) condition. Stars indicate p-values for two-sided t-tests. Results not present in the figure: 
Given high accessibility, there is a significant difference between project managers in the upper and 
lower half of the internalization distribution (p = 0.04). Given low accessibility, there is no difference 
















TABLE A  
 Descriptive Statistics for All Project Managers by Treatment Condition 







 (n = 35) (n = 47) (n = 49) 
False positive reporta 34.3% 40.3% 57,1% 
False negative report 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Ex-ante ignorance  - 4.3% 2% 
Ex-post ignorance 45.7% 44.7% 51.1% 
Moral identity scaleb    
    Internalization 17.91 (4.0) 18.40 (4.13) 19.04 (3.25) 
    Symbolization  13.54 (4.89) 14.23 (4.29) 15.33 (3.59) 
Female (= 1) 31.4% 25.5% 40.8% 
Age  22.77 (2.99) 24.36 (5.45) 23.02 (2.34) 
Accounting courses 3.91 (2.83) 3.40 (2.59) 3.81 (3.42) 
NOTE.—All the experimental firms consist of one superior and three project managers (except one firm that 
only had two project managers). Though the firm size is larger than one project manager and superior, the project 
managers are not aware of each other, do not interact, and do not influence each other’s payments. The focus on 
project managers’ behavior necessitated that I prioritized observations of project managers. a Excluding subjects 
with aligned interests increases the relative size of false-positive reports to 41.3%, 48.7%, and 68.2%. b Displays 



















 Logistic Regression with Marginal Effects on Decisions to Report False-Positives 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All project  
managers 
Project managers with 
misaligned incentives 
Project managers with 
misaligned incentives 
    
Discretion: High accessibility † 0.0628 0.0488 0.062 
 (0.53) (0.38) (0.44) 
    
Discretion: Low accessibility † 0.263** 0.307*** 0.332*** 
 (2.35) (2.68) (2.69) 
    
Female†  -0.0819 -0.1917* -0.202* 
 (0.84) (1.79) (1.75) 
    
Age   0.020 
   (0.94) 
    
Accounting courses   0.018 
   (0.94) 
    
Relevant experience†   -0.105 
   (0.80) 
    
Ex-ante ignore   -0.015 
   (0.01) 
    
Ex-post ignore   0.341*** 
   (3.02) 
    






Robust errors YES YES YES 
Session controls YES YES YES 
N 131 109 109 
NOTE.—Results are robust to excluding the gender control and different estimation methods (linear 
probability model and probit models). t statistics in parentheses; † for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 
to 1; The table displays marginal effects, except the differences between the discretion conditions (high and low 













 Heterogeneous Treatment Effects  
 (1) (2) 
 Project managers in the upper 
half of internalization scores 
Project managers in the lower 
half of internalization scores 
   
High accessibility (1×1) † .073 .007 
 (0.33) (0.43) 
   
Low accessibility (4×5) † .398** .180 
 (2.12) (1.20) 
   
Female† .265* .002 
 (1.82) (0.01) 
   
Diff treatment effect (odds ratio) 4.924** 
     (2.13) 
2.305 
      (1.07) 
   
Session controls NO NO 
Robust errors YES YES 
N 51 58 
Pseudo R2 0.126 0.019 
NOTE.—The table shows the marginal effects of logistic regression with false_positive as the 
dependent variable. Standard deviations are in parentheses. The analysis includes project managers with 
misaligned incentives only. Results are robust to excluding the gender control variable; a discrete change 














7. APPENDIX  
The following is a selection of screenshots from the laboratory experiment in Chapter I. 
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Abstract
In this study, we provide experimental evidence on a novel phenomenon concerning in-
formation preferences: people strategically collect additional non-instrumental information to
justify morally questionable decisions. We conduct a virtual dice-rolling experiment where
participants roll a dice and self-report the outcome of the first roll for monetary rewards. In
this setting, we vary the extent to which participants can continue rolling the dice before re-
porting as well as the displayed content of those additional roll-outcomes. We document that
people systematically roll the dice more—are more curious—when tempted to misreport. We
find that curiosity is positively correlated with the size of the lie. However, contrary to pre-
vious studies, we observe no variation in dishonesty across treatments regardless of the pos-
sibility to collect additional non-instrumental information. This study provides new insights
into how individuals actively shape their information environment in pursuit of self-interest.
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Classical theories of information economics define information as a tool that individuals use to
reach superior decisions (Stigler, 1961). Under this theory, information is valuable only from an
ex-ante perspective and if it can be used to make better decisions. However, evidence from be-
havioral research shows that people can avoid relevant information to create a moral wiggle room
in which morally questionable decisions can be excused (Dana et al., 2007; Golman et al., 2017).
Avoidance may not be the only tool to achieve moral wiggle room. Collecting additional infor-
mation can be used strategically to interpret facts toward one’s own preferences. Even though
theoretical and experimental research shows that people tend to strategically avoid information
to excuse self-interested choices (Dana et al., 2007; Golman et al., 2017; Grossman and Van der
Weele, 2017), little research has examined to what extent individuals collect additional informa-
tion to excuse the pursuit of self-interest.1 We fill this gap in the literature by providing an experi-
mental analysis of the tendency to collect more information when confronted with the temptation
to misreport. We conducted a one-shot dice-rolling game (Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013;
Shalvi et al., 2011) in which participants roll a fair virtual dice and report the outcome of the
first roll for monetary rewards, with higher reported numbers resulting in higher payments. We
vary whether people can collect non-instrumental information and the content of the additional
information. We implement these treatment variations by restricting how many times people can
roll the dice before reporting, and whether the dice displays numbers or random figures after the
first roll.
Similar to avoiding information that makes it difficult to excuse selfish decisions (Gross-
man, 2014), we find evidence that curiosity is driven by a desire to justify selfish behavior. Our
main finding is that non-instrumental information is collected strategically, implying that people
are strategically curious.2 Contrary to the previous literature, we find no variation in dishonesty
across treatments despite the possibility to collect additional information and the content of this
information. With our explicit focus on deliberate decisions to acquire additional non-instrumental
1We use the term “additional information” to refer to information that, strictly speaking, is superfluous to the
reporting decision but that can be useful to individuals when trying to justify dishonest behavior. We use ‘additional’
instead of ‘superfluous’ because we introduce a new goal for the information collection: justifying dishonesty. Hence,
the information can be useful in justifying dishonesty even though the information is not instrumental according to
classical theories.
2We call the behavioral phenomenon that people collect related and unrelated additional information to relax moral
constraints that are at odds with their self-interests strategic curiosity.
48
Chapter II
information when tempted to misreport, we contribute to the research on information and moral
decisions by showing that curiosity can also be driven by a desire to justify selfish behavior.
In a pre-registered experiment, we recruited 1580 US participants on Amazon Mechanical
Turk (mTurk). In the base treatment (Single Roll), participants roll the dice once and then report
the outcome. In this condition, people can continue to roll the dice after reporting while knowing
that they cannot change their report. To study how people search for additional information when
tempted to misreport, we introduce three variations to identify causal effects of different informa-
tion environments. In the Three Rolls treatment, the number of rolls is limited to three, and people
do not have a chance to roll less or more than three times before reporting the outcome of the
first roll. In the other two treatments, participants can roll as many times as they want to before
reporting. In the Multiple Numbers treatment, the dice’s sides always display numbers, whereas
in the Multiple Figures treatment, the dice displays random figures after the first roll. Since only
the outcome of the first roll should be reported, additional rolls have no instrumental value in the
case of honest reporting.
Our results provide evidence that people are systematically more curious when collecting
additional information can help justify dishonesty. As this is an observed game, we can disentan-
gle whether collecting additional information that is related or unrelated to the outcome leads to
higher misreporting. We find that people who observe lower outcomes in the first roll are more
likely to roll more times before reporting in the Multiple Numbers and the Multiple Figures treat-
ments. People in the Multiple Numbers treatment observe numeric outcomes whereas those in the
Multiple Figures see only non-order symbols in the additional rolls. The average number of rolls
is not significantly different in these two treatments. In the Multiple Numbers treatment partici-
pants roll 4.8 times on average, whereas in the Multiple Figures treatment, they roll 4.9 times on
average. This result indicates that people acquire additional information—not only to search for
justifications—but also to distract themselves from moral conflict.
We find that dishonesty does not respond to the availability of additional information. The
average size of the lie—the distance between the reported number and the actual outcome—is 0.50
units for all participants and does not significantly vary across treatments. However, we document
a positive relationship between information collection and dishonesty. Rolling the dice additional




Our supplementary results show that even after the report is submitted, people continue
collecting information ex-post in the Single Roll treatment. We find a significant difference in
rolling behavior between ex-ante and ex-post rolling when the outcome of the first roll is low—but
no difference when the outcome of the first roll is high. This suggests that people are more curious
when the additional information can be used to justify reporting dishonestly. Further evidence
shows that people use curiosity to justify morally questionable decisions even after the decision
has already been made. In this ex-post rolling, we observe that participants who misreported roll
significantly more times than those who reported honestly. Dishonest reporters roll the dice 5.5
additional times after the first roll, whereas honest reporters roll it only 3.1 more times. Although
not pre-registered, these findings support our main hypotheses and findings on the strategic use of
curiosity to justify dishonesty.
This study contributes to research on preferences toward information in moral dilemmas,
which can arise both before and after a decision has been made, and both when the decision-
maker possesses incomplete and full information. Various motivations that shape information
preferences have been documented previously, and curiosity is one of the prominent drivers of
information acquisition. Loewenstein (1994) provides a review on curiosity and posits that de-
mand for information is intrinsic; it is “appetite for knowledge”. This kind of curiosity directed
toward all kinds of information is defined as epistemic curiosity (Litman et al., 2005). We find that
curiosity need not only arise from an intrinsic desire for information; it might also be driven by a
strategic desire to justify selfish behavior or distract oneself from moral conflict. More recently,
Golman and Loewenstein (2015) introduced the concept of “information gaps”, which refers to
people’s desire to collect information to close the gaps between what is already known and what
information is available. Eliaz and Schotter (2010) provide experimental evidence that individuals
are willing to pay to receive information regarding the results of an intelligence test even when
this information has no value in terms of achieving higher outcomes. We find that people acquire
unnecessary information particularly when tempted to make morally questionable decisions. This
extends the literature on curiosity by showing that curiosity may be motivated by strategic reasons
rather than only an innocuous desire to collect information.
Information can play an important role in people’s self-image management when it has
diagnostic utility, revealing people’s own moral type or disposition (Bodner and Prelec, 2003;
Rabin, 1995). In this case, both avoiding and collecting information can help preserve a desired
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self-image, helping people to feel good about their abilities and traits (Golman et al., 2019). Our
study expands this literature by showing that information acquisition can serve a similar function
as information avoidance. When the temptation to misreport is present, people tend to acquire non-
instrumental information. In support of this, we find that people tend to acquire non-instrumental
information that is also unrelated to the moral decision. This shows that the curiosity might not
only stem from the search for justifications, but also from the search for distractions from the
moral conflict. Prior research documents that rational inattention can cause various behavioral bi-
ases like present bias and correlation neglect (Gabaix, 2019; Sims, 2006). We extend this research
by showing that, even when information is not related to the decision or the outcome, it can serve
as a tool for self-distraction and inattention, which can be used strategically to stick with certain
decisions.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the details of the experimental
design. Section 3 explains the procedure and the details about the sample. Section 4 presents the
results from our experiment. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Experimental Design
To investigate the relation between curiosity and dishonesty, we use a modified dice-rolling game
(Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013; Shalvi et al., 2011). The dice-rolling game has been widely
used to study dishonesty in the previous literature (Abeler et al., 2019). The standard structure of
the game is that participants roll a fair six-sided dice and report the outcome of the first roll for
monetary rewards. In the instructions, participants are informed that higher reported numbers re-
sult in higher payments. Because participants roll the dice privately, the experimenter cannot infer
whether an individual misreports the roll outcome but can only infer dishonesty on the aggregate
level. Together with the payment structure, the privacy of the game provides those who roll low
numbers with a monetary incentive to misreport by reporting a higher number than the one they
rolled. In the case of honest reporting, the expected average reported number is 3.5, and outcomes
are uniformly distributed on the integers 1 to 6. Using this game has several advantages for inves-
tigating dishonesty since the game is of a simple nature that is easy to understand for participants.
Since the theoretical distribution is known, experimenters can detect overall dishonesty.
Because our research question required us to observe both the number of times partici-
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pants roll the dice and the outcomes of the dice rolls, we used an online dice-rolling game. In
our experiment, participants roll a virtual dice on a computer screen while a software records
how many times a participant rolls the dice and the outcomes of each dice-roll. Participants are
informed about this procedure in advance and are told that their payoff will only be dependent
on the reported number and not the factual outcome. Participants then report the outcome of their
first throw and receive payment according to their report (reporting 1 yields a payment of USD
0.5 and reporting higher numbers increase the payment with increments of USD 0.5).
Though observed games are becoming more common in the dishonesty literature (Abeler
et al., 2019; Gneezy et al., 2018), the observability of the reporting situation could potentially
create an experimenter demand effect and affect participants’ perceptions of the game. This could
lower participants’ level of dishonesty. However, the focus of our paper is to detect information
preferences and strategic use of information collection. Using an online experiment requires using
a virtual dice in the browser, because with a private dice we cannot collect information on how
many time times the dice has been rolled and the outcome of the first roll. Aware of the poten-
tial concerns about observability, participants are ensured that their choices remain anonymous.
Before knowing about the dice-rolling game, participants are informed that they would not be
rejected based on the submission of an incorrect answer. Before reading further instructions, all
the participants had to answer correctly on questions related to the study’s terms and conditions.
In the following instructions, participants read about the dice-rolling game and the rules of their
treatment condition. Another concern when using a virtual dice is that participants might suspect
that the dice is not fair. To combat this concern, we allowed participants to freely roll the dice
before knowing about the reporting task. We explicitly informed all participants that the dice was
programmed to be fair. To avoid priming participants on numeric values while practicing, the
sides of the dice displayed non-ordered and random symbols.
Using an observed version of the basic dice-rolling game enables us to investigate whether
the outcome of the first roll affects the likelihood that participants roll more than once, and
whether the distance between the observed first-roll outcome predicts information acquisition.
This enables us to measure the exact size of the lie and what drives information acquisition,
which is crucial for our research questions. By reaching a sample of 1,580 participants, we aimed
to provide valid findings for strategic curiosity. In addition, the virtual set-up enables us to scale
up the experiment and post the experiment on online platforms where participants can choose
52
Chapter II
when and where to complete the experiment. The sample size enables us to run a well-powered
study after making the estimations for at least 80% power (see Ay et al. (2019)).3
2.1 Treatments
To study the relation between curiosity and dishonesty, we manipulate whether participants are
able to choose how many times they can roll the virtual dice. Restricting participants’ ability to
collect additional information provides exogenous variation in the decision to collect additional
information, which facilitates causal analyses between treatment groups. In total, we introduce
four treatment variations to our dice-rolling setting.
2.1.1 Baseline
To establish a baseline, we implemented a Single Roll treatment where the participants only roll
the virtual dice once before they submit their report. In the Single Roll treatment, the availability of
additional information is (exogenously) restricted along with their ability to justify misreporting
using additional outcome-related information. To obtain a proxy measure for pure (epistemic)
curiosity in our setting, we allowed participants in the Single Roll treatment to continue to roll the
dice as many times as they would like after they reported. Because participants could not change
their report after submission, collecting additional information has no instrumental use for the
decision.
Including our baseline, we provide a design in which we manipulate exogenous and en-
dogenous information availability.
2.1.2 Exogenous availability of information
To investigate whether the amount of counterfactual information—without self-selecting to col-
lect it—affects dishonesty, we limit the number of rolls prior to reporting in two of our treatments.
In addition to the Single Roll baseline, we implemented a Three Rolls treatment where participants
are forced to roll the dice three times before they submit their report. In this treatment, additional
3Sample size is estimated with the mean values for reported die outcome from Shalvi et al. (2011). In the control
group, participants are allowed to roll the die only once, whereas in treatment participants roll multiple times. We
used the reported numbers (so the earnings) in the control and treatment groups for our estimations. µcontrol shows the
average reported outcome in the control group whereas µtreat shows in the treatment group. In condition Single Roll
(control group) where only one roll is possible µcontrol = 3.97 and σcontrol = 1.56. In the treatment where multiple
rolls are allowed µtreat = 4.45 with σtreat. = 1.59.
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outcome-related information is exogenously given to participants as they cannot proceed to the
reporting page before the dice has been rolled exactly three times. This enables us to investigate
whether observing additional outcomes-related information in itself increases misreporting and
whether this effect is driven by the counterfactual outcomes they observe.
In Single Roll and Three Rolls treatments, the number of rolls is exogenously limited prior
to reporting. This restriction helps us study how participants respond to this limitation and whether
it affects dishonesty.
2.1.3 Endogenous availability of information
To study whether participants are strategically curious, we implemented two treatments that allow
for endogenous information collection. In these two treatments, participants can roll the dice as
many times as they want to, however the content of the dice is different after the first roll.
2.1.3.1 Multiple Numbers
In the Multiple Numbers treatment, participants choose how many times to roll the dice before
reporting the first outcome. To investigate whether the content of the subsequent roll-outcomes
matters for the decision to collect additional information, we add a description underneath the
“roll” button that indicates the content of the next dice-roll. In the Multiple Numbers treatment,
the description stated, “Potential outcomes: Numbers from 1 to 6”. Because participants must
actively choose to roll the dice additional times to obtain additional outcome-related informa-
tion, we can compare whether having access to this information affects misreporting differently
by being endowed with such information. This allows us to also investigate whether those who
have access to outcome-related (counterfactual) information systematically roll more when they
observe low roll-outcomes in their first (actual) roll.
2.1.3.2 Multiple Figures
In the Multiple Figures treatment, participants choose how many times they roll the dice before
reporting but, after the first roll, subsequent roll-outcomes display non-ordered symbols instead
of numbers. Changing the displayed content of the sides of the dice restricts participants’ access
to additional outcome-related information that can (directly) help justify misreporting by report-
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ing the best throw. Rolling the figures-dice only generates unrelated information. Yet, acquiring
unrelated information can serve as a distraction from their moral standard to report honestly and
therefore make misreporting less threatening to their moral self-view (Mazar et al., 2008). To
be rationally inattentive as Gabaix (2019) proposes, participants can search for distraction by
collecting unrelated information. The description underneath the “roll” button states “Potential
outcomes: Random symbols only” to remind participants.4 In contrast to the Multiple Numbers
treatment where participants know that additional roll-outcomes display (counterfactual) numeric
information, participants in the Multiple Figures treatment know that rolling the dice additional
times only generates unrelated symbolic information. This allows us to examine whether partici-
pants are more curious about the additional information when the information has more potential
to justify misreporting and whether observing related information is more effective in justifying
misreporting than observing unrelated information.
To eliminate the effects of self-selection to rolling multiple times, our design enables us to
compare exogenous (Three Rolls) and endogenous choice of multiple rolls (Multiple Numbers).
See Figure 1 for an overview of the design.
—INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE—
3 Sample and Procedure
The experiment was posted as a Human Intelligence Task (HIT) on the Amazon Mechanical Turk
(mTurk) crowdsourcing platform in June-July 2019. The interface of the experiment was pro-
grammed using oTree (Chen et al., 2016). Before data was collected for this experiment, our de-
sign was approved by Institutional Review Board at the NHH Norwegian School of Economics.5
Our hypotheses are pre-registered with AEA-RCT Registry (Ay et al., 2019).6 Each of the 1,580
participants participated in only one treatment and was not aware of the other experimental treat-
ments.
4The symbols displayed on the sides of the dice are identical to the ones on the practice dice.
5IRB Application number: NHH-IRB 07/19.
6Before running the main experiment, we conducted a pre-test on the same platform with 125 participants.
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—INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE—
All participants received the same instructions about the task, the payoff structure, and
the overall procedure of the game. Participants were informed that their answers are recorded
but would be kept anonymous and that the researchers cannot trace their choices back to their
personal identities or their MTurk profiles. The instructions inform participants that all submitted
work would be accepted regardless of accuracy and that payments would be transferred without
any further questions shortly after the completion of the task. We reassured participants about their
anonymity and the exclusion rules because participants could refrain from acting dishonestly due
to reputation concerns on the online crowd-sourcing platform.7 To avoid potential experimenter-
demand effects, we provided this information to participants before the instructions about the
dice-rolling task.8
Initially, participants started by practicing with a trial dice for as long as they wanted before
reading about the main experiment. The sides of the trial dice displayed only non-ordered and ran-
dom symbols and all participants had to roll the practice dice at least once before proceeding. This
method was chosen to reassure participants about the fairness of the dice without priming them
with numeric outcomes. After practicing with the trial dice, participants read the instructions for
the dice-rolling task along with the payment structure. After reporting their roll-outcomes, partic-
ipants answered questions related to the experiment (e.g., perceived descriptive norms of similar
dice-rolling games, self-reported feelings of being observed, and perceived legitimacy of rolling
more than once), along with demographic questions. Overall, the experiment took participants
approximately 7 minutes to complete, and the average payment was USD 2.5, which included a
participation fee of USD 0.5.
Table 1 contains descriptive statistics across the different treatment treatments. In Panel A
we report the demographic measures, and in Panel B we report some of the self-reported beliefs
that were collected the post-experiment questionnaire. Assignment to treatments is balanced in
7Comments that participants give during the experiment also suggest that many were experiencing a moral dilemma
in the reporting situation. For example, one participant wrote, “I did report the correct first roll of ’2’. (I was curious
and did roll the dice other times, but my report was truthful and accurate.)”. Another wrote, “I wanted to report a higher
dice roll for more money. I did not.”
8Payments to participants is automated in the experiment, which allowed us to pay bonuses without storing worker
IDs. We did not store worker IDs and IP-addresses to ensure anonymity. We deliberately abstained from using con-
tentious words such as dishonesty, lying, or misreporting to avoid experimenter-demand effects. Participants were
given a participation code once they accepted the HIT, which prevented them from retaking the HIT. No duplication of
participation code was found.
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terms of observable characteristics and beliefs. The average age of participants is 38, and 46%
of our sample is female. The majority of participants have at least a high school degree. Panel
B in Table 1 provides an overview of covariates included in our analyses and estimations. Norm
shows the beliefs on the levels of dishonesty in general, whereas Feeling Observed refers to
how observed they felt during the experiment on a scale of 0 to 10. Political Views are elicited
on a scale from 0 (Very Liberal) to 10 (Very Conservative). Our results show that participants are
more liberal overall. We observe that participants’ reported beliefs about the prevailing dishonesty
norm or feelings of being observed do not differ significantly across treatments (Kruskal Wallis
test results for norms χ2 = 2.87, p = 0.41 and for feeling observed χ2 = 2.77 and p = 0.43).
—INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE—
4 Results
In this section, we report the findings of our experiment. Reported results include both pre-
registered and supplementary analyses to clarify our findings. Our results based on two sources
of randomization: treatment variations and the outcome of the dice in the first roll. The first result
we provide on dishonesty stems from the first source of randomization, whereas the results on
curiosity are based on the second source of randomization. All the hypotheses and analyses are
pre-registered except for the analyses on the number of rolls in the Single Roll treatment in Result
2b and Result 3b.
In the first subsection, we provide findings on dishonesty across treatments. Although our
design has the similar features to Shalvi et al.’s (2011), the main goal of our paper is to investigate
curiosity in a moral context. For this reason, in the following sections we document our findings
on information collection and whether it could be strategically chosen. Using an observed game
enables us to provide analyses on information collection based on the outcome of the first roll
whereas in studies using unobserved games, it is not possible to investigate such behavior and
motivations for it (Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013; Shalvi et al., 2011). Finally, we document




Our design provides two channels to investigate the impact of additional information on dishon-
esty: exogenous (Single Roll and Three Rolls) and endogenous variation of availability (Multiple
Numbers and Multiple Figures). Collecting additional information on the outcome by rolling the
dice multiple times enables participants to observe outcome-related (numeric) or unrelated (sym-
bolic) information before reporting. In the case of honest reporting, the average expected reported
number from the dice-rolling is 3.5.
Looking at the average reported numbers, we observe deviation from the theoretical expec-
tation under honesty (p < 0.001). In our baseline Single Roll, average reported number is 3.94
(sd. = 1.79). We find no statistically significant difference on dishonesty across treatments (Three
Rolls, 3.92 (sd. = 1.76) in Multiple Numbers, 4.12 (sd. = 1.66) in Multiple Figures, p = 0.125).
Figure 3 shows the distribution of reported numbers in each treatment, which reveal that distribu-
tions of reported numbers are similar across treatments. The dashed line across Figure 3 indicates
each number’s theoretical frequency, i.e., 1/6. It can be seen in the figure that the share of reports
below “4” are lower than the theoretical fraction, whereas reports of “6” are higher and also the
highest of all reports. This figure shows that participants tend to report higher numbers than “3”
and mostly “6” if they decide to misreport.
—INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE—
In the experiment, we could observe both the actual and the reported number for each
participant and are therefore able to develop a precise measure of dishonesty. These precise mea-
sures reveal that 19.9% of the participants in the Single Roll treatment, 24.6% in the Three Rolls
treatment, 20.4% in the Multiple Numbers treatment, and 20.5% in Multiple Figures treatment
misreported the outcome of the first roll. The share of dishonest reports is in line with the values
shown in Abeler et al.’s (2019) meta-study on dishonesty experiments. Findings from the previous
literature suggest that observing higher numeric outcomes than the actual outcome makes lying
easier by enabling participants to report the best outcome that they observe instead of making a
fictitious report (Shalvi et al., 2011, 2015).
Our result shows that participants in all treatments are dishonest, and the level of dishonesty
is not significantly different across treatments. This result contrasts with previous experimental
findings in unobserved settings and our hypothesis on dishonesty in the pre-analysis plan. For
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example, Shalvi et al.’s (2011) study shows an increase in dishonesty when the participants are
instructed to roll multiple times compared to only rolling once. In our experiment, the Three
Rolls treatment is similar to the “Multiple Rolls” treatment in (Shalvi et al., 2011) regarding how
many times participants are instructed to roll. In the Three Rolls treatment in which participants
are instructed to roll three times and were not given a chance to change it, we do not find any
significant difference in the level of misreporting (reported number (4.15) and distance (0.64)).
The Three Rolls treatment provides both a comparison to Shalvi et al. (2011) and serves to control
for self-selection in our experiment. However, we do not observe an increase in misreporting in
the Multiple Numbers treatment compared to Three Rolls.
Our results show that there is no difference in dishonesty between the settings where access
to additional information is exogenously limited and those where it is endogenously decided.
Although the level differences are not significant between treatments, mean reported values are
higher than 3.5 in all treatments. This shows dishonesty in all treatments, no matter the availability
and the content of the information.
Since we observe the actual outcome of the first roll, we can analyze the “size of the lie" or
the distance between the reported and actual outcome. The “distance" shows the deviation from
the actual outcome.9 We find no significant variation in distance between treatments (p = 0.383).
In our pre-analysis plan, our hypothesis was that availability of additional information increases
dishonesty. Our findings instead suggest that the availability of additional information does not
affect misreporting.
Result 1: Availability of additional information - either exogenously or endogenously
given - does not increase misreporting compared to having no additional information
available before reporting.
4.2 Curiosity
In this section, we provide our findings on curiosity by first analyzing participants’ rolling behav-
ior before reporting (ex-ante) and then the same behavior after the report is submitted (ex-post).
For ex-ante information collection, our two treatments enable us to investigate curiosity based
on the content of information: outcome-related information in Multiple Numbers and unrelated
9Distance is 0.58 (sd. = 1.39) in Single Roll, 0.64 (sd. = 1.49) in Three Rolls, 0.47 (sd. = 1.40) in Multiple Numbers
and 0.53 (sd. = 1.30) Multiple Figures.
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information in Multiple Figures. When additional roll-outcomes display numbers (Multiple Num-
bers), rolling more times generates counterfactual information, which has been previously shown
to make misreporting more frequent (Shalvi et al., 2011). Observing desired counterfactuals helps
to decrease the psychological distance between the actual outcome and the desired one.10 By con-
trast, when the additional roll-outcomes display random symbols (Multiple Figures), participants
cannot use the additional information to reduce the psychological distance between the actual
roll outcome and the desired one. In Multiple Numbers treatment, the information is always out-
come related since the outcomes of the dice are always numeric, whereas in the Multiple Figures
treatment, outcomes are unrelated since the dice shows random figures after the first roll.
In the pre-analysis plan, we hypothesized a higher number of rolls in the Multiple Numbers
treatment compared to the Multiple Figures treatment. We find however, no difference in rolling
behavior between observing outcome-related information (numeric) and information that is ran-
dom and unrelated (symbols). Participants who can roll freely before they report throw the dice
4.98 (15.5) times after the first roll when the additional rolls have numeric outcomes, whereas this
number is 4.82 (17.6) when the rolls have symbolic outcomes (p = 0.96). Figure 4 shows the av-
erage number of rolls prior to reporting in the Multiple Numbers and Multiple Figures treatments.
As shown in the figure, when faced with a lower outcome in the first roll, the number of rolls is
significantly higher in both treatments. This result is in line with our pre-registered hypothesis.
—INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE—
Result 2a: People are curious and collect additional information even when the ad-
ditional information is irrelevant to the task. Curiosity is higher when the outcome of
the first roll is low.
Although not pre-specified, we want to further investigate whether people who rolled more
when they observed a low outcome do so out of “pure curiosity” or whether they are searching
to justify misreporting. This former type of curiosity is defined as “epistemic curiosity”, which is
a desire to collect information even when it is not targeted to a specific end (Litman et al., 2005;
Loewenstein, 1994). To assess this, we let those in the Single Roll treatment have the opportunity
to keep rolling the dice after they submit the report. These participants are explicitly told that they
10By desired counterfactuals, we refer to the higher numbers than the outcome of the first roll.
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would not be able to change their report but could keep on rolling if they wanted to do so. We use
their ex-post rolling (after reporting) behavior in Single Roll treatment as a benchmark for seeking
non-instrumental information out of pure curiosity.11
—INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE—
Figure 5 shows number of rolls in both Single Roll and Multiple Numbers treatments based
on the outcome of the first roll (greater than 3 and lower or equal than 3). In both treatments,
participants who roll lower outcomes in the first roll rolled significantly more times than those
with a high outcome in the first roll (p < 0.01 for both treatments).
—INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE—
Distribution of the number of rolls can be seen in Figure 6. Number of ex-post rolls is
significantly lower than number of ex-ante rolls (4.98 in Multiple Numbers, 2.75 in Single Roll,
p = 0.005).
Result 2b: Curiosity is observed even after the decision has been made—when addi-
tional information has no instrumental value. A low outcome of the first roll increases
the number of ex-post rolls.
Our design enables us to provide findings on the rolling behavior based on the outcome of
the dice. Conditioning on the outcome of the first roll has not been possible in previous research
that has relied on hidden rolls. Our results show that the level of information collection is not sig-
nificantly affected by the content of information. Our results document that participants continue
rolling the dice even after reporting. Although additional information has no use, this behavior
could be motivated by a desire to justify dishonesty. In the next section, we continue documenting
our results on motivations for curiosity.
4.3 Motivations for Curiosity
A tension between reporting honestly and reporting self-servingly arises when there is a large
distance between the desired outcome (rolling a high number) and the actual outcome. We con-
jecture that this tension gives rise to a demand for information that reduces the gap between the
11We use instrumentality in terms of affecting the final result. Even though it cannot change the reported value,




desired and the actual outcome. Demand for information is driven by the need to find justifica-
tions that can reduce the perceived distance or gap (Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013; Shalvi
et al., 2011). The demand will be greater the larger the distance is between the actual outcome
(e.g., rolling a ‘one’) and the number that one would prefer to report (e.g., ‘six’). We pre-specified
in the pre-analysis plan that people are more likely to acquire information that could reduce the
perceived distance between the factual outcome and the wealth-maximizing outcome when this
distance is large (e.g., rolling a one) compared to the when there is less or no distance (e.g., rolling
a five). That is, when honesty concerns are in conflict with self-interest, individuals actively try
to reduce the intrinsic cost of lying by acquiring information that may reduce the perceived size
of the potential lie.12 To investigate whether curiosity is used to reach higher monetary outcomes,
we document estimations for the information collection in relation to the outcome of the first roll
and other behavioral parameters in this section.
Our analysis on motivations to collect additional information prior to reporting focuses on
how many times participants choose to roll the dice in the Multiple Numbers and Multiple Figures
treatments. In these treatments, participants have the opportunity to roll as many times as they
would like to before they report the outcome of the first roll. We hypothesized that observing a
low outcome on the first roll produces a demand for justification to misreport.
—INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE—
Among participants who could freely roll the dice with numbers, we find that the lower
their first roll, the more likely they are to roll again. Table 2 shows that for both treatments, higher
outcome of the first roll significantly decreases the likelihood that the subject would roll more
than once (p < 0.01).
Result 3a: Outcome of the first roll affects the likelihood of rolling more than once,
even when the additional outcome is not related. The lower the outcome of the first
roll, the higher the likelihood of continued rolling ex-ante.
This result supports our hypothesis on curiosity; people can be strategically curious to
justify morally questionable decisions when the actual outcome is low. For lower outcomes of
12Our estimation is based on Gneezy et al. (2018), however, the method we use deviates to correctly specify impacts
of our observed design.
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the first roll (≤ 3), the number of rolls is significantly higher before reporting (ex-ante) in the
Multiple Numbers treatment than after reporting (ex-ante) in the Single Roll (4.61 in Multiple
Rolls, 3.23 in Single Roll, p = 0.03). We do not observe a significant difference between ex-ante
and ex-post number of rolls for participants who see higher outcomes in the first roll (2.88 in
Multiple Numbers, 2.16 in Single Roll, p = 0.49).
This finding is in line with Gneezy et al.’s (2018) finding which states that the distance
between reported and actual outcomes drives the intrinsic lying costs. We find that when the dis-
tance between the desired and actual outcomes increases, participants seem to desire information
that could reduce this psychological distance. This finding suggests that people actively attempt
to shape their information-set according to what serves their self-interest. Participants search for
more information when they face lower outcomes in the first roll, and they search for such infor-
mation significantly more when it can be acquired before rather than after the reporting decision.
Figure 7 shows number of rolls after reporting by honest versus dishonest participants
(2.56 for honest reporting, 4.35 for misreporting, p = 0.043). As shown in the figure, participants
who reported honestly roll significantly fewer times than participants who reported dishonestly.
Showing that participants roll more after they misreport compared to if they reported honestly is
important as it provides additional evidence that participants seem to use additional information
as a way to assess the credibility of both potential and past lies—even when there is no monetary
gain from rolling more and continued rolling has an opportunity cost.
—INSERT FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE—
Participants are more likely to roll the dice to a greater extent when the outcome of the
first roll is low. However, in the ex-ante treatment, participants acquire more information than
the ex-post situation, supporting our hypothesis on “strategic” curiosity. By design, the additional
rolls before the reporting can be considered when reporting, but additional rolls after the reporting
cannot affect the submitted report.




4.4 Information, Curiosity and Dishonesty
Our results show a clear behavioral pattern on low values of the first roll and curiosity. When
we define strategic curiosity, we posit that it is a tool to make self-serving decisions easier. To
investigate whether participants use the additional information for this goal, we provide evidence
for the relationship between the distance of the lie and the number of rolls.
We observe no significant difference in the level of misreporting between Multiple Num-
bers and Multiple Figures treatments. Although we do not observe treatment differences in re-
ported numbers, Table 3 shows that distance (size of the lie) is significantly higher among those
who chose to roll the dice more, regardless of the content of the dice—numbers or figures. As
mentioned earlier, Multiple Numbers and Multiple Figures treatments are the ones in which par-
ticipants “endogenously” decide how many times to roll the dice. In the Single Roll and Three
Rolls treatments, the number of rolls is exogenously decided.
—INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE—
In terms of relevancy of the content, Multiple Numbers and Multiple Figures treatments
provide variation of the content of the endogenously collected information.13 We find a very
similar effect of number of rolls on distance in both treatments; it is positively and significantly
associated with the distance of the lie. This shows that even though the effect size is different,
curiosity toward both related and unrelated information is positively related, with greater distance
between the actual outcome and the reported number.
These results can provide insights on motivations of dishonesty for two different types of
information: with related information, dishonesty is driven by the fact that there is a potential
higher outcome, and with unrelated information, the mechanism might be similar to distraction.
Since it was not one of the main concerns of our research, the latter mechanism is not documented
in detail. Effects of inattention and distraction have been previously documented in different be-
havioral concepts than dishonesty (Falk and Zimmermann, 2016; Gabaix, 2019). We show the
same dishonesty level in these treatments and the same effect of rolling more on this level, sug-
gesting that different mechanisms cause similar effects on dishonesty.
13Relevancy is used in terms of additional information being relevant to the first roll and the reporting decision.
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Result 4: Curiosity is associated with misreporting regardless of the content of addi-
tional information.
Table 3 also shows that, in the Single Roll treatment in which participants could roll the
dice only once prior to reporting the outcome, the time participants spent on the rolling page
(Time Rolling) is positively associated with misreporting.14 This result suggests that, even with-
out rolling the dice more times, people who report dishonestly spend more time on the page before
doing so. This finding supports the argument that morality is the intuitive choice in social deci-
sions. For example, Cappelen et al. (2016) show a strong association between short response time
and fair behavior, which means fairness is the intuitive choice in social decisions. In a meta study
on dishonesty experiments, Köbis et al. (2019) show that in situations where dishonesty affects
others, honesty is the intuitive choice.
In none of the treatments is the feeling of being observed related to individual misreport-
ing. This shows that feeling observed during the game did not contribute to the treatment effects
that are documented in this paper. In all treatments, beliefs on norms about dishonesty are asso-
ciated with larger lies (i.e., larger distance from the first outcome). Beliefs on norms are elicited
by asking participants how likely others are to report dishonestly in similar experimental settings.
This is a self-reported measure on participants’ beliefs about others’ dishonest behavior in similar
settings. Our findings show that beliefs about others’ dishonesty is correlated with larger-distance
lies. Although these mentioned effects are low, they support related research suggesting that be-
liefs about the prevailing descriptive norms (i.e., others’ dishonesty in similar games) influence
people’s tendency to be dishonest (Bicchieri et al., 2019).
5 Concluding Remarks
Morality is often considered to restrict people from making self-serving decisions that are morally
questionable. As opposed to treating morality as a goal in itself, it is sometimes treated as a set of
internalized constraints on people’s real goal of pursuing self-interest. In that case, people strategi-
cally acquire information to create moral wiggle room that makes otherwise morally unacceptable
14Note that in the rolling page of Single Roll treatment, participants are not allowed to roll after the first one, but
they can deliberately stay on the page until they click the “Next” button. This variable is not added for the analysis in
other treatments because people stay on the page while rolling the dice. In the Single Roll treatment, they cannot do
anything on this page.
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decisions appear morally acceptable. As people increasingly have access to an abundance of in-
formation, understanding how people use their discretion over various kinds of information in
moral dilemmas is increasingly important.
In this study, we investigate how people strategically collect additional non-instrumental
information to justify morally questionable decisions. We use a modified dice-rolling experiment
where the availability and the content of additional information vary between subjects. This de-
sign enables us to disentangle what motivates collecting additional information, and to investigate
how this affects dishonest reporting. We provide novel evidence that curiosity about related and
unrelated information is heightened when being curious can help circumvent the moral obligation
to report honestly. Even though people’s curiosity is associated with more dishonest behavior, we
find no treatment effect on dishonest reporting, suggesting a more complex underlying mecha-
nism.
We obtain evidence that people acquire additional information—not only to search for
justifications—but also to distract themselves from the moral conflict. Even after the reporting
decision has been made in the Single Roll treatment, we find that people who misreport are more
likely to acquire additional information to evaluate the credibility of their past lies. Further analy-
ses provide additional evidence that people tend to use additional information to assess the credi-
bility of potential lies rather than merely searching for justifications for selfish behavior.
Our study fills an important gap in the behavioral research literature by showing that infor-
mation acquisition can be a strategic behavior. Previous research on information preferences in
moral contexts has devoted considerable attention on information avoidance (Dana et al., 2007;
Golman et al., 2017; Grossman and Van der Weele, 2017). We provide experimental evidence that
people actively collect non-instrumental information when tempted by the benefits of being dis-
honest. Our findings support the notion that people attempt to circumvent moral constraints rather
than having a preference for morality (Rabin, 1995). As people often have discretion over how
much information to collect and consider before making moral decisions, understanding endoge-
nous information collection and processing choices is essential to improve our understanding of
behavior and to design better policies.
We provide evidence that information collection is linked with higher levels of dishonesty
even when the information is not related to the task. Although our design limits us to providing
a more detailed investigation of the motivations, previous literature suggests that people might
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rationally seek inattention to distract themselves when making decisions (Gabaix, 2019; Sims,
2003, 2006). In the domain of moral cognition, becoming inattentive to moral standards can make
it easier for people to excuse diverging from their standards (Mazar et al., 2008). Our findings on
the systematic collection of unrelated information provide another interesting trait: people seem
to collect information to distract themselves from moral dilemmas.
Even though our experimental investigation is concerned with endogenous information col-
lection, we also contribute to research on how counterfactual information affects moral cognition
(Bassarak et al., 2017; Effron, 2018; Shalvi et al., 2011). Previous literature finds that people tend
to process new pieces of information to confirm their own beliefs. Though we find evidence of
this, we find that people seem to not change their decisions based on the content of the addi-
tional information. Instead, our results suggest that dishonest people tend to acquire additional
information to justify their dishonest decisions.
Our results provide insights that increase our understanding of the link between informa-
tion and moral decisions by suggesting that people could use unnecessary information to justify
morally questionable decisions. This insight is important as people have access to extensive in-
formation about many different topics in their daily life. Thus, we believe our results can increase
our comprehension of social and economic decisions as our research serves as a step towards
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Figure 1: Potential Outcome of the Dice by Treatments
Note: This figure shows the potential outcomes of the dice in each treatment. Just to represent potential outcomes and the limitations
of the treatments, we visualize four random outcomes. In Single Roll and Three Rolls treatments number of rolls is limited by design
whereas in the Multiple Numbers and Multiple Figures treatments participants can roll the dice as many times as they want (unlimited).


























Figure 2: Experiment Procedure
Note: Treatments are built on the variation of rolling rules. After participants are randomly assigned to one of the treatments, they roll the dice as many times as allowed (or they chose in the Multiple Rolls and Multiple Figures. After rolling they are asked
to report the outcome of the first roll with being informed that the final payoff is calculated over the reported number.
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Figure 3: Distribution of Reported Numbers
Note: This figure shows the distribution of reported numbers for each treatment separately. The dashed line represents theoretical
expectation on the share of each outcome from rolling a dice which is equal to 0.16. As can be seen fraction of 5 and 6 is higher than
the theoretical expectation whereas fraction of reporting lower numbers fell below the theoretical expectation.
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Figure 4: Number of Rolls Before Reporting
Note: Bars are ses. This figure shows average number of rolls for each treatment in which participants can roll the dice as many times
as they want. For each treatment, the number of rolls is shown by the outcome of the first roll as below or equal 3(< = 3) and above
3(>3). As can be seen in the figure, participants who saw lower first outcome roll significantly more times than those who saw higher
numbers. This holds for both Multiple-rolls treatments (numbers and figures) in which participants can roll as many times as they
want before reporting. (p < 0,001)
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Figure 5: Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Number of Rolls
Note: This figure shows average number of rolls for each treatment in which participants can roll the dice as many times as they want
and the outcomes of rolls are numbers. The only difference is that in the Multiple Numbers treatment they can roll the dice before
reporting (ex-ante) whereas in the Single Roll treatment they can only roll additional rolls after reporting (ex-post). Number of rolls
is shown by the outcome of the first roll as below or equal 3(< = 3) and above 3(>3). As can be seen in the figure, participants who
saw lower first roll-outcomes roll significantly more times than those who saw higher numbers. This holds for both Multiple Numbers
and Single Roll treatments in which participants can roll as many times as they want before reporting. Although this result is not
pre-registered we find it valuable to show the information seeking even when there is no instrumental value that can affect the final
reporting behavior and the outcome.
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Figure 6: Distribution of Number of Rolls
Note: this figure shows the distribution of how many times participants chose to roll by treatments in the rows and the outcome of the
first roll on the columns.
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Figure 7: Number of Ex-Post Rolls and Dishonesty
Note: This figure shows the mean number of rolls for the Single Roll treatment by groups of dishonest (misreport) and honest




Table 1: Summary Descriptives Table by Groups of Treatment
Multiple Figures Multiple Numbers Single Roll Three Rolls
N = 386 N = 397 N = 409 N = 388
Panel A
Age 37.8 (11.5) 38.7 (12.1) 39.0 (12.5) 38.3 (10.5)
Gender (= F) 0.47 (0.50) 0.48 (0.50) 0.45 (0.50) 0.44 (0.50)
Education:
High School or Less 38 (11.5%) 52 (14.7%) 45 (12.5%) 41 (12.2%)
Higher Than High School 292 (88.5%) 301 (85.3%) 316 (87.5%) 295 (87.8%)
Panel B
Norms 4.93 (2.80) 4.88 (2.60) 4.81 (2.78) 5.15 (2.76)
Feeling Observed 7.02 (3.25) 6.98 (3.21) 6.77 (3.13) 6.82 (3.36)
Political Views 3.39 (2.39) 3.48 (2.49) 3.18 (2.43) 3.45 (2.37)
Note: Values in the upper part of the table are self-reported demographics and beliefs elicited with a survey. It is clear from this table
that sample was well balanced across treatments in terms of observable characteristics and beliefs. Political views are scaled from 0
(very liberal) to 8 (very conservative).
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Table 2: Logistic Regression for Rolling More than Once
Dependent variable:
Keep Rolling ( = 1)
(Multiple Numbers) (Multiple Figures)






Log Likelihood −225.443 −218.645
Note: Results show that, in both treatments higher observed numbers in the first roll decreases the likelihood of “Keep Rolling”
significantly; se.s are in parentheses. dydx shows the marginal effect of ”First Roll”. Unlisted controls: Age, Gender, Norms, Feeling
Observed, Political views, Income level, Education Level, Belief on Lying in the Experiment.∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table 3: Predictors of "distance" (Reported - Real Outcome) across Treatments
Dependent variable: distance
(Single Roll) (Three Rolls) (Multiple Numbers) (Multiple Figures)




Time Report 0.002 0.013 0.012 0.005
(0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.005)
Age −0.011∗ −0.018∗∗ −0.027∗∗∗ −0.007
(0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007)
Sex (F) −0.400∗∗ −0.136 −0.270∗ −0.469∗∗∗
(0.157) (0.180) (0.154) (0.149)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 347 317 324 331
Note: To explain distance of the lie, we use behavioral measures that are collected in the game and other covariates like self-reported
unobservable characteristics; se.s are in parentheses. Time Report variables show the seconds participants spent on reporting and
rolling the dice. A subset of data used to make this estimation to exclude participants with first outcome of 6 (since including these
participants masks the effects of other covariates with 0 lying). Unlisted controls: Political view, Income level, Education Level,
Belief on Lying in the Experiment. When we make the same estimation for only dishonest people, we observe that 1 additional





A.1 Details of Dishonesty
Shalvi et al. (2011) argue that observing higher counterfactuals causes misreporting to reach
higher potential payoff. On the other hand, Gneezy et al. (2018) predicts that participants would
refrain from fully using the strategic advantages when lying as the size of the lie increases. In this
section we report results about lying behavior that are not pre-registered. Figure A.1 shows the
average reported number by the first roll. As can be seen, for every outcome we observe lying
which is higher for values lower than 4 compare to higher outcomes. Our results show that partic-
ipants who misreported mostly reported 6, while some share report lower numbers as can be seen
in Figure A.2. Distribution of overall (pooled sample of honest and dishonest reporters) reports
also show high share of 6 reports in Figure 3. The dashed line in Figure 3 shows the theoretical
share of each number which is 1/6 (0.16).
A.2 Dishonesty and Ex-Post Information Collection
As shown in the main results, we observe that people who see a lower outcome in the first roll
and who misreport are more likely to roll the dice ex-post, after the report has been submitted. To
complete the analysis on that here, we provide an an extra analysis on the relation between dis-
honesty and ex-post rolls. As can be seen in the Table A.1, there is a positive relation between the
distance (the size of the lie) and the ex-post number of rolls. As mentioned earlier, although this
result is not pre-registered we find it crucial to understand the relation between moral decisions
and curiosity. In a digital dice rolling game, people who misreport collect information by rolling






















Figure A.1: Dishonesty and the Outcome of the First Roll







































Figure A.2: Distribution of Dishonesty
Note: This figure shows the distribution of reported numbers for the participants who reported dishonestly. The figure is separated by
the potential outcomes of the first roll and each column corresponds to a level as indicated in the upper titles. Most of the participants
reported 6 while for lower outcomes of the first roll slightly higher variation can be seen. We do not observe any “negative lying.”
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Table A.1: Dishonesty in the Single Roll Treatment and Number of Ex-post Rolls
Dependent variable:
distance
# of Ex-Post Rolls 0.058∗∗∗
(0.022)










Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Ex-post rolls and dishonesty: se.s are in parentheses. To explain the relation between ex-post rolls and dishonesty, we use behavioral
measures that are collected in the game and other covariates such as self-reported unobservable characteristics. A subset of data was
used to make this estimation to exclude participants with first outcome of 6 (since including these participants masks the effects of


































Figure B.1: Instructions for the Three Rolls Treatment
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Figure B.2: Instructions for the Multiple Numbers Treatment
100
Chapter II




























Doing Well While Doing Good:  
Does the Presence of Profit Motives in CSR have Adverse Effects on 




Joel W. Berge  
Department of Accounting, Auditing and Law 
NHH Norwegian School of Economics 
 
Farah M. Arshad 








Many firms increasingly engage in a win-win approach to corporate social responsibility (CSR), 
whereby their charitable efforts also reap business profits. Even though many view capitalism as an 
unparalleled vehicle for meeting societal needs, research finds that people tend to perceive profit-seeking 
as immoral and in conflict with social good. This paper uses a pre-registered natural field-experiment to 
investigate whether the win-win approach to CSR has adverse effects on employee opportunism. 
Drawing on previous research, we examine whether the presence of a profit motive in win-win CSR 
enables employees to form self-serving beliefs about the employer that can justify acting 
opportunistically toward the employer. Through employing 1,500 online employees to work for our sole 
proprietorship, we find that engagements in either philanthropic or win-win CSR do not significantly 
impact employee opportunism. However, we find that the CSR initiatives affect the employees’ 
perceptions of the employer and that engaging in win-win CSR adversely affects these perceptions 
compared to philanthropic CSR. Even though perceptions of the employer are separately correlated with 
employee opportunism, engaging in CSR seems to affect many perceptions that have offsetting effects 
on employee opportunism—likely resulting in insignificant treatment effects. Thus, this study suggests 
that, although engaging in win-win CSR undermines the positive perceptions of engaging in CSR, it 
does not significantly increase employee opportunism.  
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Despite Milton Friedman’s famous argument that the “firm’s only social responsibility is to increase its 
profits” (Friedman, 1970), corporate social responsibility (CSR) has become one of the most common 
modern business practices. A classical understanding of CSR is that firms have a social responsibility—
beyond their legal and contractual obligations—to sacrifice some of their profits in the interest of society 
(Benabou & Tirole, 2010; Sprinkle & Maines, 2010). However, firms have started to rethink CSR from 
being about sacrificing profits to being endeavors that could benefit both society and the firm’s bottom-
line, i.e., win-win CSR. Firms such as Google, Nestlé, Pepsi, Unilever, and Walmart now approach CSR 
by finding ways in which their charitable efforts can also be beneficial to the firm, such that they can 
“do well while doing good” (Porter & Kramer, 2011). 
Despite the popularity of the win-win approach to CSR, little empirical evidence exists on the 
consequences of mixing profit and charitable motives in CSR. A large body of research has examined 
how corporate philanthropy can have indirect benefits to firms, such as increasing consumers’ 
willingness to pay for products (Besley & Ghatak, 2007; Lii & Lee, 2012), motivating employees to 
exert effort (Balakrishnan, Sprinkle, & Williamson, 2011), and attracting talent (Bode & Singh, 2017). 
However, a recent strand of research investigates under what conditions CSR may have adverse effects. 
In particular, List and Momeni (2020) provide field-based evidence that framing the firm’s charitable 
efforts as made on behalf of workers can backfire as it triggers moral-licensing effects among workers. 
Cassar and Meier (2018a) show that using CSR to incentivize employees to exert more effort can 
backfire because employees perceive this instrumental usage of CSR as unkind. These findings suggest 
that the effect of CSR on employee behavior is not only dependent on the social cause underlying the 
CSR initiatives but also on how employees morally perceive these engagements. Though research 
suggests that people tend to perceive the mixing of profit and charitable motives negatively 
(Bhattacharjee, Baron, & Dana, 2017; Newman & Cain, 2014), scant empirical evidence exists on the 
consequences of engaging in win-win CSR on employee behavior. 
In this paper, we investigate whether the win-win approach to CSR can affect firm profitability by 
influencing employees’ tendency to behave opportunistically toward their employer. Employees often 





Goldstein, 2004; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999). Employee opportunism incurs a significant cost on 
firms (Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, 2018)1 and comprises a variety of adverse behaviors 
such as misreporting (Antle & Eppen, 1985), shirking (Holmstrom, 1979), and theft (Cialdini et al., 
2004). Because employees often feel morally obliged to be loyal to an employer they perceive to be kind 
(Burbano & Chiles, 2020), holding their employer in high opinion reduces employees’ ability to self-
justify taking advantage of opportunities to serve their self-interest. Tella et al. (2015) demonstrate that 
if people have incentives to behave selfishly (such as employees may have), they tend to develop more 
negative beliefs about those affected by their behavior (e.g., their employer or superior). Although 
perceiving the employer negatively can help justify opportunism, employees do not hold beliefs they 
cannot reasonably justify to themselves (Kunda, 1990; Tella et al., 2015). 
We posit that the presence of profit motives in CSR (i.e., win-win CSR) might provide employees 
with sufficient ambiguity concerning the employer’s underlying motivation for engaging in CSR such 
that it can be used to justify opportunistic behavior toward the employer. Even though many describe 
capitalism as an unparalleled vehicle for meeting societal needs (Porter & Kramer, 2011; Schultze, 
1977), research in psychology finds that people tend to perceive profit-seeking as immoral and in 
conflict with social good (Bhattacharjee et al., 2017). Even when exchanges are mutually beneficial, 
people tend to perceive economic activities as zero-sum games in which someone has to lose for 
someone else to win (Baron, Bazerman, & Shonk, 2016). In some instances, mixing profit motives with 
charitable efforts can even lead people to evaluate efforts as worse than analogous efforts that produce 
no charitable benefits (Newman & Cain, 2014). Because employees can benefit themselves by betraying 
their employer, we posit that employees are likely to form self-serving beliefs about the employer (e.g., 
the employer only cares about the money) that help justify acting opportunistically toward the employer. 
We conduct a natural field experiment (Harrison & List, 2004) to investigate the consequences of 
win-win CSR on employee opportunism. We hired 1,500 high-quality US workers on Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk) to work for our sole proprietorship. Those who accepted the job worked on 
a set of tasks specifically designed to non-obtrusively measure opportunistic employee behavior: 
                                                     
1 Estimations of the size of the cost suggest that it amounts to about 5% of firm’s annual revenue (Association 





shirking and misreporting. We randomized workers into one of three treatments to study how CSR 
approaches affect employee opportunism. Similar to List & Momeni (2020), workers received a message 
about one out of three initiatives recently undertaken by the employer. Specifically, in the baseline 
condition, workers read about a recent marketing campaign in a local newspaper (NO_CSR). This 
condition serves as a baseline as there is no mention of any CSR initiatives that benefit society. In the 
first treatment condition, workers read about a philanthropic donation the employer made to a local non-
profit organization (CSR). In the second treatment condition, workers read about a win-win CSR 
initiative the firm had engaged in together with the local non-profit organization (WIN_CSR). All the 
descriptions portrayed actual initiatives of the sole proprietorship.2 
Our results show employee opportunism across all conditions. Many employees shirked on tasks, 
and about 30 % choose to misreport to increase their payment. However, different from our pre-
registered hypotheses, we find that employee opportunism is not affected by the employer’s CSR 
choices. Specifically, employees shirk and misreport to the same extent regardless of the employer 
engaging in philanthropic CSR, win-win CSR, or marketing (i.e., NO_CSR). Neither do we find a 
significant difference in employee opportunism between our CSR treatments. 
In developing our hypotheses, we conjectured that CSR affects employee opportunism by affecting 
the employees’ perceptions of the employer. To investigate this mechanism, we prompted workers to 
provide anonymous feedback concerning their perceptions of the employer’s moral integrity, 
opportunism, and profitability. Consistent with our conjectures, we find significant treatment effects on 
employees’ perceptions of the employer. Specifically, employees in the win-win CSR treatment 
perceived the employer significantly less favorably than employees in the philanthropic CSR 
treatment—and similar to employees in the marketing condition (NO_CSR). Furthermore, we find that 
perceptions of the employer’s moral integrity and opportunism are correlated with employee 
opportunism, suggesting that perceptions of the employer matter for employee opportunism. However, 
analysis of the employees’ feedback provides a suggestive explanation for why we observe no treatment-
                                                     





effect: engaging in CSR affects multiple perceptions that seem to have offsetting effects on employee 
opportunism. 
This paper makes an important contribution to research on the consequences of CSR on employee 
behaviors (Balakrishnan et al., 2011; Burbano & Chiles, 2020; Cassar & Meier, 2018a, 2018b; List & 
Momeni, 2020) by being the first to investigate whether win-win CSR can have adverse effects on 
employee opportunism. Previous studies investigating the link between CSR and employee behaviors 
have predominately studied the effect of CSR on employee behavior by using sacrificial corporate 
donations to charity (Balakrishnan et al., 2011; Burbano & Chiles, 2020; Church, Kuang, & Liu, 2019; 
List & Momeni, 2020). One exception is Cassar & Meier (2018a) who examine whether corporate 
donations could be used instrumentally to exert more effort from the workers. In their experimental 
setting, the corporate donation is contingent on employees’ level of effort to incentivize prosocial 
employees to work harder. The focus of our study, however, is on how engaging in win-win CSR, which 
is independent of employees’ effort and not linked to employees’ compensation, affects employee 
behavior. To that end, we establish a field-setting where CSR initiatives can be mutually beneficial to 
the charity and the firm. This provides a novel setting to examine the consequences of various 
approaches to CSR on employee behavior. 
Our results from our analysis of the underlying mechanisms may also shed light on why previous 
research seems to produce mixed results on the effect of philanthropic CSR on employee opportunism. 
While Burbano and Chiles (2020) find that employee misreporting decreases substantially when the 
employer engages in philanthropic CSR, List & Momeni (2020) find no effect on employee misconduct 
when workers are informed that the firm engages in a philanthropic CSR initiative.3 Our findings show 
that engaging in CSR affects employer-perceptions quite broadly, resulting in changes in several 
employer-perceptions. Further correlational results suggest that the affected perceptions have offsetting 
effects on employee opportunism, suggesting that the effect of CSR on employee opportunism relies on 
the relative strength of affected employer-perceptions. 
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we provide the background of our study 
and the rationale behind our hypotheses. In Section 3, we present the experimental design. Section 4 
contains results and additional analyses. In Section 5, we discuss our findings along with caveats and 
suggestions for further research. 
2. RELATED LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
A common understanding of CSR is that it involves voluntary firm endeavors that benefit society and 
go beyond a firm’s legal and contractual obligations (Benabou & Tirole, 2010; Sprinkle & Maines, 
2010). CSR is a multifaceted phenomenon in organizations, and companies approach CSR in many 
different ways (Huang & Watson, 2015). However, CSR initiatives are often an integral part of a firm’s 
competitive strategy (Huang & Watson, 2015), the decisions often reside at higher levels of the 
organization (Panapanaan, Linnanen, Karvonen, & Phan, 2003; Vashchenko, 2015), and lower-level 
employees are typically merely informed about the CSR choices of the firm (Werre, 2003). 
In contrast to the traditional CSR approach, whereby firms sacrifice profits in society’s interest, 
some propose a win-win approach to CSR whereby firms can find ways to directly profit from producing 
social value (Porter & Kramer, 2011). Although the philanthropic approach to CSR rarely comes without 
any indirect benefits (e.g., improving customers’ perception of the firm (Servaes & Tamayo, 2013) or 
attracting talent (Bode & Singh, 2017)), the win-win approach is distinctly different as it makes profit 
motives apparent. For instance, Nestlé used extensive resources to improve small farmers’ working 
conditions in rural areas of Africa, not only to help farmers in impoverished areas (charitable motive) 
but also to improve the productivity of their farmers in their own supply chain (profit motive). 
Though harnessing the selfish motive for profit to address social issues is argued to be more 
sustainable than relying on corporate philanthropy, research shows that people tend to perceive profit-
seeking as immoral and in conflict with social good (Bhattacharjee et al., 2017). Even when exchanges 
with profit-seeking firms are mutually beneficial, people tend to perceive economic activities as zero-
sum games in which someone has to lose for someone else to win (Baron et al., 2016). As a result, profit-
seeking is often perceived to entail a certain degree of anti-social behavior incompatible with prosocial 





the case with win-win CSR. In fact, Newman and Cain (2014) find a “tainted altruism” effect whereby 
efforts that realized both charitable and personal benefits were evaluated less favorably than efforts that 
realized no charitable benefits.  
2.1.  Link between Employee Opportunism and CSR 
Employees often face situations where they can personally benefit from “betraying” their employer 
(Cialdini et al., 2004; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999). Employee opportunism encompasses a variety of 
adverse behaviors such as inducing budgetary slack (Antle & Eppen, 1985), exaggerate performance 
reports (Maas & Van Rinsum, 2013), shirking (Holmstrom, 1979), and theft (Cialdini et al., 2004). 
Common for all these behaviors is that employees can serve their self-interest with minimal risk of 
contractual penalties. Without proper controls to align employees’ interests with the employer’s 
interests, classical economic theory predicts that employees take full advantage of opportunities to serve 
their self-interest with little concern about how these choices affect the employer (Becker, 1968; 
Lambert, 2007). However, behavioral research finds that employees in an agency relationship might not 
take advantage of these opportunities to serve their self-interest because of moral considerations 
(Gneezy, Kajackaite, & Sobel, 2018; Stevens & Thevaranjan, 2010). 
Prior research proposes several theoretical mechanisms in which CSR choices affect employee’s 
decisions to behave opportunistically. One research strand argues that CSR increases employees’ 
identification with their organization, evoking more organizational behavior (Brockner, Senior, & 
Welch, 2014; Burbano, 2019). Recently, List and Momeni (2020) posit that CSR can affect employee 
behavior through a gift-exchange effect, triggering reciprocity toward the employer—but framing the 
firm’s charitable efforts as made on behalf of workers can backfire as it triggers moral licensing effects. 
Others suggest that CSR might affect employees’ internal cost-benefit analysis for acting unethically 
where people trade off the material benefits of being dishonest with the cost of adversely updating their 
moral self-concept (Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008). That is, employees might feel worse about acting 
opportunistically when they perceive their employer to be socially responsible (Burbano & Chiles, 2020; 





Since employees often have opportunities to behave opportunistically, holding the employer in high 
opinion constrains employees’ ability to justify taking advantage of opportunities to serve their own 
self-interest. Alternatively, acting opportunistically toward an employer that is perceived as unkind and 
opportunistic is easier to justify to oneself and others, thereby reducing the intrinsic moral cost of acting 
selfishly (Shalvi, Gino, Barkan, & Ayal, 2015). Tella et al. (2015) demonstrate that if people have 
incentives to act selfishly, they tend to be “conveniently upset” with those affected by their decisions. 
That is, they develop more negative beliefs about those affected by their selfish actions because that 
could excuse their selfish actions. However, people are only able to distort their beliefs about others 
when they can construct seemingly reasonable justifications for their views (Haisley & Weber, 2010; 
Kunda, 1990; Tella et al., 2015). 
We posit that employee opportunism is affected by the firm’s CSR choices by affecting perceptions 
of morality and the opportunism of their employer. When the firm engages in philanthropic CSR (only 
charitable motive), we predict that employees perceive the absence of profit motives as an unambiguous 
signal that the employer is moral and benevolent, triggering a moral obligation to reciprocate the 
charitable efforts by reducing misbehavior on the job. However, when the firm engages in win-win CSR 
(mix of charitable and profit motives), we posit that the presence of a profit motive makes the signal 
ambiguous, enabling employees to form self-serving beliefs about the employer. Because the mixing of 
motives in win-win CSR produces some interpretative leeway about the employer’s true intentions, 
employees can use that ambiguity to convince themselves that the employer is opportunistic and use 
that as an excuse to act opportunistically. Collectively, these arguments form the following hypotheses 
about the effect of the different approaches to CSR on employee opportunism: 
H1: Employees are less likely to behave opportunistically if the firm engages in a CSR-initiative 
without apparent profit-motives compared to if it engages in a business initiative with an apparent profit 
motive. 
H2: Employees are more likely to behave opportunistically if the firm engages in a CSR-initiative 






H3: Employees are more likely to behave opportunistically if the firm engages in a CSR-initiative 
with apparent profit-motives compared to if it engages in a business initiative with an apparent profit 
motive. 
3. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
We conduct our empirical study as a natural field experiment (Harrison & List, 2004; List & Momeni, 
2020), using workers from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk). MTurk is an online labor market where 
requesters can hire workers to perform tasks in exchange for payment. The tasks are designed to allow 
workers to shirk or misreport without risking their reputation on the platform. We hired online 
employees to perform a set of tasks for one of the authors’ sole proprietorship. The sole proprietorship—
Synosis—is officially registered in the Norwegian Company Register.4 
3.1.  Procedure 
We posted a job description on MTurk that included a general description of the tasks, information about 
the job’s estimated duration, the fixed-payment size, and an opportunity to earn a bonus payment. 
Notably, the job description informed potential workers that by accepting the job, they also accepted 
that anonymized data could be used for non-commercial research purposes (i.e., informed consent). 
Those who accepted the job were redirected to a website managed by Synosis. On the first page, the 
employees read a description of the employer and read about one of three recent employer-initiatives 
(see Section 3.1.2). Before the workers started working on the tasks, they had to demonstrate that they 
were not a robot5 by using their own words to describe why the employer made the initiative presented 
to them. Employees started working on the prediction and object identification tasks in random order. 
Once these tasks were completed, they were prompted to provide anonymous feedback to the employer. 
That is, they rated to what extent they agreed to the following statements (0 totally disagree to 11 totally 
agree): i) “Synosis is a company with high moral integrity,” ii) “Synosis would take advantage of others 
to benefit itself,” iii) “Synosis is a profitable company,” and iv) “Synosis cares only about its own 
                                                     
4 To ensure a high level of research ethics, we obtained approval from the Institutional Review Board at the 
Norwegian School of Economics. We also followed the recommendations of Libby and Salterio (2019) to obtain 
informed consent and provide debriefing opportunities to employees. Research funds were used to pay for 
donations and to pay online employees. 






interests”. Employees were then asked whether they wanted to do an unpaid transcribing task for the 
employer. 
Before reaching the last page containing their submission code, all employees filled out 
demographic information. On the final page, workers were encouraged to visit the company website on 
April 20, 2020, to read more about the non-commercial research conducted with the generated data (i.e., 
debriefing). 
3.1.1 Tasks 
We developed a set of tasks from various traffic situations using the oTree software (Chen, Schonger, 
& Wickens, 2016). We used traffic context because this setting is familiar to many and computerized 
algorithms often rely on people’s assistance and input to process visual images of traffic situations. The 
following tasks were specifically designed to measure various employee behaviors in a field-based 
setting: 
First, the prediction task. This task measures employee dishonesty with no risk of detection. 
Employees are presented with images of four cars driving on a highway. A computer will pick out one 
of the cars for a random speed control. Because these drivers should not systematically predict what cars 
would be picked out, the employees are asked to predict which car would be chosen by the computer. 
To motivate their predictions, employees receive a bonus payment (+ 0.4 USD) if they can predict the 
computer’s choice. Based on the “mind game” (Jiang, 2013; Kajackaite & Gneezy, 2017), we instructed 
employees to make a mental prediction, remember it, and report their prediction after observing what 
car was chosen. Since employees do not pre-register their predictions, they can claim to have correctly 
predicted the outcome regardless of their actual ex-ante predictions. Misreporting is, therefore, 
impossible to detect on an individual level but can be inferred on an aggregate level. Figure 1 is a 
screenshot of the prediction task.  
 —INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE— 
Second, the object identification task. This task measures employees’ tendency to shirk on real effort 
tasks. Employees are presented with images of traffic situations from the Seattle Area (wsdot.com). The 





employees are instructed to investigate the images carefully and use sliders to indicate the number of 
vehicles, red lights, and pedestrians on each image. Because the images are blurry and difficult to 
inspect, employees have to exert effort to identify all relevant objects correctly.6 Thus, we use the 
number of misidentified objects as a proxy for shirking (similar to List & Momeni, 2020). Figure 2 
shows a screenshot of one of the traffic images. 
—INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE— 
After employees finished working on tasks, they were asked whether they would be willing to work 
on additional unpaid transcribing tasks for the employer. Prior research suggests one mechanism through 
which CSR might affect employee behavior through an increased sense of moral obligation (Burbano 
& Chiles, 2020). We included the optional transcribing task to investigate whether workers tend to 
exhibit “gift-exchange” motives (e.g., Bradler, Dur, Neckermann, & Non, 2016; Kube, Maréchal, & 
Puppe, 2012; List & Momeni, 2020) by reciprocating the employer’s CSR efforts by working for free. 
Because workers knew they could stop transcribing whenever they wanted to, we could precisely 
measure how much unpaid work the workers did across treatment conditions.7 A screenshot of the 
transcribing task is provided in the Appendix. 
3.1.2 Treatments Groups 
We follow List and Momeni (2020) and randomize workers into one of the three treatment groups. To 
avoid self-selection effects (i.e., benevolent employees want to work for firms that do CSR), we did not 
provide information about the employer’s CSR initiatives in the job description. Only workers who 
accepted the job contract were provided with information about one of three different initiatives recently 
undertaken by the employer—Synosis. Depending on their treatment allocations, the workers read about 
either (1) a marketing campaign in a local newspaper (NO_CSR), (2) a philanthropic donation to a non-
profit organization, or (3) a win-win CSR initiative together with the same non-profit organization. Each 
description portrayed an actual initiative taken by Synosis. 
                                                     
6 All the employees are provided with the same traffic images to facilitate comparisons between employees. 
Though employees vary in their ability to correctly specify objects from blurry images, random allocation allows 
us to investigate systematic differences in mistakes made by employees between treatments. 
7 To ensure that the initiatives were a salient factor in workers’ decision-making (i.e., CSR or win-win CSR), 





In the NO_CSR condition, employees read that the employer invested 12% of their budget in an 
advertising campaign published in one of the largest local newspapers. Furthermore, employees read 
that Synosis made this investment to boost its reputation and attract new clients (i.e., profit motive only). 
See the Appendix for a screenshot of this condition (section i). 
In the CSR condition, employees read that the employer donated8 12% of their budget to a local non-
profit organization (i.e., City Church Mission)9 that provides free legal assistance to people in 
unfortunate situations. Moreover, employees read that Synosis did not want to use this donation for self-
promotion and therefore decided to make the donation anonymous and not publicize the donation on 
company websites. Only employees (and part-time online workers) are informed about the donation 
(i.e., charitable motive only). See the Appendix for a screenshot of this treatment (section ii). 
In the WIN_CSR condition, employees read that the employer donated 12% of their budget to the 
local non-profit organization and—in return—the non-profit organization promoted Synosis at one of 
their business-oriented events.10 Also, employees read that Synosis donated—not only because Synosis 
believes in doing good and protecting human rights—but also because the good publicity could boost 
its reputation and attract new clients (i.e., a mix of profit and charitable motives). See the Appendix for 
a screenshot of this treatment (section iii). 
3.1.3 Workers 
We posted our job offer on the MTurk platform. Among the 1,855 employees who accepted the offer, a 
total of 1,500 finished and submitted their work.11 We restricted our hiring to US workers with a 
minimum of 500 completed jobs on the platform with a 95 percent acceptance rate. Table A shows the 
descriptive statistics for all workers (i.e., employees) who submitted their work. Characteristics such as 
age, gender, education level, and income level are well-balanced across treatments. Because our data 
                                                     
8 The monetary size of the marketing campaign served as our baseline for the size of the donations in the CSR 
and WIN_CSR conditions. Furthermore, we follow List and Momeni (2020) in only disclosing the relative size of 
the investment or donation in percentage of the firm’s budgeted expenses. 
9 Because of its religious affiliations, we decided not to disclose the exact name in the experiment. 
10 The proprietor negotiated a deal with the City Church Mission that was mutually beneficial. The anonymous 
donation in the CSR condition was not mentioned during negotiations. 
11 We based our power calculation on 25% level of misreporting and a 10 % treatment effect. Power 
calculations show that we obtain 80 % power with 500 participants in each group (p1 =  0.25, p2 = 0.1775, rrisk 





was collected during the COVID-19 outbreak, we included a measure of whether employees worried 
that the Coronavirus would negatively affect their personal well-being. We find no difference in their 
self-reported worries across conditions (Kruskal-Wallis test, p = 0.26). 
—INSERT TABLE A ABOUT HERE— 
3.2. Pre-Tests 
3.2.1 Pre-Test of CSR Treatment Instruments 
Before running the experiment, we wanted to pre-test our CSR instruments to investigate whether we 
could replicate Newman and Cain’s (2014) findings on the MTurk platform, using our instruments. We 
recruited 287 subjects to participate in our survey experiment.12 The survey contained a description of a 
hypothetical firm and information about one out of three initiatives taken by the firm: In the baseline 
condition (NO_CSR), participants read about a recent marketing campaign that was intended to increase 
profits boosting the reputation of the firm. In the first treatment condition (CSR), participants read about 
a recent anonymous donation made by the firm to a non-profit organization because it believes in 
contributing to society. In the second treatment condition (WIN_CSR), participants read about a recent 
public donation to a non-profit organization and that the donation was made—not only because the firm 
believes in contributing to society—but also because the donation could boost the reputation of the firm 
and attract new clients.13 
In line with Newman and Cain (2014), we found that participants’ perception of the firm is more 
favorable in the philanthropic CSR condition (CSR) compared to win-win CSR (opportunism and moral 
integrity, both p = 0.000) and the no-CSR condition (both, p = 0.000). However, we did not find support 
for the “tainted altruism” effect, where initiatives that realize both charitable and personal benefits are 
evaluated as worse than analogous behaviors that produced no charitable benefit. Instead, we find that 
participants perceive the firm as slightly more moral if it engages in win-win CSR compared to no CSR 
                                                     
12 To combat challenges associated with using online platforms in research (Bentley, 2018), participants had 
to correctly answer two attention-check questions and had to provide free-text explanations for their answers to 
prove they were not robots. Out of the 300 who participated, 287 participants passed the attention check and were 
randomly allocated to one of the experimental conditions. 
13 The instrument we used in the experiment deviated from the one we used in the pre-test because our initial 
non-profit organization had to quit the cooperation because a lack of time. However, we were careful to design 





(Mann-Whitney, p = 0.017) but equally opportunistic (Mann-Whitney, p = 0.475).14 See Section 4.4 for 
additional findings from the survey experiments. 
3.2.2 Pre-Test of Tasks 
We pre-tested our tasks before hiring workers. It was important for our research question that the tasks 
would be perceived similarly to other tasks that MTurkers would normally do on the platform. We 
recruited fifteen participants to perform the tasks and then evaluate them from 0 (completely disagree) 
to 100 (completely agree). Participants rated the prediction task as easy to understand (mean = 84.6, std 
= 19.5), a little different from other tasks (mean = 35.6, std = 30.89), and reported that a firm would be 
likely to post a similar task on MTurk (mean = 58.9, std = 34.53).15 Participants also rated the object 
identification task as easy to understand (mean = 92.8, std = 11.1), somewhat different from other tasks 
(mean = 27.5, std = 33.4), and that a typical firm would likely post similar tasks (mean = 66.65, std = 
29.87). 
3.2.3 Payment Calibrations 
Furthermore, we wanted our payment structure to be well-calibrated to establish neutral beliefs about 
the firm. Though MTurkers are typically paid poorly (Semuels, 2018), our IRB approval stated that 
employees had to be fairly compensated for their work. To balance these concerns, we recruited and 
paid ten participants to estimate how much time it took to complete tasks and adjusted our payment 
structure accordingly.16 User-ratings obtained later suggest that payments were well-calibrated, and the 
level of payment offered by Synosis was considered average by the employees.17 
4. RESULTS 
4.1.  Hypothesis Testing 
In Section 2.1, we outline our hypotheses for how different approaches to CSR affect employee 
opportunism. Hypothesis 1 states that employees act less opportunistically when the employer engages 
                                                     
14 Though we could not replicate the tainted-altruism effect with our participants, we assumed that employees 
would be more likely to form such beliefs because this could serve as a justification to act opportunistically. 
15 The prediction task did not include an incentive to report that they had correctly predicted the outcome. This 
aspect was introduced in the calibration test. 
16 We updated our payment structure such that the estimated average hourly payment was either $ 9.2 or $ 18.4 
depending on their self-reported predictions on the prediction task (US minimum wage in 2019 = $7.25). 





in philanthropic CSR compared to no CSR. However, Hypothesis 2 posits that the presence of a profit 
motive in the CSR initiative (i.e., win-win CSR) would increase employee opportunism compared to 
philanthropic CSR. Lastly, Hypothesis 3 posits that employee opportunism is higher when the employer 
engages in win-win CSR compared to not engaging in CSR at all (i.e., no CSR). 
We use the share of employees who self-report that they correctly predicted which car would be 
selected for speed control to measure employee misreporting. Since the likelihood of making an accurate 
prediction is 25 percent, shares significantly above this threshold indicate misreporting. Figure 3 
provides a visual illustration of the share of self-reported prediction-successes across our treatments. 
We find significant misreporting on the task as 54%, 56%, and 55% of the employees in the experimental 
conditions reported that they predicted which car would be selected for speed control (one-tailed 
binomial test, for all p = 0.000). Different from our hypotheses, pairwise comparisons show no 
difference in misreporting across conditions (NO_CSR versus CSR conditions, p = 0.54; CSR versus 
WIN_CSR, p = 0.67; WIN_CSR versus CSR, p = 0.85).18 
—INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE— 
We use the number of misidentified objects employees made during the object identification task as 
our individual-level proxy for employee shirking. 19 The number of misidentified is the radical number 
of total mistakes squared such that over-identifying and under-identifying objects are treated equally. 
On average, employees made 4.45 (6.45) mistakes in the NO_CSR treatment, 4.13 (5.74) mistakes in 
CSR, and 4.58 (7.10) in the WIN_CSR. Although directionally consistent with our hypotheses, the 
differences are non-significant (Mann-Whitney tests, for all p > 0.2). The variance in the shirk measure 
is however significantly lower in the philanthropic CSR condition compared to WIN_CSR (F = 0.73, p 
= 0.001) and in NO_CSR (F = 0.74, p = 0.013). Figure 4 provides a density plot of the number of 
misidentified objects across conditions. 
—INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE— 
                                                     
18 These are Mann-Whitney non-parametric tests. The null-result is robust to using other tests of statistical 
significance. 





To further investigate how our treatments affect employee behaviors, we conduct a more 
comprehensive regression analysis of employee behaviors that include demographic information about 
employees. Table B provides an overview of regression analyses on employee behaviors. Each column 
of Table B refers to distinct employee behaviors labeled on the top of that column. 
—INSERT TABLE B ABOUT HERE— 
In the first column, results confirm our previously reported finding that the CSR manipulations do 
not affect whether individuals report having made a correct prediction in the prediction task. However, 
we find that employees’ age and income levels are negatively associated with self-reported prediction 
success. Since there is no reason why older and more affluent employees are systematically better at 
predicting a random outcome, this result suggests that these employer characteristics are associated with 
honesty. We also find that the time spent on the prediction task is negatively associated with self-
reported prediction success, suggesting a positive association between time and honesty, a similar result 
to Shalvi et al. (2012). 
The second column also shows results that confirm that the CSR manipulations do not affect the 
level of shirking among employees. Furthermore, we find very little evidence that shirking is 
significantly associated with any specific demographic variables. We only find a marginally significant 
negative relation between time spent on the task and the number of total mistakes. 
The last two columns in Table B are concerned with employees’ willingness to do unpaid volunteer 
work. Though a significant number of employees choose to do volunteer work (average 19.4 %), we 
observe no difference across conditions (see Appendix for more information on employee 
volunteering).20 
None of the regressions finds that reported belief in corporate philanthropy to be predictive of any 
measured employee behaviors. That is, their response to the question posed in Church et al. (2019), 
                                                     
20 Because we had a reminder before this decision, we investigate how results would change if we do not drop 
those who initially failed the attention check (i.e., not classified as a bot). By including them, two-tailed tests turn 





“How strongly do you personally believe that companies should sacrifice profitability to promote social 
causes?” (1 = “not at all” and 11 = “very much”). 
4.2.  Analyses of Mechanisms 
We conjectured that employee opportunism is affected by the firm’s CSR choices by affecting 
perceptions of morality and the opportunism of their employer. To investigate whether employees’ 
perceptions of the employer mediate our CSR treatments’ effect on the shirking measure, we conduct a 
path analysis with structural equation modeling. We use the shirk measure as the dependent variable 
instead of the misreporting measure (i.e., whether an employee claimed to have predicted accurately) 
because the misreport measure is measured on the treatment level and thus not appropriate for 
individual-level analyses. Thus, the shirk measure is more suitable to investigate the association between 
individual perceptions and behavior. Figure 5 provides a graphical illustration of the results from our 
path analysis. 
—INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE— 
The results support our conjectures that the presence of a profit motive in CSR (i.e., WIN_CSR 
condition) affects employees’ perceptions of the employer compared to having no (apparent) profit 
motive in philanthropic CSR (i.e., CSR condition). In particular, having a profit motive in CSR is 
negatively related to employees’ perception of moral integrity (z = -13.3, two-tailed p = 0.000) and 
positively related to their perception of opportunism (z = 16.1, two-tailed p = 0.000). Though we find 
that employees’ perception of opportunism is positively related to their level of shirking on tasks (z = 
5.22, two-tailed p = 0.000), we also find that their perception of moral integrity is positively related to 
shirking (z = 4.96, two-tailed p = 0.000). This suggests, unlike our predictions, that employees shirk 
more—not less—when they perceive the employer to have high moral integrity and that employees use 
any excuse to self-justify their opportunism.  
The indirect effect of WIN_CSR on shirk through employees’ perceived moral integrity is negative 
and significant (a*b = -1.23, p < 0.01). In contrast, the indirect effect of WIN_CSR on employees’ 
tendency to shirk through employees’ perceived opportunism is positive and significant (c*d = 1.55, p 





treatment effect of WIN_CSR on employees’ tendency to shirk (b = 0.13, p = 0.786) because their 
indirect effects seem to offset each other.21 
Collectively, our results suggest that our two mediators, employees’ perceptions about the 
employer’s moral integrity and opportunism, positively affect employee shirking. However, our 
treatment manipulations asymmetrically affect these mediators, producing offsetting indirect effects on 
shirking. In total, compared to philanthropic CSR, win-win CSR initiatives change employees’ 
perceptions of the employer but do not seem to affect employees’ tendency to act opportunistically. 
4.3.  Supplementary Analysis 
4.3.1 Attention 
To ensure that the employees did not merely skip through pages and read the instructions, we included 
an attention check that required employees to write a text that explained why Synosis made the presented 
initiative using their own words. Based on their answers and pre-registered omission criteria, we omitted 
88 employees (34 because of nonsensical answers, 18 because they copied and pasted text from the 
instruction text, 16 because of high suspicion of being a bot, and 20 because they submitted twice)22. 
We selected 15 words associated with either profit or charitable motives for engaging in the 
initiatives. Table C shows the frequency in which the employees in the different conditions use each 
word in the list and the total share of profit-motive-related words. 
—INSERT TABLE C ABOUT HERE— 
We observe that the employees who read about the marketing campaign (NO_CSR) rarely used words 
associated with charitable motives (≈ 1%). In contrast, employees who read about the philanthropic 
donation to the non-profit organization (CSR) rarely used words related to profit-motives (≈ 13%). 
Employees who read about the “win-win donation,” where the non-profit organization agreed to promote 
the firm in return for the donation (WIN_CSR), frequently used words related to profit and charitable 
                                                     
21 We include employees’ perception of firm profitability in our path model to investigate whether that yields 
similar results. In addition to our reported results that are consistent, we find a positive relation between WIN_CSR 
and perceived profitability (z = 3.49, p = 0.000), but no significant relation with shirking (z = - 1.19, p = 0.23). 
22 The share of dropped participants across conditions is: no_CSR (5.1%), CSR (5.5%), and win_CSR (3.1%). 





motives. Overall, the systematic differences in word frequencies suggest that employees paid attention 
to the instructions. 
4.3.2 Treatment Effects on Employees’ Perceptions of Employer 
In Section 0, we proposed that employees would feel morally obliged to act benevolently towards their 
employer when they perceive their employer to have high moral integrity. Tempted to misreport to earn 
additional money, we conjectured that employees would attempt to justify their opportunism by 
convincing themselves that the employer is selfish and opportunistic rather than moral. However, as 
people rarely hold unreasonable beliefs, we posited that employees would use profit motive in win-win 
CSR initiatives to form negative perceptions about the employer that could help them self-justify 
opportunistic behavior. 
The lack of treatment effects on employee opportunism could be because our manipulations did not 
change their employer-beliefs. To investigate this, we elicited their perceptions of the employer after 
they finished working on tasks. To avoid demand effects, we informed the employees that their 
responses were kept anonymous and that their answers would not affect their payment or risk of being 
rejected. Figure 6 is a graphical illustration of employees’ perceptions about the employer across 
treatment conditions. 
—INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE— 
Figure 6 shows that our manipulations significantly affected employees’ perceptions of the 
employer’s moral integrity, opportunism, selfishness, and profitability. Thus, we provide evidence that 
our CSR manipulations seem to affect many beliefs about the employer, reducing the concern that our 
treatments did not sufficiently manipulate perceptions. However, we note that we do not find support 
for a “tainted altruism” effect (Newman & Cain, 2014) among online employees, but instead find that 
employees in WIN_CSR condition perceive the employer to have slightly higher moral integrity (p = 
0.07) but be equally opportunistic (p = 0.22) compared to the NO_CSR condition. 23 
                                                     
23 The employees also reported to what extent they approved of the employer’s initiatives. We found the highest 
approval rate in the CSR condition (mean = 6.84), and this was significantly higher than the win_CSR condition 
(diff = -1.18, p = 0.000) and no_CSR condition (diff = -1.26, p = 0.000). Difference is insignificant between 





4.3.3 Task-Order Effects 
There were two mandatory tasks that the online employees had to perform. We randomized the order in 
which employees worked on the prediction task and the object identification task to control for potential 
task-order effects in our setting. There are two types of task-order effects in our experimental set-up: 
First, employees’ performance on the first task might affect how they perform on the next task (e.g., 
misreporting on the prediction task might affect their level of shirking on the object identification task). 
We conduct two separate regression analyses where we have either shirking or self-reported prediction 
success as our dependent variable. We find that shirking and self-reported prediction reports are 
significantly correlated (p = 0.015). Starting with the prediction task increases the level of shirking on 
the object identification task (β = 0.753, p = 0.027). We do not find that starting with the object 
identification task increases self-reported prediction success (p = 0.46). Thus, employees seem to be 
affected by whether the prediction task is the first task. 
Second, the saliency of the treatment manipulations might be reduced after the first task. Thus, the 
treatment manipulations might have a more substantial effect on employee opportunism on their first 
task. However, we find no significant interaction between task-order and treatment conditions on both 
self-reported prediction success and shirking (both, p > 0.1). This suggests that the order of the tasks 
does not significantly interact with the treatments. 
4.3.4 Online Employees (MTurkers) 
Although online employees are becoming an increasingly important source of human capital in 
organizations (Schwartz, Bohdal-Spiegelhoff, Gretczko, & Sloan, 2016), these workers are often less 
connected to their employer and might therefore behave differently than more “traditional” employees. 
Previous experimental research frequently uses students to proxy for lower-level managers or employees 
(e.g., Cardinaels, 2016; Evans, Hannan, Krishnan, & Moser, 2001) and superiors (e.g., Rankin, 
Schwartz, & Young, 2008; Schatzberg & Stevens, 2008). Previous research finds that MTurk workers 
are similar to student participants with respect to shirking, misreporting, and reactions to contract 





representative of the population than students (Paolacci & Chandler, 2014). Thus, online workers are 
suitable proxies for investigating the behavior of non-experts (Farrell et al., 2017). 
The demographic data of our online employees show that their average age (40 years) is closer to the 
average population age (Duffin, 2020) and higher than that of other studies using students (about 21 
years). We find that employee misreporting is comparable to the general level of dishonesty found in 
previous literature, with approximately 30 percent of our participants decided to report dishonestly (see 
Abeler et al., 2019 for a comprehensive overview). We find that about 60 percent of all employees have 
less than three mistakes on the prediction tasks. Considering the task’s difficulty, the low number of 
mistakes reveals that most workers deliver high-quality work. Furthermore, our data show that about 20 
percent of employees choose to voluntarily work on unpaid tasks for the employer, which further 
suggests that employees are not carelessly going through tasks. 
We also took preemptive measures to ensure that online employees were serious workers (Chandler, 
Mueller, & Paolacci, 2014). We required workers to have at least 500 completed tasks with a minimum 
95 percent approval rate to accept the job offer. Because workers cannot manipulate these measures, 
these qualification requirements ensured that only candidates with a proven track record on the platform 
could accept the job offer. 
4.3.5 Attrition 
We also collected data on employees who accepted the job but did not complete the tasks. The overall 
attrition rate was 19 percent (355 out of 1855 employees started working on the tasks but did not finish). 
Even though employees quit for unbeknown reasons, all employees who accepted the job were 
immediately prompted to read about one of the firm’s initiatives, which served as our primary treatment 
manipulation. This, therefore, allows us to investigate whether our treatments affected employee 
turnover. We find higher turnover rate in WIN_CSR (136/618 = 22%) compared to the CSR (104/613 = 
17%, p = 0.026), while no significant difference in turnover rates compared to the NO_CSR condition 
(115/605 = 0.19, both p < 0.20). 
Even though we limited the possibility that employees choose to work for a firm because of its CSR 





the increase in attrition could be viewed as a treatment effect as employees might be provoked or upset 
when they read about their new employer. Therefore, we may observe no significant treatment effects 
because those who would use the presence of a profit motive in CSR to justify taking advantage of the 
employer instead decided to quit. We believe that the increase in attrition in our win-win CSR treatment 
might reflect that more people take offense with the mixing of profit and charitable motives. 
4.4.  Outsiders’ Perceptions of Employee Misbehavior 
Although this study focuses on actual employee opportunism, it is important to understand how people 
outside the organization perceive internal employee opportunism depending on whether the firm 
engages in philanthropic CSR or win-win CSR. Understanding people’s expectation of employee 
opportunism is important as it is directly related to the concept of interpersonal trust (Morgan & Hunt, 
1994), which is an essential component in firms’ everyday operations (Arrow, 1974). 
There are potentially several mechanisms in which people’s perception of the firm affects their 
beliefs about internal employee opportunism in the prospective firm. For instance, firms that are 
perceived as highly moral might attract employees with high moral integrity (Fehrler & Kosfeld, 2014), 
making immoral employee behavior less likely (Boegershausen, Aquino, & Reed, 2015). Because of 
this matching, observers might not associate opportunistic employee behavior with firms that they 
perceive as highly moral. Alternatively, the choice to engage in CSR may leak information about the 
firm’s ethical culture (e.g., Cardinaels & Yin, 2015). Hence, CSR choices affect perceptions of employee 
opportunism to the extent that these choices seem indicative of the norms at play in the organization. 
In the same survey experiment that we pre-tested our CSR instruments (N=287), we also investigated 
how our CSR treatments affected participants’ evaluations of the likelihood of employee opportunism 
in that firm. To that end, we provided participants with the following case: “Consider Employee A to be 
representative of a regular employee at [the firm]. Employee A recently went on a work trip to meet 
with prospective clients for [the firm]. During the trip, Employee A met up with old friends and treated 





work-related expenses he paid during the trip”. 24 Participants then rated how likely on a scale from 0 
(extremely unlikely) to 100 (extremely likely) they thought that the employee would claim 
reimbursement for the dinner with friends by falsely reporting it as a work-related expense.25 
The results reveal that participants’ perceive employee misreporting to be significantly less likely 
when the firm engages in philanthropic CSR (M = 43.3, SE = 2.9) compared to both win-win CSR (M 
= 56.2, SE = 2.8) and no CSR (M = 55.8, SE = 2.7) (for all, p < 0.01). However, participants do not 
differ in their perception of employee misreporting between the win-win CSR condition and the no-CSR 
condition (p = 0.92).26 Coupled with our field-based findings on actual employee opportunism, this 
suggests that people tend to overestimate the extent to which firm-level CSR decisions are indicative of 
opportunistic behavior of its employees. Therefore, attempting to “do well while doing good” seems to 
undermine not only employees’ perceptions of their employer but also undermines external 
stakeholders’ perceived trust in the firm’s employees.27 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Though CSR is traditionally viewed as firms voluntarily sacrificing profits to promote social causes, a 
recent trend among practitioners is to rethink CSR from being about sacrificing profits to being 
endeavors that benefit both society and the firm’s bottom-line. Though previous research has 
documented many consequences of engaging in corporate philanthropy, no empirical evidence exists on 
the consequences of engaging in CSR with an apparent profit motive on employee behavior. 
We contribute to the previous literature by examining the consequences of win-win CSR on actual 
employee opportunism. Based on extensive evidence that people tend to view profit-seeking as in 
conflict with prosocial behavior, we use a natural field experiment to investigate whether engaging in 
win-win CSR can have adverse effects on employee opportunism. Our results suggest that the presence 
                                                     
24 We used a description of a general employee to elicit people’s perceptions of how a typical employee would 
behave in the situation and to avoid priming our participants on gender differences. 
25 Note that in our manipulations, we stated that the firm recently made initiatives. Hence, when participants 
read about “a representative of a regular employee,” they were not prompted to think of an employee who started 
working for the firm because of its CSR engagement. Furthermore, we choose the reimbursement case because it 
is explicit that misreporting would be at the firm’s expense and unrelated to its CSR initiatives. 
26 CSR compared to WIN_CSR (t(187) = -3.2 , p = 0.002) and NO_CSR (t(193) = -3.1 , p = 0.002). NO_CSR 
compared to WIN_CSR (t(188) = -0.11, p = 0.92) 





of a profit motive in win-win CSR seems to undermine employees’ perceptions of the employers’ CSR 
efforts but that the change in perceptions does not translate into a significant increase in employee 
opportunism. It is not that employer-perceptions are irrelevant for employee opportunism. Instead, 
engaging in CSR affects multiple perceptions that seem to have offsetting effects. Overall, our study 
provides field-evidence to test the hypothesis that win-win CSR increases employee opportunism. 
Although we view our study as the first to investigate the consequences of win-win CSR on actual 
employee opportunism, another factor that distinguishes our study from previous research is our detailed 
analysis of the employer-perception mechanism proposed by previous studies (Burbano & Chiles, 2020; 
Cassar & Meier, 2018a; Tella et al., 2015). Our field-based findings on the mediating role of employer-
perceptions on employee opportunism shed light on why previous research seems to produce somewhat 
mixed results on the effect of philanthropic CSR on employee opportunism. For instance, Burbano and 
Chiles (2020) report that by informing online workers about a philanthropic CSR initiative, employee 
misreporting decreased substantially with effects similar in magnitude to those who had to sign an honor 
code pledge before working. List and Momeni (2020), however, find no treatment effect on employee 
misconduct when workers are informed that the firm engages in a philanthropic CSR initiative. Our 
analysis of their feedback suggests engaging in philanthropic CSR affects more than just perceptions of 
moral integrity but also perceptions of selfishness, opportunism, and profitability, which seem to 
produce offsetting effects on employee opportunism. This result suggests that CSR affects employer-
perceptions broadly and that the effect on employee opportunism relies on the relative strength of the 
affected employer-perceptions. 
Our study also extends to research on how CSR can be used as a signaling device to attract talented 
and ethical employees (e.g., Bode & Singh, 2017; Fehrler & Kosfeld, 2014). Because the firm’s ethical 
type is hard to observe from the outside, a firm may choose to sacrifice profits in society’s interest to 
signal their type to a target audience (Zerbini, 2017). However, when the CSR initiative also has profit 
potential, the credibility of the signal diminishes because firms of low ethical type might also choose to 
engage in CSR as it is “good for business,” thereby creating a ‘lemon market’ problem (Ackerloff, 
1970). Our results are consistent with this notion, showing that people discount the signal and attribute 





Although we show that a firm’s engagements in either philanthropic or win-win CSR do not affect 
employee opportunism, our findings on how perceptions are affected may have implications for 
practitioners. This study provides evidence on an important trade-off that firms should consider when 
communicating their CSR efforts to different firm stakeholders (Du, Bhattacharya, & Sen, 2010). While 
investors push firms to frame their CSR efforts as a business case with apparent profit potential (Rangan, 
Chase, & Karim, 2015), our study shows that highlighting the profit potential of a firm’s charitable 
efforts crowds out other stakeholders’ (e.g., employees) positive perceptions from engaging in CSR. 
Our field-data show that communicating the profit potential of engaging in charitable efforts—even 
when the exchanges are mutually beneficial—may undermine evaluations of the firm’s charitable 
efforts. Being aware of this trade-off can inform firms’ communication choices when communicating 
their CSR efforts to different stakeholders. 
Related to the trade-off in communication, we find that when we asked people—in our pre-test—
about their expectations of employee opportunism, they report significantly lower expectations of 
employee opportunism only when the employer engages in philanthropic CSR. Our findings show that 
people expect employee opportunism to be more likely when the firm engages in win-win CSR 
compared to philanthropic CSR. Understanding people’s expectations of employee opportunism is 
important because that can proxy for external stakeholders’ trust in the organization (Morgan & Hunt, 
1994), which is crucial for firms’ future financial performance (Arrow, 1974; Lins, Servaes, & Tamayo, 
2017). Thus, this study suggests that firms’ attempt to “do well while doing good” may evaporate any 
“trust benefits” associated with engaging in CSR. 
We recognize a number of limitations in this study that provide opportunities for further research. 
One potential limitation is that we only hired experienced employees with high approval ratings on 
MTurk to avoid hiring unserious employees, i.e., at least 500 completed tasks with a minimum of 95 
percent approval. It is possible that, because of their extensive experience, our employees have worked 
on numerous tasks where they have been tempted to cheat for additional money. Over time, this might 
have desensitized them to moral dilemmas (Engelmann & Fehr, 2016) and made them automatize their 
responses to moral conflicts (Moore & Loewenstein, 2004). Potentially, this could explain why 





should investigate whether prolonged exposure to situations with moral conflict reduces people’s 
sensitivity to contextual and situational factors in moral decision-making. 
Another limitation is that we use online or gig-workers to study how an employer’s CSR initiatives 
affect employee opportunism. Although gig-workers are becoming an increasingly important source of 
human capital in organizations (Schwartz et al., 2016), gig-workers are less connected to their employer 
and might respond differently than more “traditional” employees who work full-time for the firm. 
However, using online workers allows for a clean manipulation of employees’ perceptions of the 
employer (since they do not have prior knowledge of the firm) and presents the opportunity to obtain 
sufficient statistical power to detect potential treatment effects. Further research could benefit from 
cooperating with organizations and conducting field experiments on traditional employees to investigate 
whether engaging in philanthropic or win-win CSR have different effects on employee perceptions and 
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FIGURE 1.—Screenshot of the prediction task in the field experiment. Employees are instructed to 
make a mental prediction of which car will be randomly selected for a speed control by the computer. 
The computer selects one of the cars with equal probability. Employees self-report whether their mental 


























FIGURE 2.—Screenshot of the effort task in the field experiment. Employees inspect two images of 
traffic situations and are instructed to identify the number of vehicles, red traffic lights, and pedestrians 






















FIGURE 3.—The figure displays the mean scores of self-reported prediction outcomes across 
treatment conditions. The notation “ns” indicates p-values above conventional significance levels for 
pairwise Mann-Whitney U-test comparisons. The dotted line indicates the expected level of accurate 
























FIGURE 4.—The figure displays density plots of employees’ total number of misidentified objects on 
the identification task (shirking measure) across treatment conditions. To improve readability, we censor 


































FIGURE 5.—The figure shows the path analysis (N = 945), where we compare the two CSR 
conditions, CSR and WIN_CSR. All paths displayed are estimated jointly using the maximum likelihood 
method. The standardized path coefficients and corresponding two-tailed p-values are shown next to 
each path. Solid lines indicate significant coefficients at a 0.1 level or less. WIN_CSR is the information 
about the CSR initiative that benefitted both the firm and the non-profit organization. This variable 
equals 1 if the employee received information about the win-win CSR initiative and 0 if they received 
information about the philanthropic CSR initiative that only benefited the non-profit organization. 
PERCEIVED MORAL INTEGRITY represents the extent to which employees agreed with the 
statement that Synosis is a firm with high moral integrity (0 = “Completely disagree”, 4 = “Neither agree 
nor disagree”, 8 = “Completely agree”). PERCEIVED OPPORTUNISM represents the average score in 
which employees agreed with the following statements: “Synosis would take advantage of others to 
benefit itself” and “Synosis cares ONLY about its own interests” (0 = “Completely disagree,” 4 = 
“Neither agree nor disagree,” 8 = “Completely agree”). SHIRK is the total number of misspecifications 













a*b  =  -1.23
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FIGURE 6.—Employees’ reported perceptions of the employer across treatment conditions. 
Employees rate to what extent they agree with four different statements about the employer on a scale 
from 0 to 8.  The figure displays the mean scores of employees’ anonymous feedback to the employer 
(bars are in ses). Stars indicate p-values above conventional significance levels for pairwise Mann-

































    
Age 39.97 40.74 41.25 
 (12.95) (13.11) (13.08) 
    
Female (= 1) 0.50 0.51 0.52 
    
Education level 4.412 4.397 4.408 
 (1.278) (1.255) (1.211) 
    
Income level 4.037 4.006 4.017 
 (1.739) (1.715) (1.648) 
    
Worry about Covid-19  
4.795 





    
N 493 519 488 
NOTE.—Education level is the mean score of the highest level of academic achievement on a scale 
from 1 (less than high school) to 7 (doctorate). Income level is the mean score of employees’ annual 
household income from 1 (less than $10 000) to 7 (higher than $120 000). Across all conditions, 28 





















Frequency of Words Associated with Different Motives 








PROFIT MOTIVE    
Profit/profitable 18 47 108 









Customer/Client 264 3 153 
Reputation 224 1 167 
Publicity 233 16 196 
    
CHARITABLE MOTIVE 
   
Giving 1 21 29 
Donation/contribution 0 182 176 
Benevolent/altruistic 0 6 1 
Free 0 54 63 
Support 3 13 12 
Doing good 4 160 85 
Care 0 12 8 
Ratio of profit-related words 99% 14% 66% 
NOTE.—The table includes words that unambiguously relate to either a profit or a charitable motive. 
For example, the word “help” is omitted, even though it occurs frequently because employees use the 
word to describe both profit motives “…help them make more money,” and charitable motives “help 











 Regression Analyses of Employee Behaviors 












     
Philanthropic CSR (CSR) 0.0931 -0.339 -0.0183 0.211 
 (0.136) (0.403) (0.168) (0.208) 
     
Win-win CSR (WIN_CSR) 0.0456 0.141 -0.0582 -0.0190 
 (0.134) (0.441) (0.168) (0.217) 
     
Age -0.0242*** -0.0164 0.00615 -0.00140 
 (0.004) (0.011) (0.005) (0.007) 
     
Gender (F = 1) -0.148 -0.256 0.435*** 0.288* 
 (0.105) (0.319) (0.130) (0.168) 
     
Education level 0.020 0.081 -0.015 0.005 
 (0.046) (0.126) (0.058) (0.072) 
     
Income -0.070** -0.0275 -0.003 -0.077 
 (0.033) (0.091) (0.0410) (0.049) 
     
Belief in philanthropy 0.028 0.095 0.009 0.063 
 (0.033) (0.104) (0.041) (0.053) 
     
Time spent on prediction 
task 
-0.002***    
 (0.001)    
     
Time spent on reporting 0.00490    
 (0.006)    
     
Time spent on effort task  -0.005* 0.004*** 0.001 
  (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
Constant 1.554*** 5.292*** -2.709*** 3.231*** 
 (0.373) (1.178) (0.469) (0.637) 
     
No. of Obs. 1412 1412 1412 273 
Regression type Logistic OLS Logistic OLS 
Robust errors YES YES YES YES 
R-Squared  0.00731  0.0415 









Supplementary Analyses (Pre-Test) 
In the pre-test of our treatment instruments, we recruited 287 subjects on Amazon Mechanical Turk 
(mTurk) to participate in a survey experiment.28 The survey contained a description of a hypothetical 
firm (Enera)29 along with information about one out of three initiatives taken by the firm (note that our 
manipulations in the field experiment somewhat deviate from these because we had to change the non-
profit organization): 
NO_CSR condition: Recently, Enera has invested 10 % of its operating expenses 
into an extensive advertising campaign in the city where the company is based. The 
management invested the money because they knew that the good publicity would 
boost the reputation of the company and attract more clients. 
CSR condition: Recently, Enera has anonymously donated 10 % of its operating 
expenses to a non-profit organization dedicated to the global protection of human 
rights in the city the company is based. The management invested the money because 
they believe in doing good and protecting human rights. 
Win-Win CSR condition: Recently, Enera has donated 10 % of its operating 
expenses to a non-profit organization dedicated to the global protection of human 
rights in the city the company is based. The management donated the money not only 
because they believe in doing good and protecting human rights but also because 
they knew that the good publicity would boost the reputation of the company and 
attract more clients. 
Participants evaluated how altruistic, selfish, opportunistic, and moral they perceived the 
hypothetical firm based on this information. At the following stage, participants rated how likely on a 
                                                     
28 To combat challenges associated with using online platforms in research (Bentley, 2018), participants had 
to correctly answer two attention-check questions and had to provide free-text explanations for their answers to 
prove they were not robots. Out of the 300 who participated, 287 participants passed the attention check and were 
randomly allocated to one of the experimental conditions. 
29 The general description of the firm: Enera is a company devoted to providing insights and solutions to firms 
and start-ups by analyzing data. Enera has a team of individuals who specialize in predictive analysis, data mining, 






scale from 0 (extremely unlikely) to 100 (extremely likely) they thought that “Employee A” would claim 
reimbursement for the dinner with friends by falsely reporting it as a work-related expense.30 Note that 
in our manipulations, we stated that the firm recently made initiatives. Hence, when participants read 
the case about “a representative of a regular employee,” they were not thinking of an employee who 
started working for the firm because of its CSR engagement (reducing the role of self-selection effects 
in participants’ evaluations). 
We investigated the role of firm-level perceptions (i.e., moral integrity and opportunism) on 
participants’ perceived likelihood of employee misreporting. We conducted a path analysis with 
structural equation modeling to investigate the mediating role of firm-level perceptions on evaluations 
of the likelihood of employee misreporting. The below figure shows results that suggest that engaging 
in win-win CSR – compared to philanthropic CSR – affects participants’ perceptions of the firm 
(opportunism and moral integrity). These firm-level perceptions have significant effects on the 
perceived likelihood of employee misreporting. 
 
FIGURE A.1.—Path analysis of how CSR affects perceptions of employee misreporting. The figure 
shows the results of the path analysis (N = 195), where we compare the two CSR conditions, CSR and WIN_CSR. 
All paths displayed are estimated jointly using the maximum likelihood method. The standardized path coefficients 
and corresponding two-tailed p-values are shown next to each path. Solid lines indicate significant coefficients at 
a 0.1 level or less. WIN_CSR is a dummy variable that indicates treatment conditions. CSR is the reference 
condition. PERCEIVED MORAL INTEGRITY is the average reported score across two firm characteristics: 
morality and altruism (highly correlated measures: ρ = 0.64, p = 0.000). PERCEIVED OPPORTUNISM is the 
average score across the characteristics: selfishness and opportunism (ρ = 0.69, p = 0.000). PERCEIVED 
LIKELIHOOD OF EMPLOYEE MISREPORTING is participants’ reported score (from 0 to 100) of how likely 
they think the employee in the case misreports travel expenses. 
 
                                                     





The path model results suggest that engaging in win-win CSR affects participants’ expectations of 
employee misreporting through perceived moral integrity and opportunism of the firm. We find no direct 
link between CSR choices of the firm (philanthropic CSR or win-win CSR) and expectations of 
employee misreporting. 
Supplementary Analyses (Field Experiment) 
After employees finished working on tasks, they were asked whether they would be willing to work on 
additional unpaid tasks for the employer. To ensure that the employer’s initiative was a salient factor, 
we put a reminder on the same page employees decided to volunteer. Although a significant number of 
employees choose to do volunteer work (average 19.4%), we observe no difference across conditions 
(for all pairwise comparisons, p > 0.2). The below figure provides an overview of how many transcribing 
tasks the volunteering employees completed across conditions. Though more of the volunteering 
employees in the philanthropic CSR condition do more tasks compared to the employees in the 
WIN_CSR or NO_CSR conditions, the difference is not statistically significant (CSR vs NO_CSR, t(183) 
= 1.57,  p = 0.12; CSR vs WIN_CSR, t(181)=1.24, p = 0.21).31 
 
FIGURE A.2.—Volunteer behavior across conditions. The figure shows the distribution of how many 
optional tasks the volunteering employees completed between 0 (only read the description and then 
skipped) and 4 (all the tasks). 
                                                     
31 Because we had a reminder before this decisions, we investigate how results would change if we do not drop 
those who initially failed the attention check (i.e., not classified as a bot). By including them, two-tailed tests turn 





 Screenshots from Field Experiment 
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One of the major challenges with using management accounting systems to facilitate decision-making 
is that it relies on effective communication between multiple individuals with different interests, 
analytical abilities, and perceptual lenses. However, prior experimental research on the decision-
facilitation process is relatively small and fragmented and lacks a coherent framework. In this paper, we 
develop a conceptual framework that specifies the key tasks and responsibilities of the decision-
facilitation process. We use this conceptual framework to conduct and structure a systematic and 
comprehensive literature review of the last 20 years of experimental management accounting research 
on decision-facilitation. On this basis, we suggest several avenues for further experimental research -
not by mere “gap-spotting”- but by drawing on trends in practice and recent insights from psychology 
and behavioral economics. Thus, this paper serves as a guide for those planning to research on factors 
that can distort the communication of decision-relevant information in firms. 
 







One of the most prominent roles of accounting information is to facilitate decision-making by providing 
decision-makers with valuable information (Arnold & Artz, 2019; Demski & Feltham, 1976; 
Zimmerman, 2003). To this end, accounting systems measure and store data that can be transformed 
into decision-relevant information that improves managerial decision-making. For example, internal 
reporting systems can provide managers with information that helps them select appropriate investment 
opportunities that will improve firm profitability (Hemmer & Labro, 2019). For accounting systems to 
be effective, it is essential that relevant information is acquired, reported, and incorporated into decision-
making. 
However, facilitating decision-making effectively may be challenging. On the one hand, 
transforming data into decision-relevant information often involves complex analyses that are 
technically challenging to perform (e.g., Anand, Balakrishnan, & Labro, 2017; Labro & Vanhoucke, 
2008; Noreen, 1991). On the other hand, those who acquire information are often not the same 
individuals as those who, in the end, make decisions based on the information. Therefore, decision-
facilitation can be seen as a communication process that involves multiple individuals with different 
interests, analytical abilities, and perceptual lenses (Bhimani & Willcocks, 2014; Demski & Feltham, 
1976). These individuals are likely to have different preferences, assess data relevance differently, and 
vary in their use of analytical models when processing data. 
The communication of decision-relevant information is, therefore, subject to several distorting 
factors. For instance, users might systematically disregard information that could have provided 
valuable insight into a decision (e.g., Chenhall & Morris, 1991), or preparers’ mental models could be 
inappropriate when analyzing data (e.g., Farrell, Luft, & Shields, 2007). Another source of distortion is 
the potential misalignment of interest between those who prepare and use accounting reports. In such 
cases, preparers might intentionally misrepresent accounting information to benefit themselves (Rankin, 
Schwartz, & Young, 2008) or their business unit (Church, Hannan, & Kuang, 2012). Even if preparers 
truthfully disclose accounting information, users might disregard the information because they fear that 
they could be “fooled” by the sender (Rankin, Schwartz, & Young, 2003) or because they dislike the 






In this paper, we conduct a systematic literature review of the last 20 years of experimental 
management accounting research on the decision-facilitation role of information. Though firms also find 
it challenging to capitalize on the potential gains from utilizing available data due to technical and 
analytical issues, the scope of this review is on the factors affecting the effective communication of 
decision-relevant information. We limit our review to experimental research because the experimental 
method helps overcome typical identification and data availability challenges when studying accounting 
systems (Bloomfield, Nelson, & Soltes, 2016; Sprinkle, 2003). Experimental research can generate 
precise data on what motivates behavior related to the acquisition, communication, and usage of 
information. Thus, experimental research can provide evidence on issues or settings where archival data 
may not exist or is difficult to obtain and analyze causally. 
Previous reviews of the experimental management accounting research conclude that research on the 
decision-facilitating role of information is relatively small and fragmented (Luft, 2016; Sprinkle, 2003). 
Luft (2016) provides a plausible reason: there is a lack of analytical models of the decision-facilitation 
process that identifies the task structure, important variables, and baseline predictions of behavior (p. 
16). 
Thus, this paper aims to make three distinct contributions to the management accounting literature. 
First, it develops a conceptual framework that specifies key tasks and responsibilities in the decision-
facilitation process. The conceptual framework is based on the General Communication Model 
(Shannon, 1948) but modified to the decision-facilitating approach where relevance, measurement, and 
evaluation of information depend on the decision and the user of the information (Demski & Feltham, 
1976). This is an important contribution because prior research provides only a general description of 
the decision-facilitation role of information (Bromwich, 2006; Demski & Feltham, 1976; Luft, 2016; 
Sprinkle, 2003). 
Second, we provide a focused review of the experimental management accounting literature. Using 
the conceptual framework, we review the last 20 years of experimental research published in leading 
accounting journals. Unlike Luft (2016), the review focuses solely on issues relating to the decision-
facilitation process, enabling us to organize, integrate, and evaluate publications in 15 accounting 






Third, we provide suggestions for future research and introduce new theoretical lenses that propose 
interesting and testable behavioral predictions deviating from the baseline predictions of classical 
information economics (Stigler, 1961). Our conceptual framework allows us to identify important gaps 
in the existing research literature. On this basis, we motivate our suggestions for further research by 
drawing on trends in practice and on research in related fields. Luft (2016) stresses the need for analytical 
models that postulate behavioral predictions relevant to decision-facilitation. Thus, we introduce two 
theories from behavioral economics. In settings with aligned interests between prepares and users of 
information, we introduce a belief-based theory of information that posits risk-taking behavior and 
decisions to acquire information depend not just on material payoffs but also on beliefs and the attention 
devoted to these payoffs (Golman & Loewenstein, 2018). In settings with misaligned interests, we 
introduce moral constraint theory that posits that individuals treat morality as a constraint rather than a 
preference (Rabin, 1995). The theory posits that individuals will selectively and self-servingly gather, 
avoid, and interpret data that will tell them whether it is morally acceptable to pursue their self-interest. 
Both theories provide new perspectives on decision-facilitation as they challenge underlying 
assumptions of how preparers and users interact with accounting systems and each other. 
The remainder of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we present the analytical framework we use 
in our systematic review of the extant literature. The following section outlines the research 
methodology. Section 4 is a topical presentation of the current literature on decision-facilitation under 
aligned and misaligned interests. Our suggestions for future research are found in Section 5. We 
conclude with a short discussion of the main contributions and limitations of our paper in Section 6. 
2. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
In their seminal work, Demski and Feltham (1976) propose that accounting information serves two 
distinct roles in organizations.1 On the one hand, accounting information can be used to motivate specific 
behaviors via the effects that monitoring, measuring, evaluating, and rewarding actions and performance 
have on motivation (i.e., decision-influencing role). On the other hand, accounting information can serve 
                                                     







as a valuable input in numerous judgments and decisions with the ultimate goal to facilitate better 
decision making (i.e., decision-facilitating role).2 For example, more refined cost information (e.g., 
activity-based costing) can lead to more accurate pricing decisions. 3 
The Shannon Model of Communication (Shannon, 1948) is one of the most prominent 
communication theories with more than 75,000 scholarly citations. The Shannon model is a 
mathematical theory that posits that the communication process between individuals can be categorized 
into a few key concepts: sender, encoder, channel, noise, decoder, and receiver.4 The model assumes a 
linear form of communication. A sender converts data into a message, chooses an appropriate channel 
(e.g., formal report or an informal phone call), and sends the message. Before the message reaches its 
destination (the receiver), the message must be encoded by the sender and then decoded by the receiver.5 
The decision-facilitation process is particularly subject to three sources of noise. The first source is 
the noisy processing of data. Providing information to facilitate decision-making requires that senders 
(hereafter preparers)6 determine what data is relevant for a focal decision. The general definition of 
information posits that an object is an instance of information if and only if; i) the object is derived from 
data, ii) the data is rightly put together according to the syntax that governs the chosen system, and iii) 
the object complies with the meanings (semantics) of the chosen system in question (Floridi, 2010). This 
definition implies that a preparer could collect all available data but as long as the preparer does not 
                                                     
2 This includes judgments and decisions concerned with the past (e.g., performance evaluation) and the future 
(e.g., planning). In general, decision-facilitation is concerned with the acquisition, use, and disposition of both 
inputs and outputs to achieve organizational goals (Sprinkle, 2003). Regarding judgements of performance 
evaluation, it is important to note that it does not involve managerial performance evaluation where managerial 
behavior is evaluated in isolation (e.g., keep or drop the manager). Decision-facilitation involves a “retrospective 
examination of prior choices and decisions and, as such, involve evaluating, appraising, and assessing 
performance, with the ultimate goal of improving future performance” (p. 302). 
3 Many have criticized the “decision-facilitating approach” as it assumes that people collect data to inform their 
decisions. Some argue that people collect information independently of decisions (Cohen, March, & Olsen, 1972). 
March (1987) states that “Theories of rational choice obscure the extent to which information handling and 
decision making contribute largely independently to the development of meaning. (…) Information shapes the 
meaning of a decision situation, thus normally changes both the structure of alternatives and the preferences being 
pursued” (p.160). However, Demski and Feltham are not unaware of such processes in organizations, but state 
that “(…) many would argue that no one is completely rational. Since we are conducting research to assist the 
evaluator, we choose to assume that he at least desires to be rational” (p. 251). 
4 The model is also frequently called the Shannon-Weaver Model. 
5 The encoder and decoder are often referred to as machines in the classical literature. For example, the 
encoding of an image into binary code and then the receivers’ machine need to decode the binary data to see the 
image. As we are interested in the behavioral research on this process, we view encoding as data processing and 
preparing reports, and decoding as the receiver’s interpretation of the report. 
6 We make a distinction between user and receiver to emphasize that users are responsible for receiving 






know its meaning - the preparer has not yet obtained any information. Thus, decision facilitation implies 
that preparers have to collect and process data to derive decision-relevant information from it. However, 
the process of deriving information from data is subject to noise because preparers’ apriori knowledge 
of the world affects what conceptual and perceptual filters they apply when evaluating data (Bhimani & 
Willcocks, 2014). 
The second source is the noise in the communication of information. When transmitting information, 
preparers send information to receivers through a communication channel (e.g., a cost report). Receivers 
then have to decode the message and infer its informational content. In general, noise in the 
communication stems from differences between the prepares’ intended message and the receiver’s 
perceived message. Transmitting information from one person to another inadvertently introduces noise 
because of individual and perceptual differences between the two.7 
The third noise source is contextual differences between preparers and receivers. Decision-
facilitation is often a multi-person endeavor where the users of information are not typically the same 
as the preparers of information (Balakrishnan, 1991; Demski & Feltham, 1976; Demski & Sappington, 
1987). Preparers are typically employees who are specially qualified to acquire information. They might 
have methodological expertise (e.g., data scientist or engineer) or have specialized knowledge about 
local conditions (e.g., production manager). Users are typically those with decision-making authority in 
an organization (e.g., Chief Financial Officer). In some contexts, the preparer’s interests are 
(predominately) aligned with the user of the information. Thus, the preparer’s goal is to supply 
information that improves the welfare of both the preparer and the user (e.g., improving production 
efficiency). When interests are aligned, preparers are mainly concerned with providing users with the 
most accurate information to reduce users’ ex-ante uncertainty of what decision is superior. In other 
contexts, however, prepares’ interests might diverge from those of the superior. The preparers might 
then intentionally distort information to benefit themselves at the user’s expense and potentially also the 
organization. 
                                                     
7 Our framework does not exclude the possibility that one individual could be responsible for both the 






In developing a framework to review the experimental research on decision-facilitation, we modify 
Shannon’s model (Shannon, 1948) in three ways. First, the communication process is conditional on the 
decision at hand (Demski & Feltham, 1976). Through backward induction (starting with the focal 
decision), preparers determine the appropriate analysis and what data is relevant for that analysis. 
Second, preparers have access to only a subset of “all available data”. The relative size of the subset 
of accessible data is given by the firm’s ability to measure and store data for employees to access and 
use. For example, a firm that monitors social media activity and stores this data increases the subset of 
available data compared to a firm that does not store it. However, measuring more data does not imply 
an increase in information as the additional data’s entropy could be close to zero (Floridi, 2010).8 
Third, the modified framework emphasizes the aspects that involve human evaluations and judgment. 
In our framework, the collection, processing, and reporting of information (encoding) is the preparer’s 
responsibility. The user’s responsibility is to receive information and to incorporate it into decision-
making (decoding). 
—INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE— 
The framework in Figure 1 serves as a mapping tool for experimental research within management 
accounting. The main components of the framework are the following. Available data denotes the data 
that is considered accessible to preparers. Prepares have to choose what data to collect and include in 
the data processing (data collection). Data processing implies structuring, analyzing, and 
contextualizing data such that it constitutes an instance of information (Floridi, 2010). Communication 
is the process of transmitting information from the preparer to the receiver through a chosen channel 
(e.g., cost report). The successful transfer of information rests on the preparer’s ability to communicate 
information and the receiver’s ability to decode and perceive the information correctly. The end goal of 
the information is to affect the users’ decisions.9 
                                                     
8 Despite being available, information could be less accessible because the data is unstructured, silo-based, or 
the user-interface is not suited to preparers’ needs. As such, transforming data into information requires additional 
data processing. 
9 Demski and Feltham (1976) argue that the supply of any particular information does not merely rely on the 
focal decision but also on the users’ perception of the decision situation, the method of analysis employed by the 






I choose to separate our review with respect to noise that stems from a misalignment of interests 
between preparers and receivers. This is because the misalignment of interests changes the reporting 
setting into a moral dilemma. In that case, preparers might choose not to acquire pertinent information 
because the effort is costly to the preparer (e.g., Balakrishnan, 1991), or the preparer might intentionally 
mislead the user by misreporting acquired information (e.g., Antle & Eppen, 1985). As the challenges 
that arise due to diverging interests are qualitatively different from those that arise when incentives are 
(predominantly) aligned, our literature review distinguishes between research in contexts with aligned 
and misaligned interests. 
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
To provide a comprehensive topical review of the experimental management accounting research on 
decision-facilitation, we conduct a systematic literature review (Okoli, 2015). The following presents 
the research methodology of our review. 
3.1.  Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria 
Because the review’s purpose is accounted for in previous sections, we now present the established 
inclusions and exclusion criteria. First, we only include research in management accounting concerned 
with the production or usage of information for internal decision-makers in an organization. Since there 
is no commonly accepted definition of management accounting (Bhimani et al., 2012; Bloomfield, 2015; 
Bromwich & Scapens, 2016; Krishnan, 2015; Salterio, 2015), we choose a pragmatic definition similar 
to Salterio (2015). That is, management accounting is about producing information for internal users or 
decision-makers in an organization. Consequently, we do not include research primarily concerned with 
external users (e.g., investors or external auditors). We acknowledge that this may be a too restrictive 
definition of management accounting (Krishnan, 2015). Still, we want a definition with clear boundaries 
from the adjacent research literature when conducting a systematic literature review. 
Second, we only include experimental studies as defined by Bloomfield et al. (2016). We limit our 
review to experimental research because of experimental studies’ advantage to examine the causal effect 






factors (Libby, Bloomfield, & Nelson, 2002).10 Experimental research can provide evidence on issues 
or settings where archival data may not exist or is difficult to obtain. Moreover, we focus on 
experimental research as we are building on prior review studies that exclusively focus on experimental 
management accounting research (Luft, 2016; Sprinkle, 2003; Sprinkle & Williamson, 2007). 
Third, we limited the search to articles published in accounting journals ranked three or higher in 
the Association of Business Schools (ABS) list (unpublished research is not included). Although our 
goal is to provide a comprehensive topical review of prior research, we wanted to limit our investigation 
to journals that are considered to be leading the field. The Journal of Management Accounting Review 
(JMAR) is included despite its low ranking on the ABS list because it specializes in topics concerning 
management accounting and frequently publishes experimental studies. 
Forth, the search was limited to publications during the last two decades (2000 to 2020). This choice 
allows us to build on Luft (2016). She noted that the experimental literature on decision-facilitation after 
2000 has been relatively small and fragmented compared to the late 1970s and early 1980s (p. 9). This 
review focuses on research after the millennium as both Luft (2016) and Sprinkle (2003) cover 
experimental management research conducted before 2000. While Luft’s (2016) review only included 
the top three accounting journals, we aim to systematically investigate the broader stream of accounting 
literature to identify what topics have been addressed and what topics are ripe for research. 
3.2.  The Search Process 
We followed the recommendations of Webster and Watson (2002) in the search process. The search 
process included the following steps: (1) keyword search using the Scopus online database, (2) review 
of relevant articles, (3) review of relevant references to key publications identified in steps 1 and 2, and 
(4) identification of publications citing key publications. 
Table A is an overview of all papers obtained through the search process described above. The 
number of publications identified through steps 3 and 4 is listed in the manually-collected column. To 
obtain a comprehensive overview of the selected journals, we used a broad search scope that reduced 
                                                     
10 For example, in classical information economics, the value of information is derived from the difference 
between a decision taken with or without that information. Thus, this implies a counterfactual argument that 






the likelihood of overlooking relevant articles (Knudsen, 2020). We limited the search for relevant 
literature to published articles and excluded proceedings and other unpublished material. In step one of 
the search process, we searched for articles using “Experiment”, “Experimental”, or “Experimentally” 
in the title, abstract, or keywords. This search resulted in a set of 796 articles published across 15 
journals.11 Step 2 in the search process involved reviewing all the abstracts of the identified articles to 
determine which satisfied the criteria described in Section 3.1. While reviewing, we examined the 
references of the most relevant publications and other papers that cite the publications identified in Steps 
1 and 2. In total, we ended up including 98 research papers in our review. 
—INSERT TABLE A ABOUT HERE— 
4. REVIEW OF EXANT LITERATURE 
Figure 1 guides the structure of the review. Following the flow of the framework, we review the literature 
associated with the preparer’s information acquisition (Phase A), then the communication of information 
from preparer to user (Phase A  B), and lastly, the usage of information in decision-making (Phase 
B). We first review research conducted in settings with (relatively) aligned interests between prepares 
and users. Alignment of interest implies that the goal is to obtain accurate and reliable information to 
facilitate better decision-making for the user. 
4.1.  Aligned Interests: Data Collection and Processing (Phase A) 
Phase A is concerned with preparers’ choices in collecting and processing available information. This 
process also involves decisions concerning measurement and evaluations of what data is considered 
relevant or reliable for focal decisions. The following is a topical presentation of the publications 
concerned with the preparers’ data collection and processing (Phase A). 
4.1.1 Information Processing and Motivation 
Unbiased processing of information is paramount for acquiring information that facilitates better 
decision-making. Cardinaels and Labro (2008) use an experiment to investigate systematic measurement 
                                                     
11 I manually searched through publications in Contemporary Accounting Research (CAR) and the Journal of 
Management Accounting Research (JMAR) because i) some publications in CAR do not have an abstract 
accompanying the publication in the Scopus database and ii) the Scopus database only contains publications in 






errors in time-driven activity-based costing (TDABC) caused by psychological biases in information 
processing. They conduct an experiment where participants work on either incoherent or coherent tasks 
and receive a notification (before or after the task) to provide either aggregated or disaggregated time-
estimates for time spent on these activities. All participants have incentives for accuracy. Their main 
finding reveals that psychological factors affect how individuals process information, which produces 
systematic measurement errors. 
A slightly different stream of research investigates how responsibility affects how information is 
processed. Jermias (2001) shows that commitment to a cost system affects the incorporation of feedback 
about the usefulness of costing systems, which increases their resistance to changing the cost system 
when faced with negative feedback. Commitment to a favored cost system induces motivated reasoning 
whereby people only assess a subset of their knowledge to support their desired conclusion. 
Hales (2007) provides compelling evidence that motivated reasoning can lead people to reach biased 
conclusions, even when they have incentives to draw accurate conclusions. Participants in the 
experiment read through a real company’s financial information and provided estimates of the 
probability that earnings would result in gains or losses from their investment position. To manipulate 
directional preferences, participants were randomly assigned a payoff that was either a positive or a 
negative function of earnings. Results show that, despite incentives for accuracy, participants seem to 
agree unthinkingly with information that suggests they might make money on their investment and 
disagree with information that suggests they might lose money. Hence, this finding suggests that 
motivated reasoning can arise for purely psychological reasons. Complementing Hales (2007), 
Bloomfield and Luft (2006) provide additional evidence that biased information processing can occur 
despite incentives for accuracy. They find that participants responsible for choosing a cost improvement 
initiative are significantly less able to learn from market feedback than those who are not responsible. 
Other studies examine what underlying characteristics seem to drive the tendency to process 
information in a preference-consistent manner.12 Libby and Rennekamp (2012) show that the 
                                                     
12 Though people tend to process data in a preference consistent manner, that does not necessarily imply that 
the interests of preparers and receivers are misaligned. For example, a loss-averse preparer might discount 






psychological trait of overconfidence increases managers’ willingness to issue earnings forecasts 
because of a heightened tendency to engage in self-serving attribution in making sense of past 
performance. In particular, participants who score high on facets of the overconfidence trait tend to give 
greater weight to internal than external factors as explanations for good performance, boosting their 
confidence in their ability and thereby increases their willingness to issue forecasts of future 
performance. A more recent study shows an interaction effect between performance incentives and 
aggregation level in management forecasts (Chen, Rennekamp, & Zhou, 2015). 
Task interruption is another factor that can inhibit unbiased information processing. Long and 
Basoglu (2016) conduct an experiment with tax professionals where they manipulate goal commitment 
and whether or not participants are interrupted while working on a relatively ambiguous task. Findings 
show that task interruption exacerbates tax professionals’ motivated reasoning, resulting in 
overconfidence in the defensibility of an aggressive tax compliance position. 
Other studies investigate what factors might mitigate managers’ tendencies to process information 
according to their directional preferences. Jermias (2006) investigates whether accountability can 
attenuate the self-serving processing of information. In the experiment, he finds that managers 
responsible for choosing a cost system tend to become overconfident in their ability to select the superior 
cost system, which leads them to discount negative feedback and be more resistant to changing the 
system. However, managers who are made accountable for the negative consequences of their decisions 
tend to exhibit less resistance to changing cost systems when facing negative feedback. 
Tayler (2010) finds that managers involved in selecting strategic initiatives perceive those initiatives 
as more successful than managers who are not involved in the initiative-selection process (holding 
constant actual performance). Only when the scorecard is framed as a causal chain, in conjunction with 
involving managers in selecting scorecard measures, are the effects mitigated. A later study finds that 
visualization and interactivity features in the accounting system interface separately increases decision-
makers’ overconfidence (Tang, Hess, Valacich, & Sweeney, 2014). However, when both features are 
present, the level of confidence increases together with their performance accuracy. 
One implication of motivated processing of information is the escalation of commitment to failing 






benefits when considering project continuation decisions. Findings suggest that participants are not 
influenced by the sunk outcomes when they do not have responsibility for the sunk cost or benefit 
themselves. Kadous and Sedor (2004) investigate whether third-party consultants could mitigate 
managers’ tendency to escalate their commitment to failing projects.13 Their experiment shows that the 
purpose assigned to the consultants before they begin processing information influences whether they 
are likely to construct the appropriate mental representations needed to support to abandon the failing 
project. Unless specially assigned to provide management with high-quality project-continuation 
recommendations, consultants also fail to recommend de-escalation. 
More recently, Loh et al. (2019) investigate whether using external versus internal consultants is 
better able to hinder the escalation of commitment in firms. They find that the requirement to 
communicate project concerns to top management can frame the decision scenario as one that involves 
a social-identity conflict, causing internal consultants to be less willing to communicate their escalation 
concerns than external consultants.14 
4.1.2 Experience and Accounting Knowledge 
A body of accounting research is concerned with how experience or existing knowledge is associated 
with differences in data collection and processing. Magro (2005) examines how relevant experience 
affects tax professionals’ ability to adapt their information search to changes in relevant features in the 
decision-setting. Results from an experiment with tax professionals indicate that relevant institutional 
knowledge enables individuals to adapt their information search to relevant changes in the decision 
context. Dearman and Shields (2001) use a quasi-experiment to examine whether higher activity-based 
cost (ABC) knowledge is associated with a greater ability to de-bias volume-based cost information 
when estimating the cost of heterogeneous products. They show that ABC knowledge is associated with 
higher decision-making performance by improving subjects’ ability to process the cost data. Similarly, 
Farrell et al. (2007) find that their manipulation of performance measures affects decisions depending 
                                                     
13 In this setting, the escalation decision is not a strategic choice. See Sections 4.4.1 and 4.6 for research on 
escalation decisions under misaligned interests. 






on the subjects’ experience.15 They find that using profit rather than cost as the performance measure 
reduces the accuracy of individuals’ judgment of a non-linear relation between a cost-reduction initiative 
and financial performance. 
Vera-Munñoz et al. (2001) investigate how different types of accounting expertise influence the 
development of choosing appropriate problem representation (mental model) in processing data. In the 
experiment, accountants with different types of accounting experience receive task information in 
alternative formats and use this to prepare reports for a client’s decision. The study shows that subjects 
are more likely to choose an appropriate problem representation when they have more accounting 
experience or receive an appropriate format. Management accounting experience is associated with 
improved development of relevant knowledge given correct task representation relative to public 
accounting experience. In a similar vein, Victoravich (2010) examines whether management accounting 
experience enables managers to identify relevant information (i.e., opportunity costs) when situational 
factors negate attention to this information. Results show situational factors (opportunity-cost vagueness 
and completion-stage of projects) exacerbate participants’ tendency to discount opportunity costs unless 
they have substantial management accounting experience. 
Whereas the above-mentioned research examines how experience is linked with information 
collection and processing, Bradley (2009) investigates whether high levels of inductive reasoning 
abilities can substitute for inexperience or knowledge on an ill-structured case. Results show that 
inexperienced participants with high inductive reasoning-abilities perform better than experienced 
participants with low inductive reasoning and similar to those with both experience and high inductive 
reasoning abilities. Despite being unable to manipulate experience and reasoning abilities, the results 
suggest that a high level of inductive reasoning can effectively substitute for inexperience on problems 
that require the appropriate processing of information. 
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4.1.3 Competitive Environment 
A stream of research suggests that individuals tend to respond to changes in the competitive environment 
in ways not accounted for by classical economic theories. Krishnan et al. (2002) conduct an experiment 
investigating how competition affects decisions to obtain more accurate cost information to inform their 
production-quantity decisions.16 While the main findings are in line with prior analytical models, results 
show that subjects seem to react asymmetrically to increasing and decreasing competition; subjects 
believe that increases in competition consistently imply an increase in the importance of accurate 
product costing but do not believe equally strongly that a decrease in the competition implies a decrease 
in the importance of accurate product costing (as long as there is still at least one competitor in the 
market). Hence, monopolists who face their first competitors tend to overreact by overspending on cost 
data. 
Ackert et al. (2018) use an auction setting to investigate how the nature of the information 
environment among traders affects individuals’ ability to assess the expected benefits of acquiring costly 
private information. When obtaining information is costly to market participants (fewer acquire private 
information), informed subjects’ performance is inferior to the uninformed subjects. They tend to 
misjudge their ability to exploit the informational advantage and end up overspending on acquiring 
information. 
4.1.4 Reliability of Information 
A recent strand of accounting research focuses on how individuals assess the reliability of available 
information. Myers et al. (2017) examine how managers perceive the credibility and reliability of 
alternative IT-systems that are not sanctioned or monitored by the IT-department in a firm, i.e., Shadow 
IT-systems. Creating shadow IT-systems is a recent trend among practitioners where employees 
typically develop their own Excel spreadsheets or macros without the IT department’s approval or 
oversight. The experiment shows that participants’ perceived credibility of information produced by the 
IT system was lower than when produced by the organization’s accounting system. Despite being more 
                                                     
16 In the experiment, subjects act as accountants making the cost-data collection decision in the first stage and 






skeptical of the output from a shadow IT system, participants are no more likely to detect an apparent 
mathematical flaw in the shadow IT-system, suggesting that people fail to properly assess the reliability 
of the shadow IT system despite being more skeptical. 
Ang and Trotman (2015) investigate information reliability in a group setting. They examine whether 
information is more frequently mentioned during group discussions when expressed quantitatively 
compared to qualitatively. In their experiment, experienced managers were asked to make capital 
investment decisions—first individually, then as a group. Before meeting together, each manager 
received a set of cues that contained both unique and common cues. The experimenters manipulated 
whether cues were expressed qualitatively or quantitatively and used video recordings to measure how 
often the cues were used and mentioned. Their main finding is that the managers use quantitative 
information more than qualitative information before group interaction and make more references to it 
during discussions. However, it is unclear what mechanisms drive the observed preference for 
quantitative information for individual use and in communicating with others (for research related to 
this, see Section 4.2.4). 
4.2.  Aligned Interests: Communication (Phase A  B) 
Phase A  B is concerned with transmitting information between preparers and receivers using a mode 
of communication (e.g., formal report or face-to-face delivery). In this process, the transmitted 
information is subject to noise as receivers might perceive the information differently than what the 
preparers intended.17 18 
4.2.1 Receivers’ Behavioral Reactions to Information 
Receivers sometimes decode information differently than theories of rational information-processing 
predict. A compelling example of this is found in Buchheit (2003) that finds that reporting unused 
capacity leads decision-makers to myopically reduce these costs without realizing the opportunity costs 
of reducing capacity when demand is high. Although more refined information about unused capacity 
                                                     
17 We identified no papers that mainly focused on the preparers’ reporting decisions when interests are aligned. 
18 A sizeable portion of the papers categorized as Phase A  B are also concerned with how information is 
used in decision-making (Phase B). We choose to categorize papers that were mainly concerned with how receivers 






should facilitate better decision-making, these results reveal unintended adverse effects of directing 
attention to unused capacity in cost reports. In a subsequent paper, Buchheit (2004) shows that a fixed-
cost reporting format also influences participants’ price-setting decisions in a repeated Bertrand-
Edgeworth duopoly. Participants tend to factor in low-levels of fixed costs to reduce the frequency of 
reported accounting losses. However, when fixed costs increase to a level where price reductions no 
longer mitigated accounting losses, participants reversed their price-cutting behavior and increased 
prices. This suggests that fixed cost reporting affects pricing decisions because participants attempt to 
avoid accounting losses. 
Jackson (2008) uses an experiment to investigate whether straight-line depreciation - relative to 
accelerated depreciation - causes non-executive managers to make non-value-maximizing capital 
investment decisions. As the depreciation choice is made for external financial reporting purposes, the 
choice should not systematically affect managers’ decision-making. However, results show that 
participants that use straight-line depreciation are less likely to invest in a replacement asset than 
participants that use accelerated depreciation. In a subsequent study, Jackson et al. (2010) provide 
additional evidence of this fixation using multiple contexts, methodologies, and participant groups. 
Results consistently show that managers sell assets that have been depreciated using accelerated 
depreciation for lower prices than identical assets that have been depreciated using straight-line 
depreciation. The effect even endures in the presence of fair value information about the asset being 
sold. The study demonstrates that the effect is not driven by a failure to understand depreciation or that 
participants are not incentivized to take the decision seriously. Instead, the depreciation choice affects 
managers’ mental conceptualization of the asset pricing tasks. 
In a similar vein, Chen et al. (2013) show that due to managers’ aversion to reporting volatile 
earnings, managers are more likely to forego economically sound hedging opportunities when 
considering the fair value accounting impact of hedging (i.e., increased earnings volatility). Their 
findings suggest that presenting the economic impact of hedging decisions before the accounting impact 
alleviates managers’ concerns over financial statement volatility. Rennekamp et al. (2015) report similar 
findings. Managers responsible for recording an asset impairment invest more in those divisions when 






differ in their investment based on the impairment reversibility. When accounting effects are reversible, 
managers tend to focus on altering the outcome instead of revising their beliefs to rationalize the cash 
flow outcome. 
A related case of how accounting choices affect managers’ mental conceptualization of the decision-
setting is provided by Mastilak (2011). Using an experiment, Mastilak (2011) examines how the 
classification of costs into different cost pools affects how people use the cost information. Results show 
that attention is directed toward within-pool relations and away from pool relations, which influences 
the accuracy of participants’ cost spoilage predictions. 
4.2.2 The Decision-Facilitating Role of the “Balanced Scorecard” Framework 
The decision-facilitating role of the Balanced Scorecard (BSC) framework is to enable users of the 
framework to learn from past performance to make better-informed decisions in the future.19 Lipe and 
Salterio (2000) published their findings on how superiors’ evaluation of business unit managers’ 
performance tends to be based only on BSC measures that are common across different business units 
while ignoring measures that are unique to individual business units. A tendency often referred to as the 
common measures bias because this is a ‘natural simplifying strategy’ (p. 293) when evaluating 
performance in complex settings using the BSC.20 
Subsequent research finds that providing decision-makers with detailed strategy information makes 
them rely more on strategically linked measures even if they are unique than on non-linked measures 
that are common (Banker, Chang, & Pizzini, 2004). However, Humphreys and Trotman (2011) find that 
the common measures bias is eliminated only when all performance measures are linked to divisional 
strategy and strategy information is provided in the BSC framework. 
Related to research on accounting fixation, Johnson et al. (2014) and Bartlett et al. (2014) 
demonstrate that superiors tend to fixate on lagged financial performance measures. Findings suggest 
that the provision of an implementation timeline seems to aid evaluators in decomposing large, complex, 
and multidimensional judgments into simpler components. A study that more directly investigates the 
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However, we only report the findings that address the facilitating role of BSC. 
20 Dilla and Steinbart (2005) find that participants who have experience and training in BSC tended to not 






facilitating role of BSC shows that presenting a set of strategic objectives with causal linkages to 
managers, with or without time delays, has a beneficial impact on long-term profit (Humphreys, Gary, 
& Trotman, 2016). While time delays do not affect overall performance, managers provided with the 
delay information demonstrate greater learning over time, which results in improved performance 
through the accuracy of managers’ mental models of strategic causal relationships. 
In a recent experiment, Dalla Via et al. (2019) investigate how accountability type and design of the 
accounting system affect information search and decision quality using eye-tracking technology. The 
experiment uses a 2×2 between-subjects design in which they manipulate accountability type (outcome 
or process) and balanced scorecard presentation format (with or without causal chain). Their results 
suggest that causal chain representation effectively focuses attention on decision-relevant cues, which 
reduce the need for extensive search efforts. They find that accountability type and causal chain framing 
interact. Providing a causal chain is much more helpful in improving decision quality when held 
accountable for the outcome, than the process. 
Earlier research has also been concerned with decision tools that can help decision-makers learn from 
the environment. Rose and Wolfe (2000) show that decision aids can better facilitate learning when 
system-generated explanations are easily accessible. Lowe et al. (2011) find that providing a strategy 
map reflecting integrated dependencies can help debias evaluations of individuals with a high tolerance 
for ambiguity. Their results suggest that the effectiveness of using BSC to debias information processing 
might depend on individual traits and characteristics. 
The BSC framework promotes the usage of “causal links” between the performance measures. 
However, testing these links and their weights is often challenging in practice. Kelly (2010) examines 
how the accuracy of assumptions about the relative strength of lead measures affects how managers 
receive the information. Findings suggest that inaccurate relative weights make managers more engaged 






psychological research showing that inconsistent information stimulates more detailed information 
processing than neutral or consistent information.21 
Although the BSC is a way to organize internal information, Cheng and Humphreys (2012) 
investigate whether the BSC can enhance managers’ abilities to assess the relevance of external 
information. Results show that causal linkages of key performance measures with a strategy map 
structure enhance managers’ abilities to incorporate external information. In a similar vein, Cheng et al. 
(2018) examine whether integrating strategic risk information in the BSC affects managers’ responses 
to the information relative to when the risk information is presented in a stand-alone list. While they do 
not find an overall difference, their results suggest that incorporating risk information in a BSC increases 
managers’ tendencies to distinguish between performance driver risks and performance outcome risks 
and to place greater emphasis on the former. 
Although not being about the BSC, Sawers (2005) complements the above research as he 
demonstrates that decision aids can mitigate choice avoidance among experienced managers. When 
accounting systems facilitate a better structuring of decision-tasks, managers are less anxious and are 
therefore less likely to postpone making decisions in difficult choice-settings. 
4.2.3 Using BSC as a Communication Tool 
An essential aspect of the decision-facilitation role of information is to ensure that members of an 
organization have a common understanding of what decision should be made and how to make them 
(e.g., strategy). Aranda and Arellano (2010) conduct a field experiment and find that using BSC to 
communicate strategy—compared to an alternative accounting system that lacks the hierarchical 
structure of links—is more successful at communicating strategy and generating consensus among 
managers. 
Other research finds that people tend to fail to fully appreciate that BSC’s performance measures are 
merely representations of the strategic constructs they represent. Choi et al. (2012) conduct an abstract 
experiment to investigate whether participants tend to act as if performance measures are the same as 
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strategic constructs of interests—a phenomenon labeled “surrogration”. They find that managers tend 
to use strategic performance measures as surrogates for strategy when compensated on these measures, 
especially when compensated on a single measure.22 This result suggests that using BSC to communicate 
strategy might be hampered when combined with financial performance incentives. 
A recent study on surrogation shows that prompting participants to provide explanations for decisions 
reduces surrogation because participants reflect upon their decisions in more holistic terms, focusing on 
the unmeasured aspects of performance, in addition to the measured aspects of performance (Bentley, 
2019). Choi et al. (2013) investigate how strategy selection involvement affects managers’ propensity 
to exhibit surrogation in later phases. Results suggest that being involved in selecting strategy reduces 
surrogation. However, involvement in the strategy-deliberation process does not reduce surrogation.23 
Thus, managers’ involvement in the actual choice of strategy appears to be a necessary and sufficient 
condition to mitigate surrogation. 
4.2.4 Formatting Choices 
One strand of accounting research is concerned with how formatting choices affect how receivers 
perceive the information presented. The most cited study, Cardinaels (2008), looks at how the 
appropriate presentation format depends on the receiver’s accounting knowledge. Participants work on 
a complex pricing task and are provided data on customer profitability but receive this data in either 
tabular or a graphical format. Decision-makers with a low level of cost accounting knowledge attain 
higher profits when using a graphical format compared to a tabular format. However, graphs versus 
tables have an adverse effect on profits for users with a high level of cost knowledge partly because the 
graphic format is less appropriate for knowledgeable decision-makers who approach the problem in an 
analytical way. 
Prior research on formatting effects investigates how providing participants with graphs (either bar 
charts or schematic faces) in addition to tabular information affects the accuracy of participants’ 
bankruptcy predictions (So & Smith, 2004). Results suggest that, compared to only having tabular 
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information, graphical representations that complement the numerical financial data significantly reduce 
accuracy. This result suggests that providing subjects with graphical representations shifted participants’ 
decision-frame from analytical to more intuitive, which is more prone to cognitive biases. The results 
show that graphical formats are not always complementary to tabular information but that subjects tend 
to substitute tabular information with graphical when this is provided. Thus, formatting choices can have 
detrimental effects on decision performance because receivers evaluate the information less 
thoroughly.24 
Other research on formatting effects shows that reporting a confidence interval instead of a point 
estimate affects performance (Foong, Lawrence, & O’Connor, 2003). Though the confidence interval 
report contains more information than a point estimate, results show an unintended effect; the disclosure 
of such information transforms a seemingly complex decision task to one that is less complex, which 
makes the task intrinsically less rewarding to work on, resulting in a deterioration of performance. Thus, 
introducing performance-based incentives becomes crucial for promoting a diligent use of the 
confidence interval information in decision-making. 
A more recent study on formatting effects investigates how qualitative (quantitative) information has 
a positive (negative) indirect association with managerial perceptions regarding strategic risk 
management activities (Stoel, Ballou, & Heitger, 2017). Using highly experienced participants, they 
find that the choice of format is directly associated with the perceived reliability and perceived relevance 
of the strategic risk information. Superiors favor qualitative information for strategic risks, whereas they 
are skeptical about quantitative measures for complex strategic risks. In contrast, a quantitative report 
format is preferred for operational risks, which reflects that these risks are easier to manage and estimate 
such that quantitative point estimates may be expected as the norm. 
4.2.5 Accounting Fixation 
Earlier research in accounting identified a behavioral tendency among accountants to insufficiently 
adjust their decision processes to changes in accounting methodology (e.g., changes in depreciation 
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method or cost-estimation method); often referred to as functional fixation. Luft and Shields (2001) 
examine whether fixation persists even when individuals have opportunities to learn from their choices 
and find that learning does not mitigate fixation on accounting—because the accounting choice 
(expensing versus capitalizing intangible expenditures) affects the learning process itself. Further 
research shows that fixation exists in a repeated design setting with feedback (Arunachalam & Beck, 
2002). Their findings show that fixation is a relatively robust behavioral phenomenon. 
Despite the robustness of the accounting-fixation phenomenon, scant research has examined ways to 
mitigate the effect. The exception is Dearman and Shields (2005), whose research finds that participants 
who exhibited high scores for relevant accounting knowledge, general problem-solving abilities, and 
intrinsic motivation tend to avoid fixating on the cost estimation method. 
4.2.6 Feedback Information 
Though feedback is often tied to performance remunerations (decision-influencing role),25 feedback 
information facilitates learning that can improve future decision-making. Experimental accounting 
research has started to thoroughly investigate these aspects of feedback information. Thornock (2016) 
conducts an experiment where he examines whether the effectiveness of feedback information depends 
on the timing of the feedback. Based on the theory of how learning costs fluctuate over a multi-period 
task, he predicts and finds that providing feedback immediately following implementation most 
effectively promotes learning and fosters better performance. Viator et al. (2014) document that 
individual traits, such as reflective cognitive capacity, further differentiate who are likely to benefit from 
feedback information. 
Regarding the frequency of feedback, Casas-Arce et al. (2017) conduct an experiment where they 
examine the frequency of feedback and the level of detail affect the behavior of professionals working 
for an insurance repair company. Contrary to the notion that more frequent feedback is better,26 they 
find that the best performance is achieved when professionals receive detailed but infrequent feedback. 
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Consequently, papers that examine the influencing role of feedback (e.g., performance evaluations that are linked 
to compensation) are not included. 
26 The management team of the participating firm strongly believed in this relation, prompting the 
experimenters to populate the high-frequency condition with relatively more employees than the low-frequency 






This result suggests that the employees cannot correctly process detailed feedback information when 
provided too often. 
Concerning the content of feedback information, Kelly (2007) shows that providing non-financial 
feedback-measures that reflect key value-creating activities do not increase decision-quality unless 
coupled with incentives. Managers only perform better when non-financial measures are incentivized 
because this directs attention to broader aspects of the decision-situation. Loftus and Tanlu (2018) 
investigate a different aspect of the feedback information; how the use of causal language in feedback 
impacts subsequent task performance. In contrast to regular feedback, feedback with causal language 
explains why performance was evaluated differently from their peers. Their study finds that causal 
language has a differential effect depending on past performance. If initial performance is low, the use 
of causal language results in improved subsequent performance compared to non-casual feedback.27 
However, if initial performance is good, using causal language resulted in decreased subsequent 
performance compared to non-casual feedback. 
4.3.  Aligned interests: Usage of Information (Phase B) 
Phase B of the decision-facilitation process concerns the usage of information in decision-making. 
Unlike the communication phase (Phase A  B), the papers included in the following section are 
primarily concerned with how decision-makers use information. 
4.3.1 Value of Information 
One strand of experimental management accounting research is concerned with the value of additional—
or more accurate—information. The value of information is defined as the increased monetary benefit 
from decisions taken with information compared to without information. Cardinaels et al. (2004a) 
examine whether providing participants with detailed customer profitability analysis improves their 
resource allocation decisions in a marketing environment varying in complexity. They find that 
providing more accurate customer profitability information enhances decisions in highly complex 
marketing settings. In simple settings, more accurate information does not enhance performance because 
                                                     






decision-makers are able to combine their traditional volume-based cost data with other available types 
of feedback to perform. 
To investigate whether the benefits of more accurate cost data extend to more competitive settings 
where participants could learn from market feedback, Cardinaels et al. (2004b) conduct an experiment 
where participants act as price setters in a duopoly. Participants receive imperfect cost reports (either 
ABC or traditional volume-based costing) and market feedback (either informative or uninformative) in 
the form of a report containing the price choices and their competitor’s profit.28 Findings show that more 
accurate cost information improves price-setting under two conditions. First, when the market feedback 
is uninformative, more accurate cost information (ABC) enables participants to filter out irrelevant cues 
and more quickly reverse price distortion than participants with less accurate cost information (volume-
based costs). Second, when optimal pricing decisions produce accounting losses under volume-based 
costing but not under ABC, participants tend not to set optimal prices but set prices that do not incur 
accounting losses. More refined cost information (ABC) improves price-setting decisions because 
participants are less concerned with avoiding accounting losses. However, when both cost reports 
produce accounting profits under optimal pricing, the informative competitive feedback dominates the 
effect of more accurate cost information. 
Further research documents the benefits of having more accurate cost reports in a duopolistic market 
with sequential price-setting (Cardinaels, Roodhooft, Warlop, & Van Herck, 2008). Their findings show 
that when only the leader (first mover) is given a high-quality cost report, an information leakage occurs 
because the follower infers information from the leader’s prices. As a result, higher quality information 
is incorporated into market prices, leading to an improvement in profits for both the leader and the 
follower. While the leader’s profits are unaffected by the quality of the follower’s cost report, the 
follower’s profit is significantly increased by having a high-quality cost report only when the leader has 
a low-quality cost reporting. Hence, the results show that the additional value of more accurate 
information depends on whether it is the leader or the follower who invests in better cost information. 
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Davis and Albright (2004) have a slightly different approach to this topic as they use a field setting 
to examine whether financial performance improved after implementing a balanced scorecard 
framework. In particular, the BSC framework contained both financial and non-financial performance 
measures, while the traditional performance measurement system used only financial measures. Despite 
not being able to do a random assignment, the authors suggest that financial performance was improved 
among branches that implemented BSC. A more recent study uses a field experiment to examine whether 
an information-sharing system of employees’ creative work between the firm’s stores increased financial 
performance (Li & Sandino, 2018). Although their pre-registered hypotheses show no significant 
effects, supplementary analyses suggest that the system improved the quality of creative work and 
financial performance in stores that had accessed the system more frequently. 
Luft et al. (2016) examine whether additional information might have adverse effects on decision-
making in a setting with subjective performance evaluation. In contrast to the previous literature, they 
find that additional information (non-accounting and external information) causes coordination failures 
between subordinates and superiors when the relation between performance and tasks is ambiguous. 
The reason is that, due to differences in cognitive abilities, the presence of additional information diverts 
attention from the most crucial aspects of the decision-task. 
4.3.2 Value of Information in Negotiations 
Decision-makers often participate in bargaining and negotiations both within the organization (e.g., 
transfer-pricing) and between organizations (e.g., asset procurement). A body of experimental 
accounting research investigates how the provision of information affects the outcomes in negotiation 
processes.29 Early research shows that changes in the accounting system that reduce uncertainty about 
how different bargaining outcomes affect payoff (e.g., more accurate identification and measurement of 
cost drivers) can improve bargaining outcomes (Haka, Luft, & Ballou, 2000). Subsequent research finds 
that refined accounting information can, under certain conditions, stimulate cooperative behavior 
between negotiators (Chang, Cheng, & Trotman, 2013; Essa, Dekker, & Groot, 2018; Masschelein, 
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Cardinaels, & Van den Abbeele, 2012). However, Drake and Haka (2008) demonstrate that because of 
strategic concerns, information sharing between negotiators is less pronounced when they have to share 
fine versus coarse information, resulting in more hold-up problems when cost information is fine. 
Similarly, Miller and Drake (2016) show that aggregation of shared cost information could mitigate hold 
up problems in supply chains relative to disaggregated cost information; suggesting that a higher level 
of information asymmetry can improve coordination in supply chains. 
A different perspective is offered by Van den Abbeele et al. (2009), who investigate how power 
imbalance between negotiators affects the efficient use of more detailed cost information. Results show 
that less powerful buyers’ performance disadvantage is less pronounced when they have detailed cost 
information. In contrast, more powerful buyers do not seem to be able to exploit this information. 
Whereas less powerful buyers use the information in problem-solving techniques more frequently, more 
powerful buyers tend not to exploit the information but rely instead on distributive bargaining 
techniques. Thus, power seems to interact with the usefulness of additional information in bargaining 
situations. 
4.4.  Misaligned Interests: Data Collection and Processing (Phase A) 
The following research is conducted in settings where preparers and users have misaligned interests. In 
these settings, the preparers often have incentives to distort private information to benefit themselves at 
the firm’s expense. 
4.4.1 Data Collection and Processing 
As pointed out in Luft (2016), experimental management accounting research on the private acquisition 
of information is scarce, especially in contexts with misaligned interests between preparers and users. 
In our review, Church et al. (2014) is the only study investigating preparers’ information-collection 
decisions in a setting with misaligned interests. Across two experiments, the authors find consistent 
evidence that, although participants tend not to collect costless—but valuable—information before 
reporting, having the discretion to do so does not affect reporting decisions. By not collecting 
information, participants can avoid the psychological discomfort associated with knowingly 






information avoidance increases self-interested behavior (Dana, Weber, & Kuang, 2007; Golman, 
Hagmann, & Loewenstein, 2017; Grossman & van der Weele, 2017). Additional findings show that only 
those categorized as moderately ethical report more opportunistically when able to avoid information. 
Similarly, we identify no papers that focus on how preparers process information in a setting with 
misaligned interests. We identify some papers investigating information processing in project 
continuation decisions (Kadous & Sedor, 2004; Loh et al., 2019). However, failing to discontinue failing 
projects is often in the interest of both project managers and their superiors. It harms both the reputation 
of the project manager and the firm’s profitability. In fact, Sleesman et al. (2012) find in their literature 
review that “agency problem” is only one out of 16 determinants of escalation.30 
4.5.  Misaligned Interests: Communication (Phase A  B) 
In contrast to the non-existence of research on preparers’ reporting decisions in settings where interests 
are aligned, a wealth of research exists on preparers’ reporting decisions in settings with misaligned 
interests. Although a substantial share of the research on this topic is concerned with control aspects 
(i.e., decision-influencing role), the following papers are concerned with factors that influence preparers’ 
reporting decisions. 
4.5.1 Honesty Concerns and Individual Differences 
Classical agency theory suggests that, when interests are misaligned, preparers will take full advantage 
of opportunities to misreport as long as the expected monetary benefit exceeds the expected costs (e.g., 
penalty if caught). Evans et al. (2001) test the assumptions of agency theory in a capital budgeting setting 
based on Antle and Eppen’s (1985) formal model. Their findings sparked a strand of subsequent research 
as the results significantly deviate from agency predictions. They find that participants are willing to 
sacrifice wealth to report more honestly. Even when the experimenters increase the monetary benefits 
of misreporting, ceteris paribus, most participants still produce honest or partially honest reports. Later 
research shows that these honesty concerns are triggered when budget reports require a factual assertion 
(Rankin et al., 2008). Rankin et al. (2008) show that misreporting is significantly lower when a factual 
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assertion is required because it transforms the reporting decision into a moral dilemma where 
participants have to explicitly lie to earn more money (i.e., send a factually untrue report). They find 
that honesty concerns matter less when supervisors have the authority to reject reports because strategic 
concerns dominate the reporting decision. However, later research revisits the latter finding and shows 
that honesty concerns (factual assertion versus no factual assertion) have strong effects on budgetary 
slack despite superiors’ rejection authority (Douthit & Stevens, 2015).31 
One strand of research on honesty concerns is focused on understanding individual differences that 
are predictive of honest reporting. Hobson et al. (2011) find that participants who scored high on 
traditional values and empathy on a pre-experiment personality-questionnaire were more likely to judge 
significant budgetary slack as unethical.32 In a similar vein, Davidson (2019) classifies participants 
according to their score on the Social Value Orientation scale and finds that those classified as pro-selfs 
or pro-socials react differently when exposed to changes in the reporting context; suggesting that 
individuals are heterogeneous with respect to honesty concerns. Further research supports this notion 
(Blay, Douthit, & Fulmer, 2018; Murphy, 2012), demonstrating that honesty concerns seem to originate 
from an individual’s desire to avoid negative affective reactions from violating social norms. In support 
of their argument, they find that individuals systematically differ in the intensity with which they 
experience negative affective reactions to misreporting and that lower levels of this intensity are 
predictive of misreporting. 
Murphy (2012) shows that individuals who are higher in Machiavellianism are more likely to 
misreport.33 Furthermore, participants who misreport experience negative emotions, but high-
Machiavellian participants feel significantly less guilt than others who misreport. Murphy (2012) finds 
that misreporting is significantly reduced when prompting participants to think about common 
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reduced by withholding the relative pay of the superior from the subordinate. Honesty continues to have a strong 
effect on budgetary slack when the salience of reciprocity is increased by giving the superior the ability to set the 
subordinate’s salary. 
32 They find that participants only judged significant budgetary slack as unethical when no formal control 
design to induce truthful reporting was present. The presence of such controls seems to “crowd out” honesty 
concerns. We discuss similar findings in Section 4.5.2. 
33 Machiavelliansim is one of the personality traits in what is often called the “Dark Triad”. It refers to a 
personality trait which sees a person so focused on their own interests that they would deceive and exploit others 






rationalizations before the reporting decision. However, those who still misreported rationalized to an 
even greater extent. 
4.5.2 Contextual Factors and Honesty concerns 
Psychology theories on moral cognition suggest that individuals trade-off the benefits of misreporting 
with the intrinsic cost of updating one’s moral self-view (e.g., thinking of oneself as dishonest). Because 
people like monetary rewards and to think of themselves in favorable terms, these theories suggest that 
people use contextual factors as potential justifications for why acting selfishly is morally acceptable. 
Accounting research finds that contextual factors affect the honesty of reporting decisions. Cardinaels 
(2016) provides evidence that a company’s earnings situation affects subordinates’ tendency to induce 
slack in their budget proposals. In the absence of formal controls to induce truthful reporting, 
misreporting is less pronounced when it determines whether the firm earns a gain or loss than when their 
report does not affect whether the firm earns a profit or loss. However, formal controls seemingly crowd 
out participants’ motivation to report honesty, resulting in an insensitivity to the company’s earning 
situation. 
A strand of accounting research uses a reporting setting similar to the “trust contract” in Evans et al. 
(2001) because it allows for the clean investigation of participants’ moral motivations when participants 
have strong economic incentives to act opportunistically. Trust contract implies that the firm trusts the 
manager to report in good faith, rather than mechanisms such as hurdles or audits to induce truthful 
reporting. In this setting, Church et al. (2012) find that managers’ tendency to misreport increases when 
the reporting manager is not the sole beneficiary of the slack benefits. When others also benefit, 
managers can more easily justify inflating their budgets. Only when the reporting managers know that 
the beneficiaries have negative attitudes toward misreporting is the effect mitigated. Later research finds 
that similarity in peer environments—without knowledge of peer actions—can increase the tendency of 
misreporting in a budgeting setting (Cannon & Thornock, 2019). 
Contextual cues about the social aspects of the reporting situation play an essential role under trust 
contracts. Brown et al. (2014) find that rankings that are not tied up to participants’ compensation 
significantly affect the honesty of their budget reports. They find an increase in misreporting when 






misreporting compared to random ranking. When ranked on both firm profit and individual 
compensation, participants tend to focus on firm-profit ranking, resulting in a lower level of misreporting 
than individual compensation. 
Matuszewski (2010) provides findings that suggest that misreporting is affected by changes in the 
horizontal pay dispersion, i.e., relative pay among peers. Complementing these findings, Guo et al. 
(2017) find that high vertical pay dispersion motivates subordinates to misreport costs to a greater extent 
than low vertical pay dispersion.34 The combination of these results suggests that fairness concerns 
interact with participants’ honesty concerns. Further support for this notion is presented by Douthit and 
Majerczyk (2019). They show that the level of misreporting is significantly lower when subordinates 
perceive superiors to be legitimate in their roles. Results suggest that, if the superior role is assigned 
based on luck rather than merit, subordinates feel less obliged to adhere to property-right norms (i.e., 
superior is the residual claimant of profits) and therefore tend to misreport.35 Thus, perceptions of 
fairness seem to be a predictive factor of misreporting. 
Brüggen and Luft (2016) provide an interesting case where subordinates’ beliefs about superiors’ 
decisions in the later stages of a multi-period project affect their initial budget reports. They examine 
how replacing superiors after the first stage affects escalation tendencies in firms. The motivation for 
the study is to investigate whether replacing superiors reduces escalation tendencies because new 
superiors tend to react more skeptically to continuation proposals when first-period cost overruns have 
occurred. However, in settings with private project-cost information, changing superiors leads to greater 
initial understatements because subordinates anticipate that new superiors will be more critical of their 
projects. Therefore, they become more focused on gaining initial funding and choose to underestimate 
project costs to a greater extent. When initial cost overruns have been high, new superiors are less 
influenced by an additional unit of predicted second-period profit than are continuing superiors. Hence, 
subordinates ‘‘need’’ to promise more units of higher profit (i.e., understate costs more) to changing 
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superiors to achieve a given probability of receiving second-period funding. Thus, subordinates’ 
perceptions of their superiors affect their level of reporting honesty. 
Seybert (2010), however, finds that participants are more likely to continue a suboptimal project 
when past expenditures are capitalized (versus expensed), and they are responsible for initiating the 
project. Additional evidence suggests that overinvestment is driven by reputation concerns associated 
with reporting accounting losses. A supplementary survey shows that experienced executives also 
anticipate this behavior. 
4.5.3 Report Format 
Experimental research has also devoted attention to whether the report format affects managerial 
misreporting. In particular, Church et al. (2019) study whether the measurement basis used in 
participants’ budget proposals affected their tendency to misreport under a “trust contract” setting. Their 
findings show that a non-financial measurement basis increases the level of honesty relative to a 
financial measurement basis but only when the benefits of slack are direct. When slack benefits are 
indirect, the measurement basis does not affect reporting decisions. This is because a financial 
measurement basis activates the concept of money—which is associated with independence and self-
interests—thereby promoting opportunistic reporting behavior. However, when slack benefits are 
indirect, participants can better maintain a positive moral self-image while misreporting, thereby making 
misreporting equally likely when the measurement basis is financial.36 
The aggregation level of reports has also received attention in the research literature—but the results 
are somewhat mixed. In particular, Nikias et al. (2010) investigate the behavioral effects of aggregation 
and timing on budgeting in a face-to-face “trust contract” setting. By manipulating whether budget 
reports are aggregated and whether budget reports are reported simultaneously or sequentially, they find 
that misreporting is less pronounced for disaggregated budget reports and that a sequential budgeting 
process leads to more truthful reporting. Therefore, the report format (aggregated or disaggregated) 
affects reporting decisions because participants’ are less able to maintain an honest appearance when 
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the report format is aggregated. In contrast, Schwartz et al. (2012) find that more aggregated budget-
reports result in less misreporting (inflated proposals) when superiors can reject proposals. Findings 
suggest that, as actual costs increase, subordinates with the aggregated report-format moderate their 
proposals because they anticipate that superiors are more likely to reject large high-cost proposals. 
Despite its focus on the control aspects of information, Majors (2016) investigates whether 
mandating range disclosures to uncertain estimates affects reporting managers’ tendency to report 
private information more aggressively. In the experiment, managers privately learn a narrowed-down 
range of possible asset values and their point estimate’s relative position within that range (low, medium, 
high). Each manager reports the asset’s value to a paired investor who could potentially impose a cost 
on the manager in suspicion of misreporting.37 Experimental results show that managers report less 
aggressively when ranges are disclosed because they anticipate investors will suspect aggressive 
reporting and take action against them when ranges are disclosed. Moreover, the results show that the 
disciplinary effect of range disclosures is most pronounced for managers exhibiting higher levels of at 
least one of the personality traits collectively referred to in psychology as the Dark Triad. 
4.5.4 Internal Whistleblowing 
Employees can potentially play an important role in the early detection of fraud within organizations. 
As business-unit managers and other employees are typically “closer to operations”, they are often the 
first to obtain information about ethically questionable practices in the organization (e.g., sub-contractor 
exploiting cheap labor). Research on employees’ decision to report such behavior finds that willingness 
to report depends on the firm’s characteristics, the perception of the responsible superior, and the type 
of behavior they discover (Kaplan S.E., Pope, & Samuels, 2015). Further research suggests that, after 
an unsuccessful social confrontation, employees’ reporting intentions to their supervisor’s supervisor 
are stronger than to an internal auditor, suggesting that employees experiencing unsuccessful social 
confrontation seek out more powerful internal report recipients (Kaplan S.E., Pope, & Samuels, 2010). 
Zhang (2008) investigates internal whistleblowing in a capital budgeting setting where participants 
can observe whether their peers misreport or not. Consistent with previous findings, results show that if 
                                                     






there is a high reward for whistleblowing, perceived superior fairness positively affects subordinate 
reporting honesty and negatively affects explicit collusion attempts against the superior. Thus, 
perceptions of the superior play an essential role in combating collusion among subordinates. 
Collectively, this research strand suggests that the reporting of ethically questionable practices depends 
on a variety of factors that should be considered when firms design procedures for internal 
whistleblowing in firms. 
4.5.5 Receivers’ Reactions to Reports 
While a large body of research investigates reporting decisions when interests are misaligned, a 
relatively small research body is concerned with how receivers perceive these reports. Kida et al. (2001) 
investigate whether affective reactions to reports can impact how superiors perceive reports and, thus, 
influence superiors’ capital-budgeting decisions. Results show that superiors are influenced by their 
affective reactions to the senders of budget proposals. In particular, managers tend to reject decision 
alternatives that elicit negative emotional responses, even though these alternatives have higher expected 
financial benefits.38  
More recently, Fehrenbacher et al. (2020) find that superiors are more likely to select financially 
inferior projects when proposed by a manager triggering a positive affective reaction. That is, “Roger 
(the preparer) has been appreciative of your work and pleasant to interact with” versus “Joe (the 
preparer) has never been appreciative of your work and has been unpleasant to interact with”.39 They 
find that this tendency is attenuated by making superiors accountable for their decision.40 However, 
regardless of accountability, participants are less likely to select a financially superior project when 
proposed by a manager triggering a negative affective reaction. Even though affective reactions do not 
impact the underlying economics of a proposed capital project, this research suggests that managers tend 
                                                     
38 Although the study uses the term “managers”, we use the term “superiors” to make clear that the decision-
makers in question are receivers of a report and use this to form their beliefs and make decisions. 
39 These are short excerpts from manipulations used in the experiment. Complete manipulations are found on 
page 6 in their paper. 
40 Accountability refers to the implicit or explicit expectation that one may be called on to justify one’s beliefs, 






to make decisions based on affective reactions instead of solely considering the underlying economic 
factors. 
4.6.  Misaligned Interests: Usage of Information (Phase B) 
The final phase of the decision-facilitation process is concerned with the usage of information in 
decision-making. Because the misalignment of interests reduces the reliability of the information 
provided by prepares (e.g., cheap talk), considerably less research has been done on this topic than 
settings with aligned interests. While no research papers focus solely on how decision-makers use 
information produced by subordinates with misaligned interests, some papers provide some insight into 
how users (often superiors) consider such information. 
Rankin et al. (2003) investigate superiors’ rejection decisions of budget proposals under asymmetric 
information. Their main finding concerning superiors’ decisions is that superiors claim to reject projects 
when they suspect misreporting, despite the project being profitable. However, these non-binding 
announcements seem to be used more as a bluff and an attempt to convince managers that they will 
reject profitable projects more often than they intend to. In a later study, Rankin et al. (2008) find that 
superiors reject about 1/3 of all projects even though this choice reduces their own pay. Subsequent 
research also finds that superiors tend to reject budgets they suspect are untruthful even when their own 
compensation does not depend on accepting such budgets (Schwartz et al., 2012). These results suggest 
that superiors use the threat of rejection as a non-binding threat and that this threat is not merely a bluff. 
Superiors seem to have preferences for fairness and are therefore willing to incur personal costs to punish 
behavior they suspect is unfair or dishonest. 
5. DISCUSSION AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This section aims to discuss topics relevant to decision-facilitation that has received little attention in 
the previous research in experimental management accounting.41 We use the framework to identify 
unexplored topics that are considered sufficiently promising for future research. The following is an 
overview of the identified topics in the different phases of the decision-facilitation process. 
                                                     
41 The purpose is not to provide suggestions on how to extend the research topics covered in Section 4. 






5.1.  Aligned Interests: Data Collection and Processing (Phase A) 
5.1.1 Challenging the assumptions of classical information economics 
While a body of experimental research has challenged the assumptions of classical agency models (e.g., 
assumption of narrow self-interest), the assumptions of information economics—which most of the 
management accounting is built on (Bromwich, 2006)—has mostly been unchallenged.42 In particular, 
classical information economics assumes that information is valuable to the extent and only to the extent 
that it leads to better decisions (Stigler, 1961). Accordingly, decisions to acquire additional information 
rely solely on the cost-benefit analysis of acquiring information. New perspectives on information 
economics—that also consider psychological factors—suggest that the acquisition of information 
depends not just on material payoffs but also on beliefs and the attention devoted to these payoffs 
(Golman & Loewenstein, 2018). 
This theory has potentially significant implications for management accounting research because it 
proposes that individuals acquire (or avoid) information based on whether they anticipate what they 
discover will be pleasurable (or painful). The theory suggests that the valence of information (positive, 
neutral, or negative) determines whether individuals tend to avoid information (Golman et al., 2017). 
For instance, preparers who are excited to think about a new potential project might systematically 
collect information that they anticipate will confirm the project’s viability (positive valence) but avoid 
collecting information that might indicate potential cost overruns (negative valence). The valence of 
information also affects attitudes toward risk-taking and ambiguity (Golman, Loewenstein, & Gurney, 
2020). When thinking about missing information is pleasurable (e.g., your business unit outperforming 
other units), this theory suggests that people will be more willing to bet on that information. However, 
when thinking about the missing information is aversive (e.g., the failing of a pet-project), people prefer 
not to bet on it (Golman et al., 2020; Peysakhovich & Karmarkar, 2016).43 
                                                     
42 With the exception of earlier research that investigates problems related to “information overload”, in which 
more information decreases performance (Luft & Shields, 2009) 
43 Golman et al. (2020) also provide experimental evidence that the missing information’s valence affects 
people’s risk taking decisions. They find that people bet more money on uncertainties they like to think about than 






Based on these recent theoretical developments, research in experimental management accounting 
could investigate whether these implications manifest themselves in a managerial accounting setting. 
As the assumptions of classical information economics are pervasive in most management accounting 
tools (Bromwich, 2006) ( e.g., relevant cost analysis, cost estimation, information systems), this line of 
analytical research could produce novel insights into how individuals interact with management 
accounting tools.44 
5.1.2 Data Reliability, Relevance, and Privacy 
The massive generation of data (both structured and unstructured), coupled with plummeting data 
storage costs, has led to an explosion of data in firms (Deloitte, 2018a; McKinsey, 2018). The 
proliferation of mobile devices, applications, and operating systems, requires firms to understand how 
to deal with this abundance of data and how their employees assess and evaluate available data. We 
identify three areas related to data collection that warrant the attention of future management accounting 
research. 
First, assessing data reliability: Reliability represents the extent to which information is unbiased, 
free from error, and representationally faithful. Despite the central role of data reliability, it is a complex 
and elusive aspect of accounting information (Maines & Wahlen, 2006). While there is some auditing 
research on how auditors evaluate reliability (e.g., Kadous, Koonce, & Thayer, 2012), no research 
investigates how internal preparers assess data reliability from various sources. More non-accounting 
data makes the boundary of accounting and non-accounting information increasingly elusive (Knudsen, 
2020), exacerbating the task of evaluating data-reliability for decision-making. Understanding how 
employees evaluate data reliability is an important step in developing modern accounting systems.45 
Second, determining information relevance: A recent survey finds that the usage of relevant cost 
analysis is close to non-existent among UK medium-sized firms (CIMA, 2016). While only a few papers 
focus on how individuals approach the concept of relevant cost (Buchheit, 2003, 2004; Chenhall & 
                                                     
44 Belief-based theories on information acquisition suggest that attention drives information acquisition 
depending on the valence of the missing information. Interestingly, management accounting tools are often thought 
of as being “attention-directing”. 
45 One business leader exclaimed, “Most of big data – most of Internet data – is completely unimportant for 
most of the questions in the world. Only a few things are relevant for answering specific questions. The art is to 






Morris, 1991; Victoravich, 2010), little research has investigated how preparers filter out data in a 
decision-facilitation setting. Economics research suggests that individuals are cognitively biased 
towards only considering information they observe (“what you see is all there is”) and fail to consider 
information that is not explicitly in front of them (Enke, 2020). Many factors in a relevant cost analysis 
require people to consider implicit information, e.g., opportunity cost. Why practitioners tend not to 
base their decisions on a thorough analysis of relevant costs is not clear. One potential explanation might 
be that thinking about both explicit (e.g., differential costs) and implicit costs (e.g., opportunity cost) 
often has negative valence (Golman & Loewenstein, 2018). For example, a product manager estimates 
a positive net present value of a new and exciting product. However, considering the opportunity costs 
will reduce the new product’s attractiveness, leading the product manager to ignore these costs.46 
Third, understanding attitudes to privacy and data security: As internal databases become populated 
with sensitive information, privacy and data security issues become more pressing in firms. Except for 
Myers et al. (2017), little experimental research has addressed this aspect. Behavioral research on 
individuals’ attitudes towards privacy and data security suggests that privacy concerns are highly 
malleable and context-dependent (Acquisti, Brandimarte, & Loewenstein, 2015). For firms, this implies 
that there are potentially hidden data-security hazards associated with not properly understanding how 
employees’ attitudes towards data security interact with organizational and situational factors. As data 
security and privacy is a top concern for many businesses, practice could benefit greatly from 
experimental research investigating the micro-foundations of employee behavior in such settings. 
5.1.3 Integrated Profitability Analyses 
The presence of more non-accounting information (e.g., social media data) poses a challenge for 
preparers on how to incorporate these aspects into their reports. While there are many theoretical 
guidelines on how to estimate costs using accounting information (Bromwich & Scapens, 2016), little 
                                                     
46 Some researchers in accounting suggest that individuals’ decision-making process does not adhere to 
normative theories of rationality; in which accounting becomes an “answering machine” (Burchell, Clubb, 
Hopwood, & Hughes, 1980). Yet, Cabantous et al. (2010) argue that “people try to formulate problems, they do 
try to find alternatives, and they do try to calculate and compute to arrive at a decision (…) the paraphernalia of 
decision making makes people rational; they become framed into rationality and become economic agents by 
means of accounting”. Experimental research could shed new light on the determinants of usage of management 






guidance is provided to incorporate non-accounting data in analyses of profitability, e.g., customer 
profitability analysis. While most of the profitability analyses in management accounting are descriptive 
and based on historical transaction data, there is a growing need to understand how to incorporate and 
harness the value of other types of data surrounding the organization (KPMG, 2015). Future 
experimental research could investigate how non-accounting data affects the processing of accounting 
information and the relative weight preparers and users place on such data. For example, if social media 
data indicates a successful product launch, how would that affect how preparers analyze accounting 
data? Future research could also look at this topic from a visualization perspective. For example, how 
to visually demonstrate the difference between internal accounting data and external big data in 
accounting reports? 
5.1.4 Cost Estimation in a Digital Age 
Regarding cost estimation, we identify two areas that could benefit from future behavioral research. 
First, digitalization and robotization pose new challenges for how firms estimate costs. In time-driven 
ABC, the costs associated with excess capacity should be allocated to activities because that would 
direct managers’ attention to considering reducing capacity over time. However, the excess capacity 
becomes permanent with robotization (the practical capacity surpasses usage), making it difficult to 
allocate costs to activities (Bjørnenak, 2017). With more overhead costs, providing an objective and 
nuanced analysis of profitability becomes more difficult. Although this challenge is mostly technical 
(i.e., how to allocate costs), experimental research could complement the technical research by 
investigating how people perceive the fairness of different trade-offs between measurement accuracy 
and the relative cost of using human labor with limited capacity. This trade-off is an essential issue 
because the measurement method would, in many cases, determine whether human labor should be 
substituted with robots, e.g., customer service personnel versus a chat robot. In this sense, management 
accounting could play an important role in estimating the “fair” value of using human labor in firms. 
Second, how do people determine cost variability? Determining what costs are considered relevant 
is often tricky and depends on a subjective evaluation of the relevant time-horizon. The nature of costs 






cost when determining a network’s size but considered fixed once it has become part of the network. 
Though decisions regarding the relevant time-horizon for a given decision significantly impact 
profitability evaluations, there is scant experimental research on these decisions. Like Cardinaels and 
Labro (2008), future research could investigate the psychological factors that affect people’s assessment 
of relevant time-horizons in determining cost variability. 
5.1.5 Interdependencies between External and Internal Accounting Information 
In a special issue in the Journal of Management Accounting Research (JMAR), Labro (2015) suggests 
that future research should investigate the links between the different accounting disciplines. For 
instance, financial and management accounting tends to be closely related in many firms. Surveys find 
that firms usually manage internal operations with the same information used to report to external 
constituencies (Kaplan R. S. & Atkinson, 2014). While some investigate the consequences of using a 
single accounting system for multiple purposes in a firm (Arnold & Artz, 2019; Arnold & Gillenkirch, 
2015), few investigate how accounting choices made for external reporting purposes influence internal 
processing accounting data, 47 and in particular, how accounting choices cascade in the organization 
(e.g., IFRS versus GAAP) and how preparers appropriate information to facilitate internal decision-
making when it has been produced to cater to external users’ needs. 
5.2.  Aligned Interests: Communication (Phase A  B) 
5.2.1 Preparers’ Reporting Choices 
Noise in communication often comes from differences in perception, mode of analysis, analytical 
abilities, and context between preparers and receivers. However, little research on how preparers deal 
with anticipated noise when they choose what reports to send. For example, preparers might consider 
the receivers’ lack of time and knowledge of local conditions as an argument to bias their report or 
explicitly misreport to avoid superiors rushing to conclusions.48 In practice, management teams often 
consist of individuals with different abilities and skills (e.g., business majors) than those who process 
                                                     
47 Research in auditing and financial accounting has devoted attention to how accounting changes affect 
auditors’ and investors’ information processing and decision-making (Agoglia, Doupnik, & Tsakumis, 2011; 
Capps, Koonce, & White, 2017; Clor‐Proell & Nelson, 2007; Jamal & Tan, 2010; Psaros & Trotman, 2004). 






data and prepare reports (e.g., data scientists or engineers). Although previous research finds that 
formatting choices affect how users receive information (e.g., Buchheit, 2003; Cardinaels, 2008), little 
research is concerned with how preparers adjust their reports when anticipating how users perceive 
reports.49 For example, suppose an analyst knows that the supervisor often bases decisions on a particular 
graph. In situations where that graph does not capture all relevant aspects of the decision, the analyst 
might choose to disclose this information in a tabular format to prompt a more analytical mindset from 
the supervisor. 
5.2.2 Internal Whistleblowing of Profit-Enhancing Activities 
Another topic that has received little attention is internal whistleblowing of profit-enhancing activities. 
Research on internal whistleblowing examines reporting behavior in settings where employees discover 
misconduct (e.g., peers misreporting costs) that does not directly affect their wealth. However, many 
ethically questionable practices benefit both upper- and lower-level managers in firms (aligned 
interests). 
For example, a local manager may learn that one subcontractor supplies components for a 
significantly lower cost than competitors because the subcontractor exploits its workers (e.g., Daniela, 
2018). The low cost allows the company to sustain its role as a cost leader, which generates significant 
profits for the local manager’s division and the company. Sharing information about the subcontractor’s 
questionable practices might pressure the upper-level management to deal with the issue (e.g., enact 
costly programs to ensure subcontractor compliance with ethical standards). By sharing this information, 
the upper-level managers are more likely to be held accountable if they fail to enact appropriate 
measures. However, suppose the local manager decides to withhold information from those responsible. 
In that case, the upper-level managers are less likely to be held accountable because of “plausible 
deniability” if these practices are exposed. Thus, as many questionable practices enhance (short-term) 
profits, firms often have incentives on both lower- and upper-levels to withhold information from those 
with decision authority (Phillips, 2010). 
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A recent survey reports that 77 percent of surveyed corporate managers believe that modern slavery 
is likely to occur in their supply chains (Lake, MacAlister, Berman, Gitsham, & Page, 2016). Research 
in behavioral economics has already started investigating how willful ignorance is used in hierarchical 
settings (Shalvi, Soraperra, van der Weele, & Villeval, 2019). Future research in experimental 
accounting research could help develop a better understanding of how institutional and contextual cues 
affect internal whistleblowing of profit-enhancing activities. 
5.3. Aligned Interests: Usage of Information (Phase B) 
5.3.1 Incorporating External Information into Accounting Reports 
A body of prior research investigates the instrumental value of having more refined or accurate 
information in various decision settings. While accounting reports become more populated with external 
information (e.g., social media reports), we know little about how such information affects managerial 
decision-making. While some suggest that more data will lead to better and faster decision-making (e.g., 
Deloitte, 2017), others are skeptical and fear that the introduction of “big data” will lead to “the wrong 
decisions much more quickly than before” (Quattrone, 2016, p. 3). That is, the provision of “big data” 
in accounting reports can make the reports themselves so persuasive that decision-makers become less 
critical to its content, making them vulnerable to cognitive biases (Quattrone, 2016). Similar to the 
finding that graphical representations can lead to faster and less analytical decision-making (Cardinaels, 
2008; So & Smith, 2004), future experimental research could further investigate the “pitfalls” of 
receiving more comprehensive and visually appealing reports on decision-making performance. By 
better understanding this link, accounting research could produce valuable insights to practitioners on 
designing and integrating external information into their accounting reports. 
5.3.2 Usage of Advanced Decision Aids 
Advanced decision-aids are becoming more common in practice. However, behavioral research finds 
that people tend to be algorithm-averse and are often reluctant to follow decision-aids’ recommendations 
(Longoni, Bonezzi, & Morewedge, 2019). Future research in accounting could investigate whether—
and potentially why—managers would be reluctant to rely on decision-aids in different decision-






algorithm aversion in managerial decision-making, accounting researchers can provide implementable 
solutions that can significantly improve decision-making performance.50 
5.4.  Misaligned Interests: Data Collection and Processing (Phase A) 
5.4.1 Examining the Predictions of Moral Constraint Theory 
Our review of previous literature reveals a significant gap in the literature in the information acquisition 
phase (Phase A) in settings with misaligned interests. While the existence of a gap is not in itself a 
sufficient argument for conducting research, a large stream of literature in related fields seems to suggest 
that research on this topic deserves more attention from accounting scholars. Though researchers in 
accounting tend to attribute honest reporting behavior to honesty preferences (Douthit & Majerczyk, 
2019; Evans et al., 2001; Rankin et al., 2008), Rabin (1995) suggests that people tend to view morality 
as a constraint rather than a preference. This distinction has thought-provoking implications because 
people pursue preferences but seek to circumvent constraints. If morality is treated as a constraint on the 
real goal of pursuing self-interest, “a person will be keen to selectively and self-servingly gather, avoid, 
and interpret evidence that will tell her whether it is morally okay to pursue her self-interest” (p. 1). 
Experimental evidence supports the moral-constraint theory by showing that people tend to avoid 
information to excuse selfish decisions (e.g., Dana et al., 2007; Grossman, 2014; Grossman & van der 
Weele, 2017). Recently, Ay et al. (2020) provide further evidence that people will also gather 
unnecessary information when the temptation to misreport is present.51 The amassed research lends 
credence to the notion that people tend to view honesty as a moral constraint, which would influence 
their information-acquisition decisions when interests are misaligned. 
As more data becomes available, firms rely more on individuals with expertise and specialized 
knowledge to transform the data into decision-relevant information. Therefore, understanding what 
drives information-acquisition decisions in the managerial-reporting contexts could be crucial for 
research to guide firms. For example, Berge (2020) shows that, because managers are reluctant to 
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physically avoid relevant information in the managerial reporting context, making internal accounting 
systems more effective in assisting private information acquisition increases reporting honesty.52 
5.5.  Misaligned Interests: Communication (Phase A  B) 
5.5.1 Modes of Deception 
Even though a large body of research investigates managerial reporting honesty, we know little about 
other forms in which preparers might deceive users to make suboptimal decisions that benefit preparers. 
In practice, opportunities to misreport are limited by internal controls such as internal audits (e.g., 
Cardinaels & Jia, 2016) and truth-inducing incentive schemes (e.g., Evans et al., 2001). Even if 
managers have opportunities to misreport, they often refrain from doing so out of a desire to maintain 
an honest self-image (Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008) or avoid negative affective reactions from 
misreporting (Blay et al., 2018). Thus, reporting decisions that involve explicit deception might be less 
common than other forms of deceptive communication. 
A distinct form of deceptive communication is paltering. Paltering is the active use of truthful 
statements to convey a misleading impression. Though the underlying motivation to deceive is the same, 
paltering is distinct from both lies of commission and omission (Rogers, Zeckhauser, Gino, Norton, & 
Schweitzer, 2017). Because paltering does not involve making untruthful statements, a manager who 
palters might more easily preserve an honest self-image while effectively misleading their superiors. 
Consider a situation where sales have grown consistently in recent years but a business-unit manager 
expects sales to be flat. To convey the impression that sales will continue to grow, the manager might 
palter by reporting, “over the last ten years our sales have grown consistently” and not highlight the 
expectation that sales will be flat this coming year.53 With more data sources to choose from, managers 
have more leeway in what to include in their reports, which makes this form of deceptive communication 
particularly tempting. 54 
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53 Example taken from Rogers et al. (2017). The difference between lies of omission and paltering is that 
paltering involves more “active selective disclosure of other true information – that the discloser expects will lead 
the recipient to a false conclusion”. 
54 While a substantial body of research investigates the use of language to persuade investors (Barton & Mercer, 
2005; Hales, Kuang, & Venkataraman, 2011; Rennekamp, 2012; Tan, Wang, & Yoo, 2019), little research exists 






Another form of deceptive communication is obfuscation. Obfuscation implies telling the “whole 
truth”55 but in a complicated manner that exploits the receiver’s limited ability or expertise to understand 
all the complexities. In auditing, Alles (2015) proposes that for an external auditor auditing a firm whose 
balance sheets reflect decisions made based on big-data analysis, verifications require that the auditor 
evaluates or replicates the analysis herself. This evaluation necessitates that the firm in question provides 
a detailed report of estimation techniques used even though these might be highly complex. 
Extending the example by Alles (2015), the firm could produce a highly complex report ostensibly 
to provide all the information. However, the firm might also strategically use complexity to present 
truthful information in a convoluted fashion so that it becomes difficult for the receiver to infer its true 
meaning. From a non-expert receiver’s perspective, it is hard to discern what level of complexity is 
needed in each case. In contrast, an expert receiver would be able to discern the appropriate complexity 
level, hence detect obfuscation. Cardinaels’ (2008) findings suggest that reporting managers need to 
adapt the presentation format to the users’ level of accounting sophistication. However, with 
obfuscation, reporting managers can exploit their discretion over the accounting report to serve their 
self-interest.56 
With the introduction of automated budget reports and system-generated decision-recommendations 
(Deloitte, 2018b, 2018a), lies of omission might become more frequent in firms. For example, the 
accounting system suggests a budget proposal of 100 based on the system’s data. A manager might 
possess private information—not available to the accounting system—that the actual cost is 70. In this 
situation, a lie of omission is simply not correcting the system’s budget proposal, creating budgetary 
slack “by default”. The research findings on lies of omission are mixed (Fochmann, Müller, & 
OVeresch, 2018; Fonseca & Grimshaw, 2017; Fosgaard, 2019; Mazar & Hawkins, 2015). Hence, future 
experimental accounting research that improves our understanding of how lies of omission differs from 
                                                     
given how common the existence of unofficial reports managers keep, internal emails, or just face-to-face 
interaction (Hall, 2010; Simon, Guetzkow, Kozmetsky, & Tyndall, 1954). Thus, using language to persuade is 
likely to be a common phenomenon in the daily workings of firms. 
55 That is, not leaving out any truthful relevant information. 
56 In a similar vein, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA, 1975 cited in Nikias et al. 
(2010)) notes “information is classified and summarized in a reasonable manner that is neither too detailed nor too 
condensed”. In general, choosing the optimal level of complexity calls for a balance between the amount of 






lies of commission could produce valuable insights into designing accounting systems that avoid 
inducing agency costs unnecessarily. 
5.6. Misaligned Interests: Usage of Information (Phase B) 
5.6.1 Reaction to Information Produced under Misaligned Interests 
In firms where management relies on employees with expertise in acquiring information, management 
often has no better options than to “rubber stamp” the information provided to them (Aghion & Tirole, 
1997).57 In contrast to classical economic predictions, prior experimental studies show that superiors 
often reject budget proposals they suspect are untruthful even if that means reducing their pay (e.g., 
Rankin et al., 2008). Considering that information is often acquired in a setting with misaligned interests, 
future research should investigate whether superiors’ aversion to being “fooled” causes them to 
disregard information when they learn that the preparers could have diverging interests. In such settings, 
superiors could risk making suboptimal decisions because they underestimate the honesty of their 
subordinates. In settings with higher stakes (e.g., project selection setting), an unwillingness to base 
decisions on information produced under misaligned interests might have detrimental effects for the 
firm. Thus, experimental research should further investigate how superiors’ usage of information differs 
when they know the subordinates’ incentive structure. 
Although superiors are often the users of information, subordinates are also users of the information 
provided by their superiors. For example, upper-level management prepares strategy reports to inform 
decision-making at lower levels of the organization. In some settings, the information provided by 
superiors (e.g., code of conduct) is intended to reduce employee misconduct (e.g., theft, shirking, 
misreporting). 
An interesting trend among practitioners is to use corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives 
as an employee governance tool (Flammer & Luo, 2017). That is, CSR initiatives are communicated to 
employees to motivate them to work harder (Balakrishnan, Sprinkle, & Williamson, 2011) or misreport 
less (Burbano & Chiles, 2018). Future research could investigate how employees use such information 
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when they know that the employer has diverging interests from the employees. Recent research has 
started to investigate whether CSR communication can backfire depending on the employer’s approach 
to CSR. For instance, Arshad and Berge (2020) use an experiment with online employees to investigate 
whether a win-win versus a philanthropic approach to CSR affects employee opportunism towards the 
employer.58 They find that the approach to CSR matters for how online employees perceive the employer 
but that these changes in perceptions do not result in an overall effect on actual employee opportunism. 
6. CONCLUSION 
In the aftermath of the recent data explosion in firms (Deloitte, 2018a; Mohr & Hürtgen, 2018), there is 
a need to develop new insights into the factors that can distort the decision-facilitation process in firms. 
To that end, this paper provides an overview of the existing experimental management accounting 
research on decision-facilitation and provides numerous suggestions for future research. In particular, 
we develop a conceptual framework that postulates key tasks, responsibilities, and sources of noise 
across three distinct phases of the decision-facilitation process. Using this framework, our paper 
provides a comprehensive and systematic review of the experimental management accounting research 
on decision-facilitation in organizations. While our review suggests that substantial research on 
decision-facilitation has already been done, we identify many unexplored and emerging topics that could 
spur future research in experimental management accounting research. 
We draw on trends in practice and recent insights from psychology and behavioral economics to 
suggest multiple avenues for future experimental research for each phase of the decision-facilitation 
process. Furthermore, we introduce two theories that introduce assumptions and predictions of behavior 
related to decision-facilitation. In settings with aligned interests, we introduce a belief-based theory of 
information acquisition based on psychologically grounded assumptions about how people think and 
feel about the presence and absence of information (Golman et al., 2017). In settings with misaligned 
interests, moral constraint theory posits that people might behave morally—not because they have a 
preference for morality—but because they treat morality as a constraint on their self-interested behavior 
(Rabin, 1995). 
                                                     






This paper is subject to some important limitations. First, identifying experimental research on the 
decision-facilitating role is challenging as there is no unique keyword that would correctly specify all 
relevant research contributions. Thus, I used a broad approach to identify all experimental research 
published in the relevant period in high-quality accounting journals and manually went through the 
abstracts to determine relevance. Despite having pre-specified the inclusion and exclusion criteria, 
human errors might have resulted in leaving out contributions that should have been included, and vice 
versa. 
Second, we found no commonly accepted definition of management accounting in the research 
literature (Bhimani et al., 2012; Bloomfield, 2015; Bromwich & Scapens, 2016; Krishnan, 2015; 
Salterio, 2015). Because we needed to define clear inclusion and exclusion criteria, we choose a 
pragmatic definition similar to Salterio (2015). That is, management accounting is about producing 
information for internal users or decision-makers in an organization. Consequently, research that 
primarily focuses on external users (e.g., investors or external auditors) is not included in our review. 
We acknowledge that this may be a too restrictive definition of management accounting (Krishnan, 
2015), and thus ignores research contributions that could have been relevant to the review. 
Third, the review does not include unpublished papers. This choice focuses the review on the research 
agenda that is set by the academic journals. However, there might be unpublished work that addresses 
the gaps identified in this review. In that case, this review could help motivate such research and increase 
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TABLE A  








TAR 190 23 2 
AOS 112 16 1 
CAR 111 13 1 
BRIA 89 9 1 
JMAR 83 5 0 
JAR 67 7 1 
AH 33 2 0 
EAR 29 1 0 
MAR 24 7 1 
JAE 18 1 0 
ABACUS 15 2 0 
AF 10 2 0 
BAR 9 2 0 
IJA 6 0 0 
AAAJ  1 1 














The lists below are ordered by phases of the decision-facilitating process and sorted by journals. 
List A: Aligned Interests – Phase A (Information Acquisition) 
Citation Journal Object of the study Key findings Theme 
(Dalla Via et 
al., 2019) 
AOS Examine how 
accountability type 
affects information search 
and decision quality and 
how accountability type 
interacts with BSC 
presentation format 
 Under outcome accountability, providing a causal 
chain is paramount to achieve high decision quality. 
 When process accountability is employed, providing 
a causal chain reduces information search effort and 
does not improve decision-making. 
 Causal chain representation focuses attention on 
decision-relevant cues, reducing the need for 





AOS How the location of 
explanations in a 
computerized decision-
aid affects learning from 
its use. 
 Results show that when explanations are integrated 
into its problem-solving steps, cognitive load is 




(Ackert et al., 
2018) 
AOS Has the nature of the 
information environment, 
impoverished versus 
enriched, an effect on 
traders’ ability to 
properly assess the 
expected benefits of 
acquiring private 
information? 
 In impoverished information environments, informed 
traders’ performance is inferior to that of uninformed 
traders. 
 Results show that when the environment is 
impoverished, informed traders misjudge their ability 
to exploit an informational advantage and overspend 






AOS Does task interruption 
compromise the 
processing of 
information, leading to 
reduced quality of 
professional judgments? 
 Task interruption exacerbates tax professionals’ 
motivated reasoning, which leads to overconfidence 
in the defensibility and support for an aggressive tax 
compliance position. 
 Absent goal commitment, task interruption also 









AOS How commitment to a 
cost system affects the 
incorporation of feedback 
about the usefulness of 
costing systems and 
people’s resistance to 
changing the cost system. 
 Commitment to a favored cost system induces 
motivated reasoning whereby people only assess a 
subset of their knowledge to support their desired 
conclusion. 






(C. X. Chen et 
al., 2015) 





incentives to influence 
the accuracy and 
optimism of forecasts 
 Preparing aggregated versus disaggregated forecasts 
leads to greater improvements in accuracy in the 
absence of a performance incentive. 
 When performance incentives are present, 
disaggregate reporting induces a forecast optimism 







BRIA Can inductive reasoning-
abilities substitute for 
professional experience? 
 Inexperienced participants with high inductive 
reasoning abilities perform on a similar level to 
experienced participants on an ill-structured case. 
 Experienced participants perform better given low-








makers’ ability to identify 
relevant information in 
the presence of 
situational factors that 
may negate attention to 
this information 
 Finds that opportunity-cost vagueness and 
completion-stage of projects affect tendencies to 
discount opportunity costs  
 Management accounting experience negates the effect 








BRIA Does the quantification of 
information result in 
increased information 
sharing and use in a 
group setting? 
 Quantitative information is used and shared more 
than qualitative information – both before group 
interaction and during group discussions. 
 Groups tend to prefer common to unique information, 









(Tang et al., 
2014) 
BRIA How do visualization and 
interactivity affect 
information processing? 
 Visualization and interactivity features increase 
overconfidence. 
 When both interface features are present, 








CAR How changes in 
competition affect the 
collection of cost data 
 Subjects collect the most cost data in monopoly, least 
in a duopoly, and an intermediate amount in the four-
firm market. 
 Monopolists who face their first competitors tend to 





CAR How effective third-party 
consultants are at pre-
venting managerial 
escalation of commitment 
 Consultants are only effective when explicitly 
assigned to that purpose. 
 Expending additional effort likely will not improve 




(Farrell et al., 
2007) 
CAR Are managers’ financial 
performance influenced 
by using profit rather than 
cost as non-linear 
predictors of 
performance? 
 The use of profit rather than cost as the performance 
measure reduced the accuracy of individuals’ 
judgement. 
 The underlying mechanism is that individuals use 
causal mental representations which are more direct 





(Hales, 2007) JAR Do investors’ preferences 
influence how 
information is processed 
and affect 
expectations of future 
earnings performance? 
 Directional preferences affect how information is 
processed. 
 Investors tend to agree with information that suggests 
they might make money on their investment but 









JAR How does overconfidence 
explain managers’ 
willingness to issue 
earnings forecasts? 
 
 Higher confidence in improved future performance is 
linked with the willingness to issue forecasts. 
 Stable psychological traits that are associated with 








JMAR How does performance 
depend on managers’ 
cost-knowledge when a 
volume-based cost 
system is used on 
products that are not 
homogenous? 
 Higher ABC knowledge is associated with greater 
ability to debias volume-based cost information, 







MAR Examine how 
commitment to a cost 
allocation system 
leads to biased 
information search in 
favor of the chosen cost 
system 
 Commitment leads to increased desirability and 
overconfidence in the preferred system, which leads 
to high resistance to changing it. 
 Making managers accountable for the negative 






(Magro, 2005) TAR Examine the relations 
between institutional 
knowledge, information 
search adaptivity, and 
performance 
 Relevant institutional knowledge enables people to 
adapt their information search to relevant changes in 
the decision context. 
 Performance increased with information search 
adaptivity, and adaptivity mediates the relation 









TAR Examine systematic 
human-measurement 
errors in TDABC time-
estimates 
 Increased aggregation in the definition of activities 
leads to lower measurement error. 
 Ex-ante notification reduces measurement error 
compared to ex-post, especially in settings with 
aggregated activities or incoherent tasks. 
 Strong overestimation bias time estimates are 
provided in minutes versus the percentage of time 





(Tayler, 2010) TAR Does framing the 
scorecard as a causal 
chain rather than a 
balanced set of measures 
mitigates the effects of 
motivated reasoning 
when involved in 
implementing the 
scorecard? 
 Managers who are involved in selecting strategic 
initiatives perceive those initiatives as having been 
more successful than managers who are not involved 
in the initiative-selection process. 
 Only when the scorecard is framed as a causal chain, 
in conjunction with involving managers in the 







et al., 2001) 
TAR How do different types of 
expertise influence 
appropriate problem 
 When given an inappropriate task format, participants 









representation and the 
acquisition of relevant 
information? 
 Management vs. public accounting experience helps 
to mitigate inappropriate problem representation. 
 More management experience is associated with 
better acquisition of relevant knowledge/information 






TAR Does responsibility for 
cost management hinder 
learning from market 
feedback in an auction 
setting? 
 Being responsible for choosing a cost management 
system decreases learning form market feedback. 
 Responsibility decreases decision performance 






List B: Aligned Interests – Phase A  B (Communication) 
Citation Journal Object of the study Key findings Theme 
(Beattie & 
Jones, 2002) 
ABACUS Investigate the impact of 
graph slope on rate how 
people process 
information in corporate 
reports 
 Suboptimal slope parameters produce distorted 





(So & Smith, 
2004) 
AF Examine the interactive 
influence of presentation 




 When information complexity is low, the 
presentation format has no impact on accuracy. 
 When information complexity is high, the 
tabular-alone format shows the highest accuracy. 
 The advantages of graphical and pictorial formats 





(Stoel et al., 
2017) 
AH Do receivers of risk 
reports care whether the 
format is quantitative or 
qualitative? 
 In the strategic risk setting, the choice of format 
is directly associated with the risk information’s 
perceived reliability and perceived relevance. 
 Receivers favor qualitative information for 
strategic risks. 
 Receivers accept quantitative operational risk 
measures but are skeptical about quantitative 







AOS Does presentation format 
affect cost-based 
decision-making, and is 
this conditional on the 
level of cost accounting 
knowledge? 
 Decision-makers with a low level of cost 
accounting knowledge attain higher profits when 
using a graphical format compared to a tabular 
format. 
 Graphs (versus tables) have an adverse effect on 






(Cheng et al., 
2018) 
AOS Investigate whether 
integrating strategic risk 
information in a BSC 
affects managers’ 
responses to different 
strategic risk profiles 
 When risks are integrated, managers make less 
favorable strategy evaluations and 
recommendations with high-performance driver 
risks. 
 No overall difference between a stand-alone 






m & Beck, 
2002) 
AOS Evaluates the presence of 
functional fixation when 
varying the level of 
feedback and what period 
(and order) the 
accounting change 
happened 
 The period of the accounting change and 
feedback do not significantly affect accounting 
fixation. 
 Feedback is differentially effective depending on 





received   
(Jackson et 
al., 2010) 
AOS Examine whether 
straight-line depreciation, 
relative to accelerated 
depreciation, influences 
selling prices that 
managers seek to obtain 
when they dispose of 
used capital assets 
 Managers sell used capital assets that have been 
depreciated using accelerated depreciation for 
lower prices than identical used capital assets that 
have been depreciated using straight-line 
depreciation. 
 This effect even endures in the presence of fair 
value information about the asset being sold. 
 The effect is robust with respect to context, 









AOS Study the effect of 
performance feedback 
timing on future 
performance 
 
 Feedback is given after no delay adversely affects 
future performance relative to when feedback is 
given after a short delay. 
 Finds support for an inverted-U relation between 















AOS Examine how reporting 




 Decision-makers tend to reduce capacity costs in 
times with low demand but fail to realize the 
opportunity costs in times with high demand 





(Foong et al., 
2003) 
BAR Examine whether 
disclosing confidence 
intervals (CI) affect 
performance in an 
investment choice task 
 CI information transforms a seemingly complex 
decision task into one that is less complex. 
 When a decision task is made more structured by 
disclosing CI information, it is perceived as 
intrinsically less rewarding, and performance 
deteriorates. 
 The drop in intrinsic motivation is offset by 







BAR Examine whether 
framing an initial 
investment produces a 
sunk cost or 
benefit project 
continuation decisions. 
 Sunk outcomes do not affect decisions when 
evaluating good investments but only when 
evaluating poor investments. 
 When evaluating poor investments, participants 
are less likely to authorize additional funds in the 






(Viator et al., 
2014) 
BRIA Investigate whether 
reflective cognitive 
capacity measures can 
differentiate which 
participants are more or 
less likely to benefit from 
feedback intervention. 
 Reflective cognitive capacity scores reasonably 
partitioned participants into two groups: those 
that were more likely, versus those that were less 








BRIA Examine whether the 
common measures bias 
exists among 
participants with 
experience and training 
in designing balanced 
scorecards 
 Decision-makers who are knowledgeable about 
the BSC attended to both common and unique 









CAR Does avoiding accounting 
fixation depend on 
certain individual 
characteristics 
and intrinsic motivation 
to appropriately engage 
in the decision task? 
 Participants who did adapt to the change in 
accounting method and thus avoided accounting 
fixation did so by debiasing costs reported by 
volume-based costing but not by ABC. 
 Adapters exhibited high values of i) accounting 
knowledge, ii) general problem-solving abilities, 







(Kelly, 2010) CAR Investigate how the 
accuracy of relative 
weights on multiple 
leading performance 
measures affect how 
managers evaluate 
information 
 Inaccurate relative weights are better than either 
no weights or accurate relative weights when 
weights are not rewarded. 
 Finds that inconsistent information stimulates 
more detailed information processing than neutral 
or consistent information. 






CAR Investigate how fixed 
cost magnitude and 
fixed cost reporting 
format affect 
competitive pricing 
behavior in a capacity-
constrained, duopolistic 
setting 
 Fixed cost reporting format increasingly 
influences competitive prices. 
 After repeated exposure to accounting feedback, 
participants receiving capacity costing feedback 
reports established lower selling prices relative to 
the prices established by participants receiving 





(Kelly, 2007) CAR Investigate whether 
providing feedback on 
non-financial measures 
leads to better managerial 
decisions 
 Managers perform better only when non-financial 
measures are rewarded in firms with heavier 
investments in intangible assets. 
 When non-financial measures are not rewarded, 
feedback on non-financial measures does not 








EAR Examine whether fixation 
on financial measures is 
mitigated when managers 
are provided with an 
explicit strategy 
implementation timeline 
in strategy maps 
 The implementation timeline is effective in 
helping evaluators overcome fixation on lagged 
financial performance measures. 
 The implementation timeline aid evaluators in 
decomposing large, complex, and 
multidimensional judgments into simpler 
components. 









(Choi et al., 
2013) 
JAR Investigate how 
involvement in strategy 
selection affects 
managers’ propensity to 
exhibit surrogation 
 Strategy selection reduces surrogation while 
engaging in strategy deliberation does not reduce 
surrogation. 
 Managers’ involvement in the actual choice of 
strategy appears to be both a necessary and 
sufficient condition to mitigate surrogation. 




(W. Chen et 
al., 2013) 
JAR Examine how fair value 
accounting information 
affect managers’ real 
economic decisions 
 Providing fair-value impact-information leads to 
suboptimal decisions compared to providing 
economic impact information, or when both the 
economic and historical accounting impact 
information is presented. 
 Sequential (separate) presentation of information 
mitigates managers’ concerns over financial 
statement volatility. 





et al., 2017) 
JAR Studies the aspects of 
feedback information 
provided to professionals 
working for an insurance 
repair company 
 Frequent feedback, regardless of how detailed it 
is, does not lead to better performance compared 
to those who receive infrequent feedback with 
aggregated information. 
 Infrequent and detailed feedback produces the 










JMAR Investigate the role of 
strategy information and 
strategically linked 
performance measures in 
eliminating the common 
measures bias 
 The common measures bias is eliminated only 
when all performance measures are linked to 
divisional strategy, and strategy information is 
provided. 






JMAR Does providing a timeline 
for strategy 
implementation reduce 
the reliance on non-
strategic performance 
metrics in BSC 
performance judgments? 
 The absence of timeline guidance in strategy 
implementation resulted in evaluators ignoring 
the subordinate’s inability to influence lagging 
measures outside of the relevant time period for 
evaluation. 
 The provision of timeline information is 
associated with reduced financial fixation in a 
BSC context. 







JMAR Study which scorecard 
approach is more 
successful at 
communicating 
strategy and generating 
consensus on strategy 
among managers in a 
field setting 
 A hierarchal structure of linked measures is better 
at communicating strategy effectively to 
managers. 
 The dispersion in managers’ interpretation of the 
strategy generated by lacking a linked structure is 
greater than the tension created by confronting 
managers’ views with the disclosed link structure. 







TAR Does expensing versus 
capitalizing intangibles 
expenditures result in 
fixation even when 
individuals have 
opportunities to learn? 
 Prediction accuracy, consistency, consensus, and 
self-insight are lower when intangibles are 
expensed.  
 Learning does not mitigate fixation on accounting 









TAR How the classification of 
costs into cost pools 
affects the accuracy of 
understanding of relations 
among costs 
 Location of relations within and across cost pools 
affects individuals who make predictions based 
on relations among the costs.  
 Attention is directed toward within-pool relations 






(Loftus, S. & 
Tanlu, 2018) 
TAR Examines how the use of 
causal language in 
conveying relative 
performance feedback 
impacts subsequent task 
performance. 
 The use of causal language affects how feedback 
is perceived depending on whether the initial 
performance was high or low. 
 If initial performance is low, the use of causal 
language leads to a greater improvement in 
subsequent performance. 
 If initial performance is high, the use of causal 
language results in less performance 





(Choi et al., 
2012) 
TAR Whether and how 
strategically linked 
performance measures for 
compensation purposes 
affect managers’ 
propensity to exhibit 
surrogation 
 Participants compensated on a single measure of 
a strategic construct are more likely to exhibit 
strategy surrogation than participants who 
received a fixed wage. 
 Participants compensated on multiple measures 
of a strategic construct are less likely to exhibit 
surrogation than participants compensated on a 
single measure of a strategic construct. 











TAR Examine whether 
narrative reporting vs. 
note-taking affects 
operational distortion and 
surrogation. 
 Narrative reporting reduces surrogation and 
prompts a more holistic view of the decision 
situation. 
 Narration reporting requirement makes 
participants focus on the unmeasured aspects of 









TAR Examine the effects of 
scorecard causal linkages 
and categorization have 
on managers’ judgments 
of information relevance 
 A strategy map structure (as opposed to a 
randomly ordered list without a strategy map 
structure) enhances managers’ ability to interpret 
the strategic relevance of external information 
and assess the implications of this external 
information on the appropriateness of their 
strategy. 






TAR Examine the impact that 
explicit and detailed 
strategy information has 
on the use of strategically 
linked performance 
measures in conjunction 
with common and unique 
measures 
 Managers who have detailed strategy information 
will rely more on strategically linked 
performance measures and less on non-linked 
measures than those with less knowledge of 
business unit strategy. 
 When managers have detailed strategy 
information, they will rely more on strategically 
linked measures, even if they are unique than on 
non-linked measures that are common. 






TAR Examine whether 
straight-line depreciation, 
relative to accelerated 
depreciation, causes non-
executive managers to 
make suboptimal capital 
investment decisions 
 Straight-line depreciation affects managers’ asset 
replacement decisions. 
 Managers perceive that an asset depreciated using 
straight-line depreciation has provided less 
retrospective utility than an asset depreciated 












TAR Examine how including 
measures common to 
multiple units and other 
measures that are unique 
to a particular unit affect 
superiors’ evaluations of 
that unit's performance 
 Evaluations are based only on BSC measures that 
are common across different business units. 
 Measures that are unique to individual business 






et al., 2016) 
TAR Does presenting causal 
linkages between 
strategic objectives and 
time delay information 
in a strategy map 
enhance managers’ 
decision performance? 
 Presenting strategic objectives with causal 
linkages - with or without time delays – improve 
performance compared to no causal linkages. 
 Time delays do not affect overall performance, 
but managers provided with the delay 
information demonstrate greater learning over 
time. 






TAR Examine whether the 
capitalization of R&D 
expenditures can lead to 
overinvestment in 
continuing projects 
 Capitalized expenditures lead to more further 
investments in suboptimal projects when 
managers are responsible for initiating the 
project. 
 Reputation concerns drive overinvestment, and 







et al., 2015) 
TAR Investigate how the 




 Managers responsible for recording asset 
impairments invest more in the impaired division 
when accounting effects are reversible compared 
to irreversible. 
 Managers not responsible - or given the 
opportunity to deny responsibility - do not differ 








List C: Aligned Interests – Phase B (Usage of Information) 




ABACUS Examine the impact of 
customer profitability 
reports on resource 
allocation decisions in 
marketing environments 
varying in complexity 
 Reports only improve decisions in highly complex 
marketing settings. 
 In simple marketing settings, decisions makers 
provided with volume-based cost information 
perform as well as those with a more accurate 












ABACUS Explore the value of 
having more accurate 
costing information in a 
competitive market 
 The value of more accurate information comes from 






Abbeele et al., 
2009) 
 
AOS Study whether 
bargaining power 
prevents buyers from 
sharing private cost 
information and whether 
this results in less 
effective negotiation 
outcomes between 
buyers and suppliers 
 Less powerful buyers can compensate for their power 
disadvantage by acquiring more detailed total cost of 
ownership (TCO) information. 
 Powerful buyers seem unable to use TCO information 
to exploit their power advantage. 
 Less powerful buyers use TCO information in 
problem-solving techniques more frequently than 
powerful buyers, who tend to rely on distributive 







CAR Investigate whether 
decision aids can reduce 
choice avoidance 
 Choice avoidance among experienced managers 
increases with choice difficulty. 
 Using a decision aid mitigates choice avoidance. 
Value of 
information 
(Luft et al., 
2016) 






 Profit plus additional (e.g., nonfinancial or external) 
information leads to more coordination failures in 
management decisions, and subordinates are more 










JAR Examine in an 
information-sharing 
system that records if 
employees’ creative 
work affects the quality 
of creative work, job 
engagement, and 
financial performance 
 Field results show no significant effect on any of the 
outcomes. 
 Stores that accessed the information system more 
frequently in stores improved the quality of creative 
work. 
 Creative work and job engagement were improved in 





JAR Examines how private 
cost reports of differing 
accuracy (quality) affect 
outcomes in markets 
with different overhead 
costs 
 When only leaders are given high-quality cost 
reports, private cost information of higher quality is 
better incorporated into market prices because 
followers infer information from leaders’ prices. 
 If followers are given high-quality cost reports, cost 
information is concealed, and followers can take 







JMAR Examine whether 
informative markets 
make cost-system 
choice redundant for 
price-setting 
 In informative markets where biased cost allocations 
produce accounting losses that hinder learning from 
superior competitors, providing ABC improves price-
setting decisions compared to volume-based costing. 
 In less informative markets, ABC still outperforms 
traditional costing, presumably because it helps filter 






(Haka et al., 
2000) 
JMAR Investigate the role of 
accounting systems in 
bilateral bargaining 
setting 
 Accounting information reduces uncertainty about 
payoffs in bargaining situations, which leads to more 
efficient bargaining and reduces premium paid to the 












 Financial performance was improved among branches 





(Essa et al., 
2018) 





 When both negotiators face payoff uncertainty, this 
evokes a reduction of cooperative behavior, resulting 
in a lower joint profit. 
 The presence of TCO information mitigates the 







MAR Studies the role of 
information asymmetry 
in hold-up problems 
 Aggregating the seller’s cost information encourages 






et al., 2012) 
TAR Examine the effect of 
more precise cost 
information on contract 
renegotiations between 
supply-chain 
 Precise cost information improves the joint profit 
independent of supply chain inefficiency. 
 Only when buyers cause the inefficiency does more 
precise information positively impact sellers’ 
perceptions of the fairness of the buyers’ argument 











TAR Examine whether fine 
information systems can 
exacerbate hold-up 
problems 
 Negotiating pairs achieve significantly higher trade 
efficiencies when sharing detailed compared to coarse 
cost information. 
 Fewer negotiating pairs share fine compared to coarse 





List D: Misaligned Interests – Phase A (Information Acquisition) 
Citation Journal Object of the study Key findings Theme 
(Church et al., 
2014) 
CAR Examine whether 




 Discretion does not affect the overall level of 
opportunistic reporting. 
 Only participants who are moderately concerned 
about honesty are affected by having the opportunity 







List E: Misaligned Interests – Phase A  B (Communication) 




AOS Investigate the effect of 
role legitimacy on 
subordinate 
misreporting choices 
 Misreporting is lower when subordinates perceive 
superiors to be legitimate versus illegitimate in their 
roles. 
 Role legitimacy decreases misreporting relative to 
random (neutral) perceptions. 
 Role illegitimacy does not affect misreporting 






(Church et al., 
2019) 
AOS Investigate how 
managerial misreporting 
is influenced by the 
measurement basis used 
in reports and whether 
slack benefits come 
directly or through an 
intermediate activity 
 A non-financial measurement basis increases the 
level of honesty relative to a financial measurement 
basis only when slack benefits are direct. 
 When slack benefits are indirect, the measurement 











 Misreporting is less pronounced if the choice 
determines whether the firm earns a gain or loss. 
 Earnings situation only matters for misreporting in 













Explore how individual 
attitudes and process of 
rationalization affect 
misreporting 
 Participants whose attitude favors misreporting and 
individuals who are higher in Machiavellianism are 
both more likely to misreport. 
 Misreporting evokes negative emotions, but high-
Machiavellian participants feel less guilt than others 
who misreport. 
 Thinking of rationalizations before the reporting 
decision significantly reduces misreporting, but 
those who still misreport rationalize their decisions 





(Brown et al., 
2014) 
AOS Study how budget 
reporting decisions are 
affected by subordinate 
rankings that do not 
affect remuneration 
 Rankings based on firm profit significantly increase 
honesty. 
 Rankings based on participants’ own compensation 
significantly decrease honesty. 
 Participants who received both rankings focused 







(S. E. Kaplan 
et al., 2015) 
BRIA Examine whether 
characteristics of the 
firm, the report 
recipient, and the type 
of wrongdoing influence 
internal whistleblowing 
 Managerial likeability and the type of fraud 
influence participants’ reporting intentions. 
 Managerial procedural safeguards nor the 







(S. E. Kaplan 
et al., 2010) 
BRIA Examine whether 
unsuccessful social 
confrontation with one’s 
supervisor regarding 
fraud influences 
reporting intentions to 
the supervisor’s 
 With unsuccessful social confrontation, reporting 
intentions to the supervisor’s supervisor are stronger 
than to an internal auditor. 
 Without confrontation, reporting intentions to the 












supervisor and an 
internal auditor 
 Employees experiencing unsuccessful social 
confrontation may be more likely to seek out 
powerful internal report recipients. 
(Nikias et al., 
2010) 
BRIA Investigate the 
behavioral effects of 
aggregation and timing 
on misreporting 
 Misreporting decreases with disaggregated 
budgeting than for aggregated budgeting. 
 Misreporting is lower for step-wise budgeting 
(sequential) than for aggregated budgeting (all costs 






(Hobson et al., 
2011) 
BRIA Investigate the role of 
moral concerns 
regarding misreporting 
to create budgetary 
slack 
 Under a slack-inducing pay scheme, significant 
budgetary slack is considered to be unethical, 
whereas participants who set budgets under a truth-
inducing pay scheme did not. 
 Those high in traditional values and empathy on a 
pre-experiment personality questionnaire are more 






(Guo et al., 
2017) 
CAR Examine how vertical 
pay dispersion affects 
misreporting 
 High vertical pay dispersion leads to higher levels of 






(Kida et al., 
2001) 
CAR Examine whether 




 Affective reactions impact managers’ capital 
budgeting decisions. 
 Managers tend to reject alternatives that elicited 
negative emotional responses, even though these 








JMAR Investigate whether 
changes in salary that 
affect the horizontal 
equity of salary affect 
misreporting 
 Honesty increases when horizontal equity comes 
from a pay increase for the subordinate. 
 Honesty decreases when horizontal equity comes 








JMAR Examine the role of 
reciprocity, self-
awareness, and social 
value orientation on 
managerial misreporting 
 Pro-socials report more honestly when they are 
required to sign the budget report or when they are 
endogenously hired. 
 Pro-selfs report more honestly only when they are 
endogenously hired, and they are required to sign 








JMAR What is the effect of 
aggregated budget 
proposals on slack when 
superiors cannot commit 
to an acceptance policy? 
 The aggregation of budget proposals increases the 






(Blay et al., 
2018) 
MAR Examine whether 
preferences for honesty 
originate from an 
individual’s desire to 
avoid negative affect 
from violating social 
norms 
 Misreporting is associated with the intensity with 
which they experience negative affective reactions. 









MAR Investigate whether peer 
environments, without 
knowledge of peer 
actions, can subtly 
affect misreporting 
 Managers facing a similar decision environment to a 
peer manager misreport more than managers facing 
a different decision environment. 
 Managers predict peers to report as they would, 







et al., 2020) 
MAR Does affective reaction 




 Superiors are more likely to select the economically 
non-preferred project when proposed by a manager 
triggering a positive affective reaction. 
 The tendency is mitigated when supervisors are held 
accountable for the decision. 
 Accountability did not mitigate the tendency to not 
invest in an economically preferred project from a 






(Zhang, 2008) TAR Examine whether 
whistleblowing and 
collusion depend on 
perceptions of the 
superior’s fairness and 
communication with 
peers 
 If there is a high reward for whistleblowing, 
perceived superior fairness positively affects 
subordinate reporting honesty and negatively affects 
explicit collusion attempts. 
 Communication between agents increased 
misreporting when they received a low wage, but 













TAR Study whether and how 
mandating range 




 Managers’ report less aggressively when ranges are 
disclosed. 
 Range disclosures have the greatest effect on 
managers with stronger levels of psychopathy, 
narcissism, or Machiavellianism (‘‘the Dark Triad’’ 







(Evans et al., 
2001) 
TAR Investigate preferences 
for honesty and whether 
the level of honesty 
depends on the size of 
monetary incentives 
 The level of honesty is higher than predicted by 
traditional agency models. 
 The level of honesty is insensitive to incentive size. 
 A modified version of the optimal agency contract, 
which makes use of preferences for honesty, yields 






(Rankin et al., 
2008) 
TAR Examine whether 
requiring a factual 
assertion affect 
misreporting and the 
effect of superior 
rejection authority 
 Requiring a factual assertion significantly reduced 
misreporting only when superiors do not have the 
authority to reject budgets. 









TAR Study the robustness of 
the findings of Rankin 
et al. (2008)  
 Honesty concerns (factual assertion vs. no factual 
assertion) matter despite giving the superior 
rejection authority. 
 Honesty affects misreporting when withholding the 
relative pay of the superior from the subordinate. 
 Honesty continues to affect misreporting, despite 








List E: Misaligned Interests – Phase B (Usage of Information) 
Citation Journal Object of the study Key findings Theme 
(Brüggen & 
Luft, 2016)* 
TAR Examine how changing 
versus continuing 
superiors affect project 
continuation decisions 
and cost overruns 
 Changing superiors reduces escalation tendencies as 
new superiors react skeptically to continuation 
proposals when first-period cost overruns have 
occurred. 
 Changing superiors leads to greater initial 
understatements as subordinates anticipate that new 
superiors will be more critical of their projects. 
 New superiors are less sensitive to additional 
reported second-period profit, prompting 








(Rankin et al., 
2008)** 
TAR Study how superiors 




 Superiors reject about 1/3 of funding proposals 
because of suspicion of misreporting – even though 







* This paper is primarily concerned with the subordinates’ reporting decisions. We include it here because it touches upon how superiors react 
to subordinates’ information with potentially misaligned interests. 
** Though this paper is in List D, the findings presented here are concerned with superior rejection decisions. 
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